Opinion
H15NCR150279666S
07-25-2016
State of Connecticut v. Daniel Gula
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Ingrid L. Moll, Judge.
Before the court is Defendant Daniel Gula's (defendant) Motion to Suppress Statement of the Defendant dated February 9, 2016 (motion). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.
I
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On or about February 9, 2016, the defendant filed the motion, moving to suppress all statements made by the defendant to members of the Central Connecticut State University (CCSU) Police Department (department) during the course of the department's investigation (specifically, those statements made during an interview on September 29, 2014). On April 27, 2016, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion (hearing). At that time, the court heard testimony from one witness, Denzel Samuda, a detective with the department. Thereafter, the parties submitted post-hearing briefs. On June 14, 2016, the parties presented oral argument.
See Practice Book § 41-12 (" Upon motion, the judicial authority shall suppress potential testimony or other evidence if it finds that suppression is required under the constitution or laws of the United States or the state of Connecticut.").
II
FINDINGS OF FACT
In deciding the motion, the court finds the following facts. At all relevant times, the defendant was an adjunct professor at CCSU, in his early 50s. The alleged victim who is referred to herein, in the warrant, and at the hearing as Jane Doe (Doe)--was a student at CCSU. The defendant was not one of Doe's professors. The defendant and Doe struck up a friendship; Doe visited the defendant at least a few times in his classroom or in his office. On one such occasion, the defendant tried to kiss Doe; when she resisted, the defendant tried to grope her.
Approximately two weeks later, on September 29, 2014, Doe reported the incident to Samuda. On that date, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Doe gave a written statement to the department, indicating that she did not wish to pursue charges against the defendant. As a result, the department immediately decided not to pursue criminal charges against the defendant.
Notwithstanding such decision not to pursue criminal charges, the department decided it should speak to the defendant (1) to make him aware of the complaint and to give him an opportunity to tell his side of the story and (2) to determine whether to notify CCSU for employment purposes (i.e., for student safety). Accordingly, the department telephoned the defendant, and later that same day, at approximately 5:00 p.m., the defendant voluntarily went to the department's station on campus and met with Samuda and Samuda's supervisor, Lieutenant Edward Dercole. The meeting lasted for approximately 40 minutes.
During the meeting, Dercole and Samuda told the defendant that he was not under arrest and that he could leave at any time. The defendant was not advised of his constitutional rights. The defendant did not exhibit signs of being under the influence of alcohol or drugs or having any apparent mental or physical impairment. The defendant was not restrained by handcuffs or other physical restraint.
The defendant told Dercole and Samuda that he did not know the purpose of the meeting. Dercole and Samuda informed the defendant of Doe's complaint. The defendant acknowledged that he knew Doe and questioned her motivation in bringing the complaint (i.e., whether she was after his money). Dercole and Samuda described Doe's allegations in detail, and the defendant denied everything. They told the defendant that Doe did not wish to press charges, that he was not going to be arrested, and that they just wanted to get to the truth of the matter. Dercole and Samuda asked the defendant to take a polygraph examination; the defendant initially agreed, then declined, claiming that such examinations are unreliable.
Dercole and Samuda repeatedly told the defendant that they were simply trying to arrive at the truth, that Doe did not wish to pursue criminal charges, and that he would not be arrested. The defendant was told that he would not be arrested even if a polygraph examination showed that he was not telling the truth about the incident. Thereafter, toward the end of the interview, the defendant gave a signed, sworn statement, in which he admitted Doe's allegations (confession). Significantly, it was only after the defendant felt comfortable that he would not be arrested that he gave a confession. The meeting ended at that point, and the defendant was not arrested at that time.
The defendant was later arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant, signed by the Honorable Robert Nastri on August 28, 2015, and charged with sexual assault in the third degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree, and disorderly conduct.
III
DISCUSSION
The defendant claims that his statements and confession were procured in violation of his due process rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States constitution and article first, section 8, of the Connecticut constitution because they were not voluntarily made. That is, he contends that the department's promise not to arrest him rendered his inculpatory statements involuntary. The court agrees.
