¶ 72 Other courts have reasoned that it is logical to permit the compulsion defense while disallowing an automatism defense. See e.g. N.M. v. Gurule, 149 N.M. 599, 252 P.3d 823 (App.2011). In Gurule, the defendant alleged she had become involuntarily intoxicated after drinking “tea” that her friend made for her. Gurule, 252 P.3d at 825.
And New Mexico law finds driving while impaired to the slightest degree unlawful. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-102(A); State v. Gurule, 252 P.3d 823, 826 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011). Here, Capehart contends he smelled alcohol emanating from Plaintiff's vehicle.
The metropolitan court sentenced Vargas to a term of ninety days in jail for aggravated DWI under Section 66-8-102(D)(3) (2010), which provides that While Section 66-8-102(A) does not provide the exact language of "impaired to the slightest degree," State v. Sisneros, 1938-NMSC-049, 42 N.M. 500, 82 P.2d 274 effectively created that standard, and State v. Gurule, 2011-NMCA-042, 149 N.M. 599, 252 P.3d 823 reaffirms it. See Sisneros, 1938-NMSC-049, ¶ 18, 42 N.M. 500, 82 P.2d 274 ("A person who has taken a drink of intoxicating liquor is not necessarily under its influence; but if it affects him so that, to the slightest degree, ‘he is less able, either mentally or physically or both, to exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle as powerful and dangerous a mechanism as a modern automobile with safety to himself and the public,’ he is under the ‘influence of intoxicating liquor’ within the meaning of the statute."
Concurrence/Dissent at Section VI.D. It appears that other jurisdictions are split on this issue. State v. Gurule, 149 N.M. 599, 604, 252 P.3d 823, 828 (App.2011) (noting jurisdictional split). Compare, e.g., State v. Hammond, 118 N.J. 306, 307, 314, 571 A.2d 942, 946 (1990) (holding that the involuntary intoxication defense is not available as to the strict liability offense of driving under the influence); State v. West, 416 A.2d 5, 7, 9 (Me.
See § 66-8-102(A) ("It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive a vehicle within this state."); State v. Gurule , 2011-NMCA-042, ¶ 7, 149 N.M. 599, 252 P.3d 823 ("In order to convict under [ Section 66-8-102 ](A), a court must find that the defendant was less able to the slightest degree, either mentally or physically, or both, to exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle a vehicle with safety to the driver and the public as a result of drinking the liquor." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see State v. Neal , 2008-NMCA-008, ¶ 27, 143 N.M. 341, 176 P.3d 330 ("Given the testimony as to [the d]efendant’s driving behavior, physical condition, admission of drinking, and performance on the field sobriety tests, the factfinder could rely on common knowledge and experience to determine whether [the d]efendant was under the influence of alcohol.").
{9} In order to convict Defendant of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the trial court must find that as a result of drinking liquor Defendant was "less able, either mentally or physically or both, to exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle [a vehicle] with safety to himself and the public." State v. Sisneros , 1938–NMSC–049, ¶ 18, 42 N.M. 500, 82 P.2d 274 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. Gurule , 2011–NMCA–042, ¶ 7, 149 N.M. 599, 252 P.3d 823 (same). "This standard is known as the impaired to the slightest degree standard."
The fact that Hancock was involuntarily punched in the head before the shooting does not change the calculus because New Mexico law holds that involuntary impairment does not negate the criminal nature of a defendant's acts. State v. Gurule, 252 P.3d 823, 828 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011) ("involuntary intoxication is a defense only when it negates the intent element of a crime."). In this case, the evidence of record establishes that Hancock shot Threadgill at least three times with two guns.
"Duress does not negate the mental state or volitional act, but instead justifies the intended criminal act." State v. Gurule , 2011-NMCA-042, ¶ 16, 149 N.M. 599, 252 P.3d 823 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). That is, "[a] defendant pleading duress is not attempting to disprove a requisite mental state and is, instead, attempting excusal from criminal liability because of the circumstances surrounding their intentional act."
{¶2} Issue 1: Defendant continues to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, maintaining that the State failed to prove that he "drove while impaired to the slightest degree." [MIO 4] See State v. Gurule, 2011-NMCA-042, ¶ 7, 149 N.M. 599, 252 P.3d 823 (providing that in order to convict under Section 66-8-102(A), the [s]tate is required to prove that the defendant, as a result of drinking alcohol, "was less able to the slightest degree, either mentally or physically, or both, to exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle a vehicle with safety to the driver and the public" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also UJI 14-4501 NMRA (providing the elements for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor). Specifically, Defendant argues that the officer "did not observe any bad driving," stopped him "solely because he had no illuminated taillights," and that he had no balance or mobility issues when getting out of his truck.
{¶2} In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant continues to maintain that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for DWI because the State failed to prove "he was impaired to the slightest degree and that impairment rendered him incapable of safely driving." [MIO 7] See State v. Gurule, 2011-NMCA-042, ¶ 7, 149 N.M. 599, 252 P.3d 823 (providing that in order to convict under NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(A) (2005, amended 2016), the state is required to prove that the defendant, as a result of drinking alcohol, "was less able to the slightest degree, either mentally or physically, or both, to exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle a vehicle with safety to the driver and the public"); see also UJI 14-4501 NMRA (providing the elements for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor).