Opinion
ID# 9905003691, 9904022426.
Submitted: February 7, 2001.
Decided: February 21, 2001.
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF. SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
This 20th day of February, 2001, upon review of the Motion for Postconviction Relief filed by Defendant and the record in this case, it appears that:
(1) On February 15, 2000, Defendant, Jamal Harper, pleaded guilty to Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony (PDWDCF), Robbery First Degree, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (PFDCF), Assault First Degree, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited (PDWBPP).
(2) On April 14, 2000, the Court sentenced Defendant as follows: for PDWDCF, two years Level 5 incarceration; for Assault First Degree, five years Level 5 incarceration, suspended after three years for two years Level 2 probation; for each count of PFDCF, five years Level 5 incarceration, suspended after three years for two years Level 2 probation; for Robbery First Degree, four years Level 5 incarceration, suspended after two years for two years Level 3 probation; for PDWBPP, two years Level 5 incarceration, suspended for two years Level 2 probation.
(3) Defendant now moves this Court for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. Defendant lists five grounds for relief in support of his motion. Defendant raises three separate allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, "hearsay evidence," and excessive sentencing. This is Defendant's first Motion for Postconviction Relief and the Court finds that none of the procedural bars listed in Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) is applicable. Therefore, the Court may consider the merits of Defendant's motion.
(4) Defendant's first three grounds for relief allege ineffective assistance of counsel. A criminal defendant who raises an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that an attorney's conduct did not meet reasonable professional standards so that such conduct was prejudicial to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A defendant must be able to show that, "[t]here is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Id. at 669.
(5) First, Defendant alleges that his plea agreement specified that he would be sentenced immediately but that the Court ordered a presentence investigation. Defendant alleges that his rights were violated as a result. Defendant fails to specify how he believes that his rights were violated or in what way he was prejudiced by a presentence investigation. Nor does Defendant specify how he believes his counsel's representation fell below reasonable standards because the Court ordered a presentence investigation. In addition, the Court notes that Defendant's plea was entered into pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e)(1)(C). As a result, had the Court decided to impose a longer sentence than that specified in the plea agreement in light of the presentence investigation, Defendant would have been entitled to withdraw the plea. However, the Court did not impose a sentence in excess of that recommended by the State in the plea agreement. The Court finds that Defendant's first ground for relief is entirely without merit.
(6) Next, Defendant claims that his defense counsel did not represent him as he should have. Specifically, Defendant states that defense counsel did not, "keep [Defendant] updated on case and withheld information. Counsel did not answers [sic] about case, and about request of evidence on case." Again, Defendant fails to provide any specific allegations of counsel's failure to update him on his case or to state what information he believes his attorney withheld from him.
(7) In addition, Defendant pleaded guilty to the charges against him. Therefore, even if the Court were to somehow accept Defendant's allegations regarding his attorney's conduct as true, Defendant cannot show that the result of the proceedings would have been different. The Court also notes that Defendant indicated on the signed guilty plea form that he was satisfied with his lawyer's representation and that his lawyer had fully advised him of his rights and of his guilty plea.
(8) Defendant's third allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel states only that he did not enter into his guilty plea "intelligently" because he "took the plea off my counsel [sic] advice." Again, as set forth above, Defendant indicated on the signed guilty plea form that he was satisfied with his lawyer's representation and that his lawyer had fully advised him of his rights and of his guilty plea. Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound by his signed statement on the guilty plea form. Fullman v. State, Del.Supr., No. 268, 1988, Christie, C.J. (Feb. 22, 1989) (ORDER). Defendant has presented no such evidence. In addition, the Court questioned Defendant during the plea colloquy and Defendant indicated again that he was entering into the plea freely and voluntarily and that he had sufficient time to go over the plea agreement with his attorney. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant's third ground for relief also is clearly without merit.
(9) In support of his fourth ground for relief, "hearsay evidence," Defendant states, "The victim had stated it's [sic] assailant was 5'3" 150 lbs. and about 20 years old. At the time Defendant was only 17 years of age. This I.D. could be one in a thousand with a description of this nature the police found." The Court reiterates that Defendant pleaded guilty to the charges against him. As a result, Defendant gave up the right to present evidence in his defense and to hear and question witnesses against him. State v. Smith, Del.Super., Cr. A. No. P89-11-1474, Del Pesco, J. (Feb. 7, 1991) (citing Sheppard v. State, Del.Supr., 367 A.2d 992, 994 (1976)). Further, on the guilty plea form, Defendant answered "Yes" to the following question:
Do you understand that because you are pleading guilty you will not have a trial and you therefore waive (give up) your constitutional right:
(1) to be presumed innocent until the State can prove each and every part of the charge(s) against you beyond a reasonable doubt;
(2) to a speedy and public trial;
(3) to trial by jury;
(4) to hear and question the witnesses against you;
(5) to present evidence in your defense;
(6) to testify or not testify yourself; and,
(7) to appeal to a higher court?
(Emphasis in original.) Again, Defendant has presented no evidence that he should not be bound by his signed statement on his guilty plea form. Also, Defendant indicated during the plea colloquy that he understood the rights he waived by pleading guilty. Therefore, the Court finds Defendant's fourth ground for relief to be without merit.
(10) Finally, Defendant argues that the sentences he received were excessive and outside sentencing guidelines. However, the sentences imposed upon Defendant, as outlined above, fall both within the statutory penalty range and the Truth in Sentencing guidelines for each of the offenses. Therefore, Defendant's fifth ground for relief also is without merit.
As a result, the Court finds that it plainly appears from Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record of prior proceedings in this case that Defendant is not entitled to relief The motion is, therefore, SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.