Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0239
09-25-2018
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JEFFERY ALLEN GROVES, Appellant.
COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel By Karen Moody, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Harriette P. Levitt, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e). Appeal from the Superior Court in Cochise County
No. S0200CR201600606
The Honorable James L. Conlogue, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel
By Karen Moody, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee Harriette P. Levitt, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Espinosa and Judge Eppich concurred. VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge:
¶1 In this appeal from his conviction for second-degree murder, appellant Jeffery Groves argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements made to detectives. Finding no error, we affirm.
¶2 "We review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion." State v. Brown, 233 Ariz. 153, ¶ 4 (App. 2013). And, in doing so, "we consider only the evidence presented at the [suppression] hearing, which we view in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's order." State v. Carlson, 228 Ariz. 343, ¶ 2 (App. 2011). However, while we defer to the court's determination of facts and witness credibility, we review de novo its legal conclusions. Brown, 233 Ariz. 153, ¶ 4.
¶3 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, an investigating officer testified that in February 2016 officers had received information that DNA from a cigarette butt found at the scene of a 2010 murder was a match to Groves, who had been imprisoned on unrelated charges after the murder, but had since been released. The match was based on a DNA sample in the "national database for DNA," CODIS. As a result, the laboratory that had made the match requested an additional sample to confirm it. The officer drafted "a request for physical characteristics," including an affidavit providing a "brief synopsis of what initiated the investigation," the evidence collected, and the match from CODIS, and seeking judicial approval to detain Groves for a buccal swab. In the affidavit, the officer represented that investigators did not have Groves's DNA and a justice of the peace issued the order.
"[T]he Combined DNA Index System." Taylor v. Cruikshank, 214 Ariz. 40, ¶ 3 (App. 2006).
¶4 When officers went to obtain the sample, they had difficulty locating Groves, despite his agreements to meet them. An officer eventually saw him, and Groves "went with the officer," although the testifying officer agreed he "may have been" handcuffed in accordance with transportation policy. After providing warnings pursuant to Miranda, they spoke with Groves, who agreed to talk to them