State v. Haire

21 Citing cases

  1. Callejo v. Brazos Elec. Power Co-op. Inc.

    755 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. 1988)   Cited 58 times
    Holding that court of appeals erred by considering evidence establishing pre-taking value of easement strip in determining legal sufficiency of evidence to support jury's post-taking value of easement strip

    perative, Inc. v. Baker, 685 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex.App. — Austin 1985, no writ); Leiber v. Texas Municipal Power Agency, 667 S.W.2d 206, 207-08 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Richards, 659 S.W.2d 861, 865-66 (Tex.App. — Tyler 1983, no writ); Texas Electric Service Co. v. Wheeler, 550 S.W.2d 297, 302 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 551 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1977); Silberstein v. State, 522 S.W.2d 562, 563-65 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1975, no writ); Ker v. State, 462 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Houston v. Hendrix, 374 S.W.2d 764, 765-66 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tuttle v. State, 381 S.W.2d 330, 336 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Roberts v. State, 350 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1961, no writ); McConnico v. Texas Power Light Co., 335 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); State v. Haire, 334 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Maddox v. Gulf, Colorado Santa Fe Railway Co., 293 S.W.2d 499, 506-07 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Brazos suggests that to uphold the trial court is to casually discard respectable authorities and interfere with the jury's ability to do justice in the individual case.

  2. Westwood Independent School District v. Southern Clay Products, Inc.

    604 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)   Cited 6 times

    The testimony of expert witnesses is not ordinarily binding on the jury, and is not in this case. City of Houston v. Hendrix, Tex.Civ.App., 374 S.W.2d 764, writ ref., n. r. e.; State v. Haire, Tex.Civ.App., 334 S.W.2d 488, writ ref., n. r. e. . . . Neither the minimum nor the maximum valuation placed on property by the opinion testimony of expert witnesses is binding on a jury. The jury is entitled to weigh the testimony of such witnesses in the light of their own knowledge and experience.

  3. Texas Elec. Service v. Wheeler

    550 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)   Cited 11 times
    Stating an obiter dictum in legal-sufficiency analysis in condemnation case that did not involve lost profits or the reasonable-certainty test

    In determining whether the evidence is "insufficient" to support the jury's findings, the reviewing court must review all the evidence. State v. Haire, 334 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin, 1960, ref., n.r.e.). Maurice Wendt, TESCO's representative during the trial, being their Engineering Manager in charge of all the design of construction of all transmission lines for the company, was called as an adverse witness.

  4. State v. Schaefer

    523 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)   Cited 1 times

    Rental values and return on capital investment are matters proper for consideration in determining market value for measure of compensation to be paid for taking property in condemnation proceedings. State v. Haire, CCA, NRE, Tex.Civ.App., 334 S.W.2d 488; Brazos River Conservation and Reclam. Dist. v. Costello, CCA, NWH, Tex.Civ.App., 169 S.W.2d 977.

  5. Lane v. Phillips

    509 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)   Cited 9 times

    The jury, as the trier of the facts, was not bound by the expert opinion; but, the weight to be given to such testimony is ordinarily within the exclusive province of the jury. State v. Haire, 334 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin, 1960, error ref. n.r.e.). All of defendants' evidentiary points relating to the value of the assets of the joint venture are overruled. In arriving at their answer to Special Issue No. 10, the jury was required to find separately the reasonable cash market value of the assets of the joint venture and the total of the liabilities thereof.

  6. Johnson v. State

    474 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)   Cited 3 times

    Appellants argue further that the work on the foundation coupled with the lease constituted a present rather than a future use by them and that, as such, the lease was admissible to show market value. City of Dallas v. Shackelford, 200 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.Civ.App. 1946, writ ref'd, n.r.e.), Reeves v. City of Dallas, 195 S.W.2d 575 (Tex.Civ.App. 1946, writ ref'd, n.r.e.); State v. Haire, 334 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Civ.App. 1960, writ ref'd, n.r.e.); Foley Bros. Dry Goods Co. v. Settegast, 133 S.W.2d 228 (Tex.Civ.App. 1939, writ ref'd). The market value of property condemned is determined as of the date of taking.

  7. Cannon v. State

    473 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)   Cited 2 times

    While there is considerable difference of opinion between the expert witnesses as to the value of the land and of the eastern remainder, both before and after taking, the evidence presented and the record as a whole indicate that the verdict of the jury is not inadequate and it is not so against the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust or wrong. In City of Houston v. Hendrix, 374 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.Civ.App., ref., n.r.e.), Justice Hughes quoted Associate Justice Gray in State v. Haire, 334 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Civ.App., writ ref., n.r.e.), as to the view of the function of opinion evidence: "The market value of property necessarily is a matter of opinion.

  8. Flato Brothers v. Builders Loan Co.

    457 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)   Cited 3 times

    This was no more than a statement of opinion. H. T.C.R. Co. v. Ellis, 111 Tex. 15, 224 S.W. 471, 474 (1920); State v. Haire, 334 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Furthermore Schmidt fails to take into consideration the undisputed fact that the property sold to Builders for $50,000 was subject to a prior mortgage of $75,000. In his affidavit Schmidt also says that he tendered McKee a warranty deed to the property which McKee declined to accept.

  9. Stewart v. State

    453 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)   Cited 2 times
    Stating that in determining the value of the land taken when the taken land contains improvements, "the ultimate question is the market value of the land so taken" and that value ordinarily is—but may not be—enhanced by the presence of buildings on the land

    The jury did nto accept the figures set out by either witness, finding the market value to be $28,150.00, well within the range of the testimony. Both Hill and Spiegel qualified as experts on valuations in the area and their qualifications are not challenged. All of the contentions advanced by Stewart are answered by the opinion in State v. Haire, 334 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Austin, Tex.Civ.App., 1960, error ref. n.r.e.), and cases therein cited. Our review of the evidence leads us, irrevocably to the conclusion that there was not only some evidence to support the jury's answer to the value issue, but that it was factually sufficient.

  10. Lakeside Park Limited v. State

    452 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)   Cited 1 times
    Zoning restriction material in determining market value

    The verdict of the jury is well within the value opinions of the qualified expert witnesses called by the respective parties, and amply supported by the evidence Admitted upon trial. Trinity River Authority v. Chain, 437 S.W.2d 887 (Beaumont Tex.Civ.App., 1969, error ref. n.r.e.); State of Texas v. Reeh, 434 S.W.2d 416 (San Antonio Tex.Civ.App., 1968, error ref. n.r.e.); Trinity River Authority v. McMurrey, 411 S.W.2d 422 (Beaumont Tex.Civ.App., 1967, error ref. n.r.e.); State of Texas v. Haire, 334 S.W.2d 488 (Austin Tex.Civ.App., 1960, error ref. n.r.e.). The jury substantially adopted the opinion values of the witness, Terry.