The voluntariness of a confession and compliance with Miranda involve analytically separate inquiries. The defendant does not claim that the department subjected him to custodial interrogation without the benefit of proper Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In this connection, the parties appear to agree that the defendant was not in custody at the time he made the statements that are the subject of the motion.
The defendant makes no assertion that he is entitled to any greater protection under the due process clause of article first, § 8, of the state constitution than under its federal counterpart. Accordingly, the court applies a federal constitutional analysis. See, e.g., State v. Pinder, 250 Conn. 385, 418 n.31, 736 A.2d 857 (1999); see also id. (noting that, under either analysis, the state bears the burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence).
The principles governing the voluntariness of a defendant's statements are generally well settled. " [T]he use of an involuntary confession in a criminal trial is a violation of due process . . . The state has the burden of proving the voluntariness of the confession by a fair preponderance of the evidence . . . [T]he test of voluntariness is whether an examination of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant's] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined . . . The ultimate test remains . . . Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process . . . The determination, by the trial court, whether a confession is voluntary must be grounded upon a consideration of the circumstances surrounding it . . .
" Factors that may be taken into account, upon a proper factual showing, include: the youth of the accused; his lack of education; his intelligence; the lack of any advice as to his constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment, such as the deprivation of food and sleep . . . (Internal quotation marks omitted; alterations in original.) State v. Lawrence, 282 Conn. 141, 153, 920 A.2d 236 (2007).
" Ordinarily, a court will deem a statement or confession involuntary only if there is some coercive police conduct that is causally related to it." State v. Castillo, 165 Conn.App. 703, 724, 140 A.3d 301 (2016) (citing State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 54, 836 A.2d 224 (2003)). " Because of this essential link between coercive activity of the [s]tate, on the one hand, and a resulting confession by a defendant, on the other . . . mere examination of the [defendant's] state of mind [although relevant to an assessment of the defendant's susceptibility to police coercion] can never conclude the due process inquiry." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted; alterations in original.) State v. Reynolds, supra, 54.
" In applying the totality of the circumstances test, those factors that a court should consider to determine whether an accused's confession is voluntary center around three sets of circumstances: (1) the characteristics of the accused, (2) the conditions of interrogation, and (3) the conduct of law enforcement officials . . . [T]hese factors are not to be weighed against one another on a balance scale, with those favorable to a free and voluntary confession offsetting those tending to the contrary. Instead, the situation surrounding the giving of a confession may dissipate the import of an individual factor that might otherwise have a coercive effect . . . Even after analyzing such dilution, if any, a single factor or a combination of factors considered together may inevitably lead to a conclusion that under the totality of circumstances a suspect's will was overborne and the confession was not therefore a free and voluntary act . . ." (Citations omitted.) Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 901-02 (2d Cir. 1988).
" No single criterion controls whether an accused's confession is voluntary; whether a confession was obtained by coercion is determined only after careful evaluation of the totality of the surrounding circumstances." Green v. Scully, supra, 850 F.2d 901. This totality of the circumstances test applies equally to those settings in which there is the presence of a direct or implied promise. Id. " Thus, the inquiry in each case is whether such a promise overbears a suspect's will, as the promise of leniency did in Bram [ v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897)], either alone or in conjunction with other factors." Id.
As an initial matter, the court addresses the defendant's argument, made for the first time at oral argument, that, in adjudicating the instant motion, the court should not consider the underlying arrest warrant because it was not admitted into evidence at the hearing and amounts to hearsay. During oral argument, the state strongly objected to the defendant's contention. First, the court finds that the defendant waived this argument because he relied on, and expressly quoted from, the arrest warrant in his June 6, 2016 post-evidentiary hearing brief (see pages 2-3, and 5). Second, because the court concludes that the outcome of the defendant's motion does not depend on whether the court considers the allegations in the arrest warrant and is the same in either event, the defendant suffers no harm from the court's consideration of the warrant. Indeed, the allegations in the arrest warrant bolster the defendant's position. Most notably, the warrant at paragraph 17 alleges: " [O]nce he felt comfortable that he was not getting arrested, and after denying all allegations on several occasions, [the defendant] decided to tell us the truth." The causal connection between the promise not to arrest and the confession that followed will be discussed more fully below.
