Prospective coercive sanctions should be levied only under "extreme and extraordinary" circumstances. State v. Gundlah ex rel. Smallheer, 160 Vt. 193, 197, 624 A.2d 368, 369 (1993) (quotation omitted); see also Vt. Women's Health Ctr., 159 Vt. at 152, 617 A.2d at 417 (holding that because circumstances were "extreme and extraordinary" prospective coercive fines were appropriate). A coercive sanction must be purgeable—that is, it must be "capable of being avoided by defendants through adherence to the court's order." Vt. Women's Health Ctr., 159 Vt. at 151, 617 A.2d at 417 ; see also Sheehan, 171 Vt. at 512, 757 A.2d at 468 ("[O]nly compensatory fines or coercive sanctions may be imposed on a civil contemnor, and these must be purgeable, i.e., they must be capable of being avoided by defendants through adherence to the court's order.
Therefore, mootness generally precludes appellate review. State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993). When mootness is raised, we must inquire "`whether decision of a once living dispute continues to be justified by a sufficient prospect that the decision will have an impact on the parties.'"
Appellant's case is similar to those in which we have found that the capable-of-repetition-but-evading-review exception does not apply. See In re P.S., 167 Vt. at 68, 702 A.2d at 101 (holding that appeal of revocation of nonhospitalization order of mental patient who had later been released under separate order did not meet mootness exception because court's findings regarding first order were specific to month in which they were made and any future revocations would "be based on new fact patterns"); Doria, 156 Vt. at 119–20, 589 A.2d at 319 (finding that mootness exception did not apply in case in which defeated gubernatorial candidate objected to poll conducted by university professor, because candidate did not "show any reasonable expectation that he will be subjected to the same type of political poll" in future elections); see also State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993) (holding that no mootness exception applied in journalist's appeal of contempt-of-court conviction for refusing to testify at prosecution of prison escapee who subsequently pleaded no contest, because "[a] repetition of the fact pattern presented seems highly unlikely and certainly does not rise to a reasonable expectation."). ¶ 15. Appellant's case likewise does not meet the second exception to the mootness doctrine, the negative collateral consequences exception.
Fact-specific issues are not generally "capable of repetition," and we will not apply this mootness exception to review claims involving court findings that relate to specific dates and circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993) (declining to apply the exception where there was no reasonable expectation of repetition of the case's fact pattern). Consequently, we find no reason to apply this exception to the mootness rule here.
Any new contempt order would be based on contemporaneous facts, and as such, it would not be appropriate for us to apply the exception to this case. See State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993) (holding that exception to mootness doctrine did not apply because repetition of fact pattern was unlikely). Further, since this appeal has been filed, the trial judge granted husband's motion to disqualify him from further proceedings involving husband.
More importantly, the injury must not be too dependent on the facts of an individual case. In re P.S., 167 Vt. 63, 68, 702 A.2d 98, 101 (1997); State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993). ¶ 8.
In re P.S., 167 Vt. at 68, 702 A.2d at 101 (holding that "[g]iven P.S.'s past history, the general circumstances that gave rise to the revocation of P.S.'s nonhospitalization order" were likely to occur again and therefore not moot). There is no "reasonable expectation" that E.S. will be subject to the same action again because he is a resident of a distant state, has no ties to Vermont and was here once for a unique set of circumstances. See State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993) (holding exception did not apply because "[a] repetition of the fact pattern presented seems highly unlikely and certainly does not rise to a reasonable expectation"). ¶ 9.
In general, a case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. See State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993). The mootness doctrine requires that an actual controversy exist at all stages of review.
See Denk v. Iowa District Court, 20 Media L. Rptr. 1454 (Iowa 1992).See State v. Salsbury, 924 P.2d 208 (Idaho 1996); State v. Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812 (Kan. 1978); Medlin v. Bettis Asphalt Constr., 17 Media L. Rptr. 1783 (Kan. Dist. Ct. 1990); State v. Hohler, 543 A.2d 364 (Me. 1988); Promulgation of Rules Regarding the Protection of Confidential News Sources, 479 N.E.2d 154 (Mass. 1985) (declining to adopt rule implementing privilege but acknowledging that limited privilege exists); State ex rel. Classic III Inc. v. Eli, 954 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1982); State v. Wallace, 23 Media L. Rptr. 1473 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1995); Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broadcasting Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780 (S.D. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 69 (1996); State v. Blais, 6 Media L. Rptr. 1537 (Vt. Dist. Ct. 1980), but see State v. Gundlah ex rel. Smallheer, 624 A.2d 368 (Vt. 1993) (acknowledging that law in this area is not clearly defined); Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974); Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 641 P.2d 1180 (Wash. 1982); State ex rel. Hudok v. Henry, 389 S.E.2d 188 (W. Va. 1989); Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1978).
Second, the exception for situations capable of repetition yet evading review does not apply because the court's findings were specific to August 1995; any future revocations of P.S.'s order of nonhospitalization will be based on new fact patterns. See State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993) (exception to mootness does not apply because repetition of fact pattern is unlikely). The standard of dangerousness to be applied at revocation hearings does, however, fall within the exception for situations capable of repetition yet evading review.