Opinion
No. 2012AP1192.
2014-09-9
STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Jacquese Franklin HARRELL, Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: Jeffrey A. Wagner, Judge. Affirmed.
Before CURLEY, P.J., KESSLER and BRENNAN, JJ. ¶ 1 PER CURIAM.
Jacquese Franklin Harrell, pro se, appeals an order of the circuit court denying his Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2011–12) motion without a hearing. Harrell complains that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to or directly challenging the State's ballistics expert's testimony. We agree with the circuit court's conclusion that the motion is insufficiently pled, so we affirm.
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011–12 version unless otherwise noted.
¶ 8 Harrell may have meant that Holzman was ineffective as postconviction counsel for failing to preserve this particular claim against trial counsel and that the failure to preserve the issue is sufficient reason why trial counsel's performance regarding Anderson was not challenged in the first appeal. However, to successfully show that postconviction counsel's ineffectiveness constitutes a “sufficient reason,” Harrell must establish that trial counsel actually was ineffective. See State v. Ziebart, 2003 WI App 258, ¶ 15, 268 Wis.2d 468, 673 N.W.2d 369.
¶ 9 To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Harrell must show that trial counsel performed deficiently and that the deficiency prejudiced his defense. See State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶ 33, 301 Wis.2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115. To prove deficient performance, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's conduct falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To prove prejudice, the “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. A defendant must successfully show both deficiency and prejudice, so if one prong is unfulfilled, we need not address the other. State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶ 72, 281 Wis.2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811.
¶ 10 A postconviction Machner hearing is a prerequisite to appellate review of ineffective-assistance claims. State v. Curtis, 218 Wis.2d 550, 554, 582 N.W.2d 409 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Machner, 92 Wis.2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct.App.1979). However, a trial court may deny a postconviction motion without a hearing if the defendant fails to allege sufficient facts entitling him or her to relief or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates the defendant is not entitled to relief. State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶¶ 13–14, 274 Wis.2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433; State v. Bentley, 201 Wis.2d 303, 310, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).
¶ 11 Relying on three cases, Harrell believes that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging Anderson's designation as an expert. However, the two federal cases on which Harrell relies are not applicable: both rely on the standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), for expert testimony. See United States v. Monteiro, 407 F.Supp.2d 351, 356 (D.Mass.2006); United States v. Green, 405 F.Supp.2d 104, 106 (D.Mass.2005). Wisconsin did not adopt the Daubert standard until 2011, and that new standard first applied to actions commenced on or after February 1, 2011. See 2011 Wis. Act 2, §§ 34m, 45(5). Harrell's case commenced October 25, 2007, and, therefore, was not subject to the Daubert standard for expert testimony.
¶ 12 Instead, the appropriate standard for the admissibility of expert testimony at the time of Harrell's trial was simply one of relevance. See State v. Jones, 2010 WI App 133, ¶ 22, 329 Wis.2d 498, 791 N.W.2d 390. More specifically, expert testimony was admissible if: (1) the evidence was relevant; (2) the witness was qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, expertise, training, or education; and (3) the evidence would assist the trier of fact in determining a fact in issue. See State v. Alger, 2013 WI App 148, ¶ 22, 352 Wis.2d 145, 841 N.W.2d 329.
¶ 13 Harrell makes multiple complaints about Anderson's testimony. He complains, for example, that Anderson did not adequately testify about his identification process or follow “base level standards” typical for his field. Harrell also contends that Anderson lacked sufficient education and training to call himself an expert. However, under the applicable relevancy standard, Harrell's complaints go only to the weight of Anderson's testimony and not its admissibility.
Specifically, Harrell complained that Anderson “has not attained a college degree in science,” is not a member of any professional organization, and had not taken any proficiency tests at the time he performed the ballistics tests in issue. Aside from the fact that Harrell has not established that any of Anderson's “deficiencies” are actual requirements, Anderson testified that he had trained for three years in an apprenticeship-type program with a forensic tool mark examiner who had thirty years' experience.
¶ 14 Further, though Harrell thinks that Anderson's testimony should be excluded because Harrell believes current literature indicates there is no such thing as a “perfect match” between bullets and a particular gun, we note that the third case on which Harrell relies, Jones, addressed exactly that question. Jones sought “a blanket rule barring as a matter of course all testimony purporting to tie cartridge cases and bullets to a particular gun ... [citing] a number of articles and trial-level decisions questioning the efficacy of such evidence.” See id., 329 Wis.2d 498, ¶ 20, 791 N.W.2d 390. We refused to impose such a rule in light of our then-status as a non- Daubert state. See Jones, 329 Wis.2d, ¶¶ 21–23, 787 N.W.2d 800. Accordingly, the circuit court could properly conclude it would not have granted any attempt by trial counsel to exclude Anderson's testimony, because there was no basis on which the court should have done so.
¶ 15 The circuit court additionally concluded Harrell had not sufficiently alleged prejudice. In particular, Harrell made no allegation that he had spoken to some other expert who might have refuted Anderson's conclusions. The circuit court was also unpersuaded that a more vigorous cross-examination of Anderson by trial counsel would have had a material impact on the case in light of other witness testimony. Specifically, witness John David testified he was driving a vehicle in which Harrell was the passenger. David heard one or two shots inside his car and looked over to see Harrell with a gun. Two other individuals, Santana Walker and Antwain Childs, both testified that Harrell admitted the shooting. See Harrell, 329 Wis.2d 480, ¶ 2, 791 N.W.2d 677. Thus, Harrell has not established a reasonable probability that the results of the proceedings would have been different had trial counsel challenged Anderson's testimony.
¶ 16 We therefore agree with the circuit court that Harrell has not sufficiently alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to challenge Anderson's testimony, nor ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failing to raise the claim against trial counsel. Accordingly, the circuit court properly denied Harrell's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion without a hearing.
Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. RuleE 809.23(1)(b)5.