Opinion
I.D. No. 0110001861.
Date Submitted: May 2, 2005.
Date Decided: September 30, 2005.
Upon Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Post-Conviction Relief — DENIED.
William L. George, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, for the State of Delaware.
Adam J. Hackett, Smyrna, Delaware, defendant, pro se.
Joseph A. Gabay, Wilmington, Delaware, former counsel for the defendant.
OPINION
Adam J. Hackett (hereinafter the "Defendant") filed the instant Motion for Postconviction Relief alleging several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons that follow, the Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
Background
On November 18, 2002, the Defendant pled guilty to two counts of Robbery First degree and one count of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony ("PDWDCF"). The Defendant was sentenced on July 11, 2003. As to each of the Robbery First degree counts, the Defendant was sentenced to a term of five years at Level V. As to the PDWDCF count, the Defendant was sentenced to a term of five years at Level V, suspended after three years, for the balance to be served at Level III. These sentences were to be served consecutively. On July 15, 2004, the Defendant filed his motion for postconviction relief, which he moved to amend on March 4, 2005. On May 2, 2005, the State filed its response to the Defendant's motion.Discussion
In a motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, the Court is to apply the rules governing procedural requirements before addressing substantive claims. According to Rule 61(i)(3), a defendant who fails to raise any claim, except for ineffective assistance of counsel, in the proceedings leading to his conviction, is barred from bringing a claim for relief unless he can show "cause and actual prejudice." The Defendant's claims are not procedurally barred.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del.Super.Ct. 1990).
Id. at 552; Johnson v. State, 460 A.2d 539 (Del.Super.Ct. 1983); Conyers v. State, 422 A.2d 345 (Del.Super.Ct. 1980).
Under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, the Defendant must establish two factors in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In the context of a guilty plea challenge, Strickland requires a defendant to show that: (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's actions were so prejudicial "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." The Strickland standard is highly demanding and under the first prong of the test, there is a "strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable." Under the second prong, the Defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice. The Defendant must show that counsel's actions were prejudicial to the defense, creating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Defendant must not only make concrete allegations of cause and actual prejudice, he must also substantiate them. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, requiring a showing of "prejudice" from defendants who seek to challenge the validity of their guilty pleas on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel serves the fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997) (citing Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985))); see also Rose v. State, 808 A.2d 1205 (Del. 2002).
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).
See Albury, 551 A.2d at 60 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; State v. Wilmer, 2003 LEXIS 80 at *12-13 (Del.Super.Ct. 2003).
See Younger 580 A.2d at 556; see also Somerville, 703 A.2d at 632.
See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
The Defendant sets forth two allegations to support his contention that his right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because counsel coerced him to accept a guilty plea. First, the Defendant asserts that his counsel coerced his guilty plea by advising him that the State would only accept his plea if both he and his brother, co-defendant Joshua N. Hackett, accepted the "all or nothing" plea or "packaged deal." This claim is without merit. This Court has previously held that "a condition attached to the plea offer by the State requir[ing] that this be an all or nothing plea, or a `wired plea' or a `package deal'" is within the discretion of the State. In such a scenario, if any of the defendants rejects the plea, the offer is revoked as to all. The Defendant's plea, therefore, was not coerced simply because it was offered as part of a "package deal."
Guess v. State, 813 A.2d 1140 (Del.Super.Ct. 2003).
Id.
Second, the Defendant contends that his plea was coerced because his counsel allegedly promised that his sentence would not exceed more than six years in prison. The plea agreement, the transcript of the plea colloquy, and the affidavits submitted by counsel in this case wholly contradict this contention. The record clearly reflects that the Defendant was well informed that the statutory range of the possible sentence he could receive under the plea agreement was six to sixty years in prison, and that the minimum mandatory sentence required by law was six years. The plea colloquy specifically reflects that the Defendant understood the maximum possible sentence and that his counsel did not make a promise regarding the sentence he would receive if he accepted the plea. Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the Defendant is bound by his statements during the guilty plea colloquy.
See Transcript of Plea Colloquy at 6-13.
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).
Finally, in his motion to amend, the Defendant alleges additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his counsel's actions and alleged inaction which purportedly would have assisted the Defendant at sentencing or in plea negotiation. However, the Defendant offers no concrete evidence that, but for these errors, he would have foregone his plea in favor of proceeding to trial. Therefore, he fails to affirmatively prove the requisite prejudice.
See Albury, 551 A.2d at 60 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
Conclusion
The Defendant's motion and the record clearly indicate that the instant motion is devoid of merit. As demonstrated above, the Defendant fails to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test. The Defendant has not shown any actual prejudice or that his counsel's actions were unreasonable. The Defendant offers no evidence to show any irregularity regarding his plea agreement, nor does the record reflect any irregularities. Instead, all evidence suggests that the Defendant made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision to plead guilty.For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's Motion for Post-Conviction Relief is DENIED.