Opinion
ID No. 9809019760, Cr. A. No. IN98-10-0243R1, IN98-10-0251R1, IN98-12-1139R1.
December 29, 2003
ORDER
This 29th day of December, 2003, upon consideration of the defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, it appears to the Court that:
1. On June 13, 2002, the movant, William Jay Hammons ("Defendant'), entered into a plea agreement whereby, in exchange for all of the remaining charges against him being nolle prossed by the State, Defendant plead guilty to Rape Second Degree, a lesser included offense of Count 1 of the indictment: Unlawful Imprisonment First Degree, a lesser included offense of Count III of the indictment; and Assault Third Degree, Count VI of the indictment.
2. On June 10, 2003, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.
3. On September 30, 2003, Defendant filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief, consisting of a ninety-six-page memorandum of law in support of his motion, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as the sole ground for relief. Defendant sets forth "twelve arguments" in support of this claim.
4. By Order, dated October 15, 2003, the Court instructed Defendant's prior counsel to file an affidavit with the Prothonotary responding to the factual allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel claims pursuant to Rule 61(g)(2). In addition, the Court requested that the Department of Justice file a legal memorandum in response to Defendant's motion, taking into account the factual assertions in both the motion and in trial counsel's response, pursuant to Rule 61(f)(1) and (2). Lastly, pursuant to Rule 61(f)(3), the Court requested from Defendant any reply that he may have to the above affidavit and to the State's response.
5. On October 15, 2003, Defendant's prior counsel requested an extension of time to file the affidavit in response to Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel was scheduled to begin a capital case five days before his response was due, in addition to his other scheduled Superior Court appearances and responsibilities, and he believed that he could not adequately address all of Defendant's concerns as set forth in Defendant's extremely lengthy motion. The Court granted counsel's request on October 20, 2003, and extended the response date to January 2, 2004.
6. On October 21, 2003, Defendant filed a twenty-nine page Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Postconviction Relief.
7. Upon close examination, and after careful consideration of Defendant's opening memorandum of law, and the supplemental memorandum of law in support thereof, ("collectively, "memorandum"), the Court finds that Defendant's Rule 61 motion does not meet the requirements of Rule 61(b)(2) regarding the permitted "content" of a motion for postconviction relief. Specifically, Rule 61(b)(2) provides that the "[m]otion shall specify all the grounds for relief which are available to the movant . . . shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified."
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(b)(2) (2003) (emphasis added).
Defendant's one hundred twenty-five-page memorandum in support of his Rule 61 motion far exceeds the purpose and the content limitations envisioned by Rule 61. Rule 61 was originally enacted to afford to prisoners the right to attack collaterally their sentences in the court where they were originally tried without recourse to habeas corpus or coram nobis. Additinally, the Rule affords a remedy to a defendant who claims that his conviction was obtained or his sentence imposed in violation of his constitutional guarantees. This procedure of collateral attack on a conviction or judgment by a defendant arises only after all available remedies have been exhausted on direct appeal.
Curran v. Wooley, 101 A.2d 303 (Del.Super.Ct. 1953), aff'd, 104 A.2d 771 (Del. 1954).
Johnson v. State, 280 A.2d 712 (Del. 1971).
Undoubtedly, the essential goal underlying the enactment of Rule 61 was to provide a supplemental vehicle through which a defendant in custody, or subject to future custody, may challenge a conviction supported by a sufficient factual and legal basis. In conjunction with this objective, and mindful of the importance of judicial economy and finality of judgment to the court system, Rule 61 was constructed to require that the movant specify all the grounds for relief at the outset. And, concomitantly, the Rule requires that the movant identify all grounds in a concise, cogent and summary manner. The objective of the Rule was not to provide a method for relief through which a pro se defendant could abuse the requirements of stating a claim(s) in a plain and simple style, by writing an unnecessarily long, meandering and verbose motion for postconviction relief. This type of "kitchen sink" mentality employed by a pro se movant in comprising a Rule 61 motion contradicts the exact principles for which the Rule was created, i.e., to prohibit repetitive, meritless, and/or meandering motions for relief, and is an onerous burden on the court system, responding counsel, and the State.
