See Peters, 244 Wis.2d 470, ¶ 1, 628 N.W.2d 797. ¶ 28 More recently, in State v. Hammill, 2006 WI App 128, 293 Wis.2d 654, 718 N.W.2d 747, we were guided by Hahn in addressing a case similar to Imbruglia's. There, the defendant was charged twice with first offense OWI, once in Eau Claire county and once in the Village of Cameron. Hammill, 293 Wis.2d 654, ¶ 15, 718 N.W.2d 747. Both charges were pending at the same time, but the defendant entered a plea on the Eau Claire county charge first, then entered his Village of Cameron plea in municipal court.
¶ 34 Finally, even if we considered Lebo's testimony from the evidentiary hearing, we would nevertheless conclude he failed to make a prima facie showing. See State v. Hammill, 2006 WI App 128, ¶¶ 9–11, 293 Wis.2d 654, 718 N.W.2d 747 (considering defendant's testimony at an evidentiary hearing in order to conclude defendant failed to make a prima facie showing his right to counsel was violated). At the hearing, Lebo could recall very little about what occurred during the Shawano County proceedings. He testified he could remember one of the hearings, and he remembered speaking to the judge for about five minutes, but he could not remember what they discussed.
He argues that because it should have been charged as a fourth offense OWI, it should have been tried in criminal court and the court commissioner therefore lacked jurisdiction. This issue is controlled by State v.Hammill, 2006 WI App 128, 718 N.W.2d 747. The parties refer to a municipal court in their briefs, but the City of Eau Claire, which charged Halvorson, does not have a separate municipal court.
¶4 Defendants may attack a prior conviction in an enhanced sentence proceeding only on the ground that they were denied the constitutional right to counsel in their prior case. State v. Hammill, 2006 WI App 128, ¶6, 293 Wis. 2d 654, 718 N.W.2d 747 (citing Hahn, 238 Wis. 2d 889, ¶25). They must first make a prima facie showing that they were deprived of their constitutional right to counsel, which is a question of law that we review independent of the circuit court.
See Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206. ¶16 The State appears to rely on State v. Hammill, 2006 WI App 128, ¶11, 293 Wis. 2d 654, 718 N.W.2d 747, for the proposition that a defendant who "simply does not remember what occurred at his plea hearing" fails to make an Ernst prima facie showing. However, Krueger claims he does remember pertinent details as to what occurred during the 1993 proceedings.
¶10 "A defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction in an enhanced sentence proceeding only on the ground that the defendant was denied the constitutional right to counsel" in the previous case. State v. Hammill, 2006 WI.App. 128, ¶6, 293 Wis.2d 654, 718 N.W.2d 747
We reject this reasoning because this court and our supreme court have applied Hahn to the analysis of OWI cases on multiple occasions without distinguishing that Hahn is dependent on the source of the enhancement. See e.g., State v. Hammill, 2006 WI.App. 128, ¶6, 293 Wis.2d 654, 718 N.W.2d 747; State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, ¶¶5, 25-26, 283 Wis.2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92; State v. Stockland, 2003 WI.App. 177, ¶¶1, 12, 266 Wis.2d 549, 668 N.W.2d 810. We note that we referenced Hammill in Socha I; our decision that Hahn was not applicable was based on Socha's failure to show that he had no options other than a collateral attack, not on the type of repeater penalty that was used to enhance his sentence.
¶13 "A defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction in an enhanced sentence proceeding only on the ground that the defendant was denied the constitutional right to counsel" in the previous case. State v. Hammill, 2006 WI.App. 128, ¶6, 293 Wis.2d 654, 718 N.W.2d 747. To be constitutionally valid, a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
As summed up by the State: “The [Hahn ] court made explicit that a person cannot base a collateral attack on a claim that his or her plea was not knowing intelligent, and voluntary-the exact claim that Socha is attempting to make in this case.” We see no basis on which to arrive at a conclusion different than the one the Hahn court arrived at. See generally State v. Hammill, 2006 WI App 128, ¶ 17, 293 Wis.2d 654, 718 N.W.2d 747 (“Hahn is a broad, bright-line rule. Since Hammill's challenge to his Village of Cameron conviction is not based on the denial of his right to counsel, the challenge is barred by Hahn. ”).
¶ 8 The State first argues that Hernandez has failed to make a prima facie showing that his rights were violated because he relies only on conclusory allegations in his affidavit and because testimony at the evidentiary hearing revealed that his recollection of various details of the 2000 proceedings was poor to nonexistent. The State points out that in State v. Hammill, 2006 WI App 128, ¶ 11, 293 Wis.2d 654, 718 N.W.2d 747, we stated that “a defendant who ‘simply does not remember what occurred at his plea hearing’ does not make a prima facie showing”. See id.