State v. Gundlah

10 Citing cases

  1. Kneebinding, Inc. v. Howell

    2018 Vt. 101 (Vt. 2018)   Cited 13 times
    Observing that private parties may contract to waive even rights of constitutional magnitude

    Prospective coercive sanctions should be levied only under "extreme and extraordinary" circumstances. State v. Gundlah ex rel. Smallheer, 160 Vt. 193, 197, 624 A.2d 368, 369 (1993) (quotation omitted); see also Vt. Women's Health Ctr., 159 Vt. at 152, 617 A.2d at 417 (holding that because circumstances were "extreme and extraordinary" prospective coercive fines were appropriate). A coercive sanction must be purgeable—that is, it must be "capable of being avoided by defendants through adherence to the court's order." Vt. Women's Health Ctr., 159 Vt. at 151, 617 A.2d at 417 ; see also Sheehan, 171 Vt. at 512, 757 A.2d at 468 ("[O]nly compensatory fines or coercive sanctions may be imposed on a civil contemnor, and these must be purgeable, i.e., they must be capable of being avoided by defendants through adherence to the court's order.

  2. Holton v. Department of Employment and Training

    178 Vt. 147 (Vt. 2005)   Cited 22 times
    Explaining that because reimbursing employers "do not pay regular unemployment taxes into the fund, but the fund pays for claims by their former employees .... noncontributing employers must reimburse the fund for every dollar in benefits paid to their former employees"

    Therefore, mootness generally precludes appellate review. State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993). When mootness is raised, we must inquire "`whether decision of a once living dispute continues to be justified by a sufficient prospect that the decision will have an impact on the parties.'"

  3. Paige v. State

    2017 Vt. 54 (Vt. 2017)   Cited 26 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding case moot where "[t]he entire purpose of appellant's case was to prevent the inclusion of the Senators [Cruz and Rubio] on the primary ballot" and, on appellate review, general election already completed

    Appellant's case is similar to those in which we have found that the capable-of-repetition-but-evading-review exception does not apply. See In re P.S., 167 Vt. at 68, 702 A.2d at 101 (holding that appeal of revocation of nonhospitalization order of mental patient who had later been released under separate order did not meet mootness exception because court's findings regarding first order were specific to month in which they were made and any future revocations would "be based on new fact patterns"); Doria, 156 Vt. at 119–20, 589 A.2d at 319 (finding that mootness exception did not apply in case in which defeated gubernatorial candidate objected to poll conducted by university professor, because candidate did not "show any reasonable expectation that he will be subjected to the same type of political poll" in future elections); see also State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993) (holding that no mootness exception applied in journalist's appeal of contempt-of-court conviction for refusing to testify at prosecution of prison escapee who subsequently pleaded no contest, because "[a] repetition of the fact pattern presented seems highly unlikely and certainly does not rise to a reasonable expectation."). ¶ 15. Appellant's case likewise does not meet the second exception to the mootness doctrine, the negative collateral consequences exception.

  4. State v. J.E. Curry

    186 Vt. 623 (Vt. 2009)   Cited 5 times
    Explaining that "mental illness is not a necessary or sufficient condition for incompetency," and mentally ill defendants can be competent to stand trial

    Fact-specific issues are not generally "capable of repetition," and we will not apply this mootness exception to review claims involving court findings that relate to specific dates and circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993) (declining to apply the exception where there was no reasonable expectation of repetition of the case's fact pattern). Consequently, we find no reason to apply this exception to the mootness rule here.

  5. Gravel v. Gravel

    186 Vt. 250 (Vt. 2009)   Cited 27 times
    Recognizing that factfinder "is in a unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the persuasiveness of the evidence"

    Any new contempt order would be based on contemporaneous facts, and as such, it would not be appropriate for us to apply the exception to this case. See State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993) (holding that exception to mootness doctrine did not apply because repetition of fact pattern was unlikely). Further, since this appeal has been filed, the trial judge granted husband's motion to disqualify him from further proceedings involving husband.

  6. In re Vermont Department of Public Service

    184 Vt. 613 (Vt. 2008)   Cited 1 times

    More importantly, the injury must not be too dependent on the facts of an individual case. In re P.S., 167 Vt. 63, 68, 702 A.2d 98, 101 (1997); State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993). ¶ 8.

  7. E.S. v. State

    872 A.2d 356 (Vt. 2005)   Cited 6 times
    In E.S. we observed that we have used the negative-collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine to review only those cases where there have been court adjudications of commitment. 2005 VT 33, ¶ 7. As in the E.S. case, there was no adjudication of commitment here. Adjudications of commitment are of a different nature than orders for commitment pending further hearings, and it was the latter that governed E.S.'s and defendant's hospitalizations.

    In re P.S., 167 Vt. at 68, 702 A.2d at 101 (holding that "[g]iven P.S.'s past history, the general circumstances that gave rise to the revocation of P.S.'s nonhospitalization order" were likely to occur again and therefore not moot). There is no "reasonable expectation" that E.S. will be subject to the same action again because he is a resident of a distant state, has no ties to Vermont and was here once for a unique set of circumstances. See State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993) (holding exception did not apply because "[a] repetition of the fact pattern presented seems highly unlikely and certainly does not rise to a reasonable expectation"). ¶ 9.

  8. State v. Fernald

    723 A.2d 1145 (Vt. 1998)   Cited 3 times
    Noting the two elements

    In general, a case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. See State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993). The mootness doctrine requires that an actual controversy exist at all stages of review.

  9. State v. Davis

    720 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1998)   Cited 12 times
    Reversing decision that privilege applied only to confidential sources and holding that Florida common law provides a qualified reporter's privilege against the disclosure of both nonconfidential and confidential information relevant to a criminal trial

    See Denk v. Iowa District Court, 20 Media L. Rptr. 1454 (Iowa 1992).See State v. Salsbury, 924 P.2d 208 (Idaho 1996); State v. Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812 (Kan. 1978); Medlin v. Bettis Asphalt Constr., 17 Media L. Rptr. 1783 (Kan. Dist. Ct. 1990); State v. Hohler, 543 A.2d 364 (Me. 1988); Promulgation of Rules Regarding the Protection of Confidential News Sources, 479 N.E.2d 154 (Mass. 1985) (declining to adopt rule implementing privilege but acknowledging that limited privilege exists); State ex rel. Classic III Inc. v. Eli, 954 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1982); State v. Wallace, 23 Media L. Rptr. 1473 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1995); Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broadcasting Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780 (S.D. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 69 (1996); State v. Blais, 6 Media L. Rptr. 1537 (Vt. Dist. Ct. 1980), but see State v. Gundlah ex rel. Smallheer, 624 A.2d 368 (Vt. 1993) (acknowledging that law in this area is not clearly defined); Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974); Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 641 P.2d 1180 (Wash. 1982); State ex rel. Hudok v. Henry, 389 S.E.2d 188 (W. Va. 1989); Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1978).

  10. In re P.S

    167 Vt. 63 (Vt. 1997)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that appeal of revocation of nonhospitalization order of mental patient who had later been released under separate order did not meet mootness exception because court's findings regarding first order were specific to month in which they were made and any future revocations would "be based on new fact patterns"

    Second, the exception for situations capable of repetition yet evading review does not apply because the court's findings were specific to August 1995; any future revocations of P.S.'s order of nonhospitalization will be based on new fact patterns. See State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196, 624 A.2d 368, 370 (1993) (exception to mootness does not apply because repetition of fact pattern is unlikely). The standard of dangerousness to be applied at revocation hearings does, however, fall within the exception for situations capable of repetition yet evading review.