Opinion
No. 5-945 / 05-0062
Filed January 19, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Peter B. Newell, Judge.
Ronnie Earl Harrington, Jr. appeals following his conviction of indecent exposure, third offense. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis D. Hendrickson, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant Attorney General, Paul L. Martin, County Attorney, and Carlyle D. Dalen, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Ronnie Earl Harrington, Jr. appeals following his conviction of indecent exposure, third offense, in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.9, 901A.1(1)(a), and 901A.2(2) (2003). He contends the district court erred in allowing lay opinion testimony. We review this claim for an abuse of discretion. State v. Price, 692 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2005).
On June 2, 2004, Rachel McGuire and two colleagues were eating lunch together at Northern Iowa Area Community College when McGuire noticed a man seated at another table looking at her. The man, later identified as Harrington, had a hole in his pants and his penis was exposed. McGuire observed him stroking the shaft of his erect penis.
Approximately thirty to forty-five minutes later, Harrington entered a staff break room on campus where Mary Bloomingdale was retrieving her lunch. Harrington entered and sat in a chair. Bloomingdale heard Harrington making groaning noises, which she described at trial as "sexual type noises."
In his motion in limine, Harrington sought to exclude Bloomingdale's testimony because the testimony regarding the groaning noises was "highly speculative, irrelevant, and any probative value it contains will be far overshadowed by its prejudicial impact." The district court denied this portion of the motion in limine.
On appeal, Harrington argues Bloomingdale's testimony should not have been allowed because it invaded the province of the jury. In order to convict Harrington, the State was required to prove the arousal or satisfaction of sexual desires of Harrington or another party. Harrington claims Bloomingdale's testimony was inadmissible because it told the jury how to decide the case, or what result to reach on that issue. This was not the objection made at trial. Accordingly, error has not been preserved. State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 1997).
Assuming arguendo that error was preserved, we conclude the testimony was properly admitted. Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.704 states that opinion testimony otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Bloomingdale's testimony did not tell the jury how to decide the case. Her testimony did not relate to the event for which he was on trial, but rather a separate event a few minutes later. Her testimony was helpful to the jury in determining whether Harrington intended to arouse or satisfy his own desires while exposing himself to McGuire, or whether, as Harrington and his fiancé testified, he was simply sitting in a relaxed manner while wearing pants in need of mending.