The defendant's motion presents the seemingly unusual factual setting in which a defendant, who is not in custody (and who is not administered Miranda warnings), gives a confession in a relatively short police interview after the police make an unequivocal promise not to pursue criminal charges. Having carefully considered the record, the court concludes that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's confession was not voluntarily given, as it was not " the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker." State v. Lawrence, supra, 282 Conn. 153.
Against the backdrop of the defendant's interview at the department's headquarters without counsel and without the benefit of Miranda warnings, the department unequivocally promised the defendant that it would not pursue criminal charges against him. Although the department's initial decision not to pursue criminal charges was based on Doe's wishes at the time (which later changed), the promise made by the department to the defendant was not qualified in any way. The promise was for more than just leniency. It is the unequivocal nature of the department's promise, coupled with the nature of what was promised (i.e., no criminal charges against the defendant), that distinguishes this case from the more typical scenario in which a defendant is given limited, vague and/or qualified promises of leniency. See, e.g., U.S. v. Pryor, 474 Fed.Appx. 831, 835 (2d Cir. 2012) (" nothing in the record indicates that Bullock was promised that he would never be charged with an offense"); State v. Gaines, 295 F.3d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Morris, 491 F.Supp. 226, 230 (S.D.Ga. 1980); Green v. Scully, supra, 850 F.2d 903 (offer of psychiatric help could not be construed as offer of leniency; State v. Janice, supra, 20 Conn.App. 217-18.
Moreover, by the express terms of Samuda's own testimony at the hearing, as well the allegations of the warrant, it is clear that the defendant made incriminating statements only after he felt comfortable that he would not be arrested based on the alleged incident. This causal connection between the confession and the department's conduct renders the confession involuntary. See State v. Castillo, supra, 165 Conn.App. 724 (" Ordinarily, a court will deem a statement or confession involuntary only if there is some coercive police conduct that is causally related to it."); cf. Green v. Scully, supra, 850 F.2d 904 (concluding that defendant's confession was voluntary because it was given for reasons unrelated to law enforcement tactics).
The court has found no binding authority, and the parties have cited none, that presents a similar factual scenario. However, while mindful that each case rests on its own facts, the court notes that the better weight of authority from other jurisdictions--specifically, cases in which the defendant was not in custody, the police made an unequivocal promise not to arrest the defendant, and a confession followed--supports the court's conclusion. See, e.g., State v. Burr, 126 Ariz. 338. 339-40, 615 P.2d 635 (1980) (holding that incriminating statements made following promise not to prosecute should have been suppressed); Walker v. State, 771 So.2d 573, 575-76 (Fla.Ct.App., 1st Dist. 2000) (reversing denial of motion to suppress inculpatory statements given following promise of no arrest in exchange for cooperation); Kansas v. Cousins, No. 112, 497, Id. -23 (Aug. 7, 2015) (unpublished) (affirming order to suppress confession given after police promise not to arrest, such promise, among other circumstances, having rendered the defendant's non-custodial incriminating statements involuntary); Commonwealth v. Stewart, No. 07-P-35, (Feb. 13, 2009) (unpublished) (affirming suppression of confession given following explicit promise not to arrest); Commonwealth v. Journell, 2 Va. 234, 235-41 (1984); see also United States v. Rogers, 906 F.2d 189, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1990).
While not directly on point, additional related cases--in which the police made, while the defendant was in custody, a promise not to arrest--buttress the court's conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 59 F.Supp.3d 648, 653 (D.Vt. 2014); United States ex rel. Caserino v. Denno, 259 F.Supp. 784, 788-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (concluding that incriminating statements that were induced by promise of immunity or leniency should have been barred from evidence); People v. Brown, 123 Misc.2d 983, 986-88, 474 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1984) (granting motion to suppress).
In sum, the court concludes that, in light of the unequivocal nature of the department's promise not to arrest the defendant and the fact that " such promise was the motivating cause of the confession, " State v. Janice, 20 Conn.App. 212, 217, 565 A.2d 553 (1989), the use of the defendant's confession would deprive him of a fundamentally fair trial under the federal and state constitutions. Accordingly, the confession is ordered suppressed.
IV
Based on the foregoing, the court grants the defendant's motion to suppress dated February 9, 2016.