Appellant next asserts that I.C. ยง 18-6607, under which he was convicted, is unconstitutional, in that the terms "lewd" and "lascivious" are too vague to give one notice of what conduct is thereby proscribed. In our recent decision in State v. Harmon, 106 Idaho 73, 685 P.2d 814 (1984), we stated: "Viewed against this standard, we conclude once again that the phrase `lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or any part or any member thereof of a minor child under the age of sixteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires . . .' is not facially vague and is sufficiently definite to give fair warning to the people of Idaho as to what acts are prescribed, without including an exhaustive list of detailed deviant bodily contexts and/or exhibitions which one might imagine."
It is true that the original lewd-conduct statute withstood facial void-for-vagueness challenges before the Legislature added a list of specific prohibited acts to the statute in 1984. State v. Harmon, 107 Idaho 73, 78, 685 P.2d 814, 819 (1984) (upholding a conviction for attempted rape); State v. Shannon, 95 Idaho 299, 302, 507 P.2d 808, 811 (1973) (rape); State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 57, 245 P.2d 788, 791-92 (1952); see also Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding a conviction where the defendant masturbated a child). Cases interpreting the former statute upheld convictions for certain egregious activities such as child rape or fondling a child's genitals.
It is true that the original lewd-conduct statute withstood facial void-for-vagueness challenges before the Legislature added a list of specific prohibited acts to the statute in 1984. State v. Harmon, 107 Idaho 73, 78, 685 P.2d 814, 819 (1984) (upholding a conviction for attempted rape); State v. Shannon, 95 Idaho 299, 302, 507 P.2d 808, 811 (1973) (rape); State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 57, 245 P.2d 788, 791โ92 (1952); see also Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1348โ49 (9th Cir.1984) (upholding a conviction where the defendant masturbated a child). Cases interpreting the former statute upheld convictions for certain egregious activities such as child rape or fondling a child's genitals.
Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 539, 148 P.2d 221, 223 (1944). This Court is not bound by federal courts' interpretations of Idaho law, see State v. Harmon, 107 Idaho 73, 76, 685 P.2d 814, 817 (1984), such interpretations have no precedential authority with this Court. Furthermore, we disagree with the Adams court's analysis.
It pointed out that "the forbidden acts and conduct are further limited and defined by the specific intent required by the statute. . . . So the certainty required by due process is present." Id. at 57, 245 P.2d at 792; accord State v. Harmon, 107 Idaho 73, 76-77, 685 P.2d 814, 817-18 (1984). Finally, this Court has held that the terms "lewd," "lascivious," and "infamous crime against nature," without further definition, are not unconstitutionally vague.
As was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mandel v. Bradley, "a summary affirmance is an affirmance of the judgment only." Blackmon v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 642 S.W.2d 499, 500 [1982]; State v. McKay, 680 S.W.2d 447, 450 [Ten. 1984]; Holland v. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 168 Ga. App. 761, 310 S.E.2d 297, 298 [1983]; State v. Harmon, 107 Idaho 73, 685 P.2d 814, 817 [1984]; Nandorf, Inc. v. CNA Ins. Companies, 134 Ill. App.3d 134, 88 Ill.Dec. 968, 479 N.E.2d 988, 993 [1985]. This court acknowledged in Dority v. Green Country Castings Corp., Okla., 727 P.2d 1355, 1359 n. 24 [1986], that an inferior federal court's pronouncement on a federal-law question is "highly persuasive" even though not binding on a state court of last resort.
State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 57, 245 P.2d 788, 791-92 (1952). After Evans, the Court concluded that the statute was sufficiently certain to convey to a person of ordinary understanding an adequate description of the evil intended to be proscribed, State v. Harmon, 107 Idaho 73, 78, 685 P.2d 814, 819 (1984); State v. Shannon, 95 Idaho 299, 302, 507 P.2d 808, 811 (1973), and was not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho 89, 94, 685 P.2d 830, 835 (1984).
The fact that Fowler did not admit to committing the act does not foreclose him from voluntarily pleading guilty since he acknowledged that the evidence made a strong case against him. State v. Harmon, 107 Idaho 73, 685 P.2d 814 (1984). From our review of the record before the district judge at the sentencing hearing, we conclude that Fowler's assertion in the presentence report of his lack of criminal intent was not sufficient to raise an obvious doubt as to his guilt. The court did not err in accepting Fowler's guilty plea.