State v. Grunow

9 Citing cases

  1. State v. Grunow

    102 N.J. 133 (N.J. 1986)   Cited 151 times
    In Grunow, the Appellate Division had concurred with the defendant that passion/provocation mitigation should be available to defendants charged with aggravated manslaughter as well as those charged with murder, and had reversed the defendant's aggravated manslaughter conviction for a killing arising from a “love triangle” among the defendant, his employee and the employee's husband, the victim.

    On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction because the instructions to the jury impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to defendant to establish that the act was "committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation" (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2)) so as to reduce murder to manslaughter. 199 N.J. Super. 241, 246-49 (1985). (For convenience, hereafter we refer to this statutory element as "passion/provocation.")

  2. State v. Ciuffreda

    602 A.2d 267 (N.J. 1992)   Cited 14 times
    Stating that self-defense could be valid justification against both aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter

    The trial court instructed the jury not only on aggravated manslaughter, the first-degree offense for which defendant had been indicted, but also on reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b(1)) and passion/provocation manslaughter as lesser-included offenses of aggravated manslaughter. In submitting those latter charges to the jury the court relied on State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 419 A.2d 406 (1980); State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 486 A.2d 833 (1985); and State v. Grunow, 199 N.J. Super. 241, 488 A.2d 1098 (App.Div. 1985). This Court's opinion in Grunow, reported at 102 N.J. 133, 506 A.2d 708 (1986), disagreeing with the Appellate Division's analysis of the case but nevertheless affirming that court's judgment, had not yet been handed down at the time Ciuffreda's case was tried — a significant circumstance, as we shall demonstrate.

  3. State v. Galicia

    210 N.J. 364 (N.J. 2012)   Cited 303 times
    Holding that any error in charging the jury regarding passion/provocation manslaughter, when that charge "had no foundation in the evidence" constitutes harmless error and is incapable of depriving a defendant of a fair trial

    The Appellate Division in Grunow held that “[i]t would ... lead to [an] absurd result” if a defendant charged with murder could seek a reduction to passion/provocation manslaughter, but a defendant charged with aggravated manslaughter could not. State v. Grunow, 199 N.J.Super. 241, 251, 488 A.2d 1098 (App.Div.1985). Despite acknowledging that the panel's reasoning “ha[d] an inherent logic,” the Grunow Court felt constrained by the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:11–4(b)(2).

  4. State v. Feaster

    156 N.J. 1 (N.J. 1998)   Cited 278 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding under a plain error standard that the defendant was not denied a fair trial when "it was the weight of the evidence ... that led to this capital murder conviction rather than the prosecutor's improper comments during summation."

    The State may also use demonstrative aids even if those aids are somewhat cumulative to other evidence it has previously presented. See State v. Grunow, 199 N.J. Super. 241, 253, 488 A.2d 1098 (App.Div. 1985), aff'd, 102 N.J. 133, 506 A.2d 708 (1986). Whether evidence is admissible turns on its relevance and whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. N.J.R.E. 403; Carter, supra, 91 N.J. at 106, 449 A.2d 1280.

  5. State v. Gerald

    113 N.J. 40 (N.J. 1988)   Cited 135 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a confession was voluntary although it was given after the defendant was informed that he failed a polygraph test

    Statev. Grunow, 199 N.J. Super. 241, 250 (App.Div. 1975), aff'd, 102 N.J. 133 (1986). These considerations all point to one basic principle: the severest sanctions should be reserved for actors exhibiting the most culpable mental states.

  6. State v. Grunow

    501 A.2d 954 (N.J. 1985)

    Petition for certification granted. (See 199 N.J. Super. 241)

  7. State v. Pickett

    241 N.J. Super. 259 (App. Div. 1990)   Cited 31 times
    Holding where the defendant failed to file a formal motion under Rule 3:18-2, and the record did not reveal a motion was ever filed, the issue was raised improperly on appeal.

    Even though identification of defendant as the seller to Dabal was a hotly contested issue and the jury may have acquitted defendant for that reason, "[i]t is equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on [Counts One and Two], and then through mistake, compromise or lenity, arrived at" an acquittal on the distribution counts. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65, 105 S.Ct. 471, 476, 83 L.Ed.2d 461, 468 (1984); accord State v. Grunow, 199 N.J. Super. 241, 249, 488 A.2d 1098 (App.Div. 1985), aff'd 102 N.J. 133, 148, 506 A.2d 708 (1986). Furthermore, because jurors are free to accept or reject, in part or in whole, any aspect of testimonial evidence based on credibility, State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 43, 214 A.2d 393 (1965), cert. den. 383 U.S. 950, 86 S.Ct. 1210, 16 L.Ed.2d 212 (1966), the jury may have had a reasonable doubt as to whether the State proved that defendant was the person who actually made the sale to Dabal.

  8. Traver v. Pack. Indus. Gp., Inc.

    242 N.J. Super. 574 (Law Div. 1990)   Cited 1 times

    In upholding the admission into evidence of a four-minute videotape depicting the recovery of the victim's body from a buried sealed barrel and the barrel itself, the Appellate Division held that the trial judge did not "abuse the broad discretion he had in admitting these items despite their `emotional stirring' quality." State v. Grunow, 199 N.J. Super. 241, 253, 488 A.2d 1098 (App.Div. 1985), aff'd 102 N.J. 133, 506 A.2d 708 (1986), citing State v. Thompson, supra. The Appellate Division has upheld the introduction into evidence of pictures of a murder victim which the court itself termed "ghastly."

  9. In re Release of Juveniles' Identities to Wise

    204 N.J. Super. 71 (Ch. Div. 1985)

    This doctrine permeates our case law. N.J. Builders, Owners and Managers Association v. Blair 60 N.J. 330, 338 (1972) [ State v. Grunow 199 N.J. Super. 241, 252 (App.Div. 1985)] As stated in the statute's legislative history, the policy is one of protecting the public and their rights as well as the goals of the juvenile justice system and the rights of the juveniles.