Defendant alleges twelve instances of attorney error in his memorandum. Without citing to specifics, it is the Court's opinion that Defendant is able to address these arguments in a more concise, abridged and summary fashion. Defendant's motion is unduly wordy, rambles on in sections, and is disproportionately long in comparison to the substantive content of the claim he is invoking. Defendant can condense his arguments, reducing the length of his motion significantly.
Notwithstanding the fact that this Court will not evaluate Defendant's motion in its merits at this time, the Court notes that many of Defendant's allegations are redundant, incomplete or unsupported by fact. At this juncture of the post-conviction proceedings, the Court reminds Defendant, only in the context of a precautionary and advisory capacity, that when invoking an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the movant must support the ineffective assistance of counsel claims with concrete allegations of actual prejudice; otherwise the movant risks summary dismissal. Further, other claims for postconviction relief, which are entirely conclusory, may be summarily dismissed on that basis.
State v. Mason, 1998 WL 449563, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct.) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990)).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4)(2003); See, e.g., State v. Brittingham, 1994 WL 750341, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct.) (citing Younger, 580 A.2d at 556).
Rule 61 is silent as to the specific permitted length of a motion for postconviction relief. Notwithstanding this fact, the Court looks to the comparable rationale, fundamental to another limiting rule found within the Superior Court Civil Rules of Procedure, for guidance. In particular, Rule 107(g) limits the length of an opening or answering brief to thirty-five pages without leave of Court. Pursuant to Rule 107(d)(3), (4) and (5), a movant must include within these thirty-five pages, the statement of the case, the facts, the questions presented, and the legal arguments. This prescribed format has been enacted to promote judicial economy, efficiency, and finality of judgment in an effort to prevent the courts from being overburdened with lengthy, oblique pleadings and documents.
Rule 107(g) provides, in part:
Length of briefs. Without leave of Court, an opening or answering brief shall not exceed a total of 35 pages and a reply brief shall not exceed 20 pages, exclusive of appendix. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 107(g)(2003).
On many occasions, the Court has been presented with Rule 61 motions that consist of lengthy diatribes of unsupported assertions in a futile attempt by the movant to "hit paydirt." Rule 61 is a collateral action and not a substitute for appeal. In much the same manner, the Court finds that Defendant's one hundred twenty-five page memorandum in support of his motion for postconviction relief far exceeds the intended "summary form" scope and format for seeking collateral relief as enumerated in Rule 61(b)(2). Rule 61(c)(1) provides that a motion that does not substantially comply with the requirements of Rule 61(b) will be returned to the petitioner only "if a judge of the Court so directs." Rule 61(b)(6) allows a postconviction relief motion to be amended. This Rule states that a motion "[m]ay be amended as a matter of course at any time before a response is filed or thereafter by leave of court, which shall be freely given when justice so requires." Further, a motion under this Rule is addressed to the discretion of the court.
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736,745 (Del. 1990).
Rule 61(c)(1) provides:
Duties of the Prothonotary. Noncomplying motion. If a motion does not substantially comply with the requirements of subdivision (b) of this rule, the prothonotary shall return it to the movant, if a judge of the court so directs, together with a statement of the reason for its return, and shall retain a copy of the motion and of the statement of the reason for its return. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(c)(1) (2003) (emphasis added).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(b)(6) (2003).
Shy v. State, 246 A.2d 926, 927 (Del. 1968).
In order to preserve the standards of judicial economy and fundamental fairness, it is within this Court's jurisdiction to deny consideration of a defendant's motion, without reaching a determination on its merits, when there exists a clear and substantial abuse of the remedial safeguards inherent to Rule 61. Accordingly, it is within this Court's discretion not to issue a decision on the merits of Defendant's postconviction motion until the motion complies with the technical requirements of Rule 61(b)(2). The Court vacates its October 15, 2003 Order and returns Defendant's noncomplying motion to him without ruling on its merits. As such, Defendant is instructed to resubmit an amended Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief setting forth his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel predicated on his "twelve arguments," in a concise, "summary form," of no more than thirty-five pages in accord with Rule 107(g). At that time, the Court will consider Defendant's amended Rule 61 motion in a light most favorable to defendant, taking into account the procedural and substantive bars to relief in Rule 61(i).