"The factual basis required to support a stop is minimal, and an actual violation [of the law] is not necessary." State v. Haataja, 611 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). A valid traffic stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.
"The factual basis required to support a stop is minimal, and an actual violation is not necessary." State v. Haataja, 611 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Minn.App. 2000) (quotations omitted),
"The factual basis required to support a stop is minimal, and an actual violation is not necessary." State v. Haataja, 611 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). "[A] mere hunch, absent other objectively reasonable articulable facts, will not justify a seizure."
"The factual basis required to support a stop is minimal, and an actual violation [of the law] is not necessary." State v. Haataja, 611 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). "Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to be able to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting [a] person of criminal activity."
Cf. City of St. Paul v. Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623, 627 (Minn.App. 1990) (implying that articulable suspicion could exist if the driver was "observed stopping or slowing down in the vicinity of any known prostitutes"), review denied (Minn. Mar. 22, 1990). While the female pedestrian here was not known to be a prostitute, the officer was suspicious and was watching her. Mobley's slower-than-normal driving by itself may not have created a reasonable suspicion. But cf. State v. Haataja, 611 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Minn.App. 2000) (holding that slow driving that was impeding traffic and appeared unnecessary provided articulable suspicion that the driver was "somehow impaired"), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). But this court must look at the "totality of the circumstances" in determining whether police had articulable suspicion to conduct a stop.
We will find that the continued investigatory stop of a vehicle is lawful where the officer had "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." State v. Haataja, 611 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Minn.App. 2000) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). I.
Having concluded that the trial court's interpretation was too restrictive, the more difficult question arises: when does a slow-moving automobile "impede" traffic? While a driver does not have to be stopped in the roadway or cause other automobiles to stop, we believe that a slow driver does not violate the statute by merely causing minor inconvenience to other motorists. For example, other jurisdictions that have considered impeding traffic statutes, which are nearly identical to Tennessee's statute, have focused on whether a driver's slow speed blocked or otherwise backed-up traffic. See, e.g., State v. Haataja, 611 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Minn.Ct.App. 2000) (holding that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop of an automobile where the driver was traveling between ten and fifteen miles per hour slower than the posted maximum speed limit and other automobiles were backed-up behind the defendant); State v. Benders, 334 Mont. 231, 146 P.3d 751, 754 (2006) (holding that driving approximately thirty to forty-five miles per hour under the posted maximum speed limit and a build-up of at least four automobiles gave a police officer "sufficient information, under the totality of the circumstances, to establish particularized suspicion that [the defendant] was violating the law against impeding traffic"); Commonwealth v. Robbins, 441 Pa.Super. 437, 657 A.2d 1003, 1004 (1995) (affirming the defendant's conviction of impeding traffic where he was driving between eighteen and twenty-eight miles per hour below the posted maximum speed limit in a no-passing zone and approximately eighteen-to-twenty automobiles where backed-up behi
The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843, and an actual violation of the law is not necessary. State v. Haataja, 611 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). Here, we conclude that Nordhus had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when he directed Shulman to "stay put."
Appellant's argument is unavailing because "an actual violation is not necessary." State v. Haataja, 611 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). Appellant also argues that he did not have any small bills on his person, which is demonstrative of the officers' lack of reasonable suspicion.
2011), and "an actual violation is not necessary." State v. Haataja, 611 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). However, a stop that is the product of "mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity" is impermissible.