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State v. Haley

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
May 28, 2008
No. 05-07-01036-CR (Tex. App. May. 28, 2008)

Opinion

No. 05-07-01036-CR

Opinion Filed May 28, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.

On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F05-72800-RQ.

Before Justices WRIGHT, O'NEILL, and FRANCIS.


OPINION


The State appeals an order granting appellee Larry O'Neal Haley a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. In its sole issue, the State contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting Haley a new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's order. The grand jury indicted Haley for aggravated sexual assault of a child. The case was set for trial three times. The third time the case was set, the trial court held a pretrial hearing. At the hearing, Haley told the trial court that he wanted to plead not guilty, but he had not been able to discuss the case with his attorney and had only met with him once since their first meeting. He asked the trial court to appoint new counsel because his attorney was unprepared. The trial court refused. The trial court recessed to allow Haley to speak to his attorney. After Haley discussed the case with his attorney, he informed the trial court he wanted to plead guilty. The trial court accepted Haley's plea and passed the case for sentencing. Before he was sentenced, Haley filed a motion to requesting the trial court to withdraw his guilty plea and appoint new counsel. Both requests were denied. At his later sentencing hearing, Haley admitted committing the offense, but claimed he did not recall doing so due to voluntary intoxication. Haley was sentenced to fifteen years' confinement. New counsel was appointed for appeal. Haley then filed a motion for new trial asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, he asserted counsel failed to prepare for trial, failed to investigate, and failed to communicate with Haley. Haley claimed he only pleaded guilty because he knew counsel was unprepared and felt he had no choice. After conducting a hearing, the trial court granted Haley's motion for new trial. The State appeals. We review the granting of a new trial for an abuse of discretion. Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. State v. Boyd, 202 S.W.3d 393, 401 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. ref'd). An appellate court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court; rather the appellate court's role is to examine the record to determine whether the trial court granted a new trial without reference to any guiding rules or principles or, in other words, whether the trial court's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. See Lewis, 911 S.W.2d at 7. The appellate court is to presume the trial court correctly granted a new trial, and the State has the burden to establish the contrary. See Lee v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 608, 322 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1958); Boyd, 202 S.W.3d at 401. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show (1) deficient performance, and (2) prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Kober v. State, 988 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Ordinarily counsel should not blindly rely on the veracity of either his client's version of the facts or witness statements in the State's file. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 501 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Moseley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). Rather, "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. A decision not to investigate "must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." McFarland, 928 S.W.2d at 501. To satisfy the prejudice prong, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In a guilty plea case, a defendant must show that but for counsel's errors he would not have pleaded guilty. Kober, 988 S.W.2d at 232. In his affidavit attached to the motion for new trial, Haley stated that he first met with his attorney in December 2005 after counsel was initially appointed. Haley did not see his attorney again until March 2007 when the case was set for trial (for the third time). Haley stated he had written to his attorney fourteen times, but the only correspondence he had received from his attorney were two letters concerning trial settings and one letter informing him of a plea bargain offer. Haley had informed his attorney of certain mental difficulties and had asked for a psychiatric evaluation. According to Haley, his attorney had never talked to him about the facts of the case and had never asked about his "witnesses." Haley stated that he decided to plead guilty because he knew the case was set for trial and his attorney had done no preparation. At the hearing the motion for new trial, Haley's trial attorney testified that he knew Haley had initially wanted to plead not guilty before a jury. Nevertheless, Haley's counsel did not request an investigator, speak to any witnesses, or subpoena any CPS records. He explained that he did not perform any investigation because he had reviewed the State's file, was aware of no inconsistencies in the child's story, and Haley had made certain admissions to him "substantially" admitting the offense. There is evidence that Haley had been hospitalized for mental illness and suffers from severe depression, polysubstance dependence, and is mildly mentally retarded. Haley at one point told his attorney he was not sane at the time of the offense, but counsel independently determined Haley was both sane and competent at the time of the offense. However, it does not appear counsel performed any independent investigation to make this determination. Although counsel was aware Haley had been treated at MHMR, he did not request any information from MHMR. In its findings on the motion for new trial, the trial court concluded counsel's failure to conduct any independent investigation, failure to investigate the child's credibility, failure to investigate Haley's mental disorders and overall failure to subject the State's case to any adversarial testing constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. It further found counsel's failures rendered Haley's plea involuntary and granted him a new trial. After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion. Haley was charged with a first degree felony offense. Although the case had been set for trial three times and counsel was aware of Haley's desire to plead not guilty, trial counsel did no independent investigation other than reviewing what the State had shown him. The State asserts trial counsel's failure to conduct any independent investigation was justified based upon admissions Haley made to his attorney. In a letter to his attorney, Haley admitted committing certain behavior suggesting his guilt for the charged conduct. However, Haley did not recall committing the specific allegations in the indictment. Moreover, the record shows Haley suffered from mental illness and was mildly mentally retarded, yet counsel did nothing to obtain an evaluation of Haley or even subpoena his medical records. The trial court could have determined, under the totality of the circumstances presented here, it was not reasonable for trial counsel to have relied on Haley's vague admissions in deciding to perform no independent investigation. We cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in determining counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The State also contends Haley failed to prove prejudice. The State misconstrues Haley's burden to establish prejudice in this case. Generally a failure to investigate will require reversal of a conviction only if the defendant can show favorable evidence existed. However, in a guilty plea case, a defendant establishes prejudice by showing his guilty plea was not voluntary due to ineffective assistance. Haley stated in his affidavit that he only pleaded guilty because his trial attorney performed no investigation. The circumstances of Haley's plea support his assertion. The trial court was free to believe Haley. We cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in granting Haley a new trial. We resolve the sole issue against the State and affirm the trial court's order.


Summaries of

State v. Haley

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
May 28, 2008
No. 05-07-01036-CR (Tex. App. May. 28, 2008)
Case details for

State v. Haley

Case Details

Full title:THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant v. LARRY O'NEAL HALEY, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: May 28, 2008

Citations

No. 05-07-01036-CR (Tex. App. May. 28, 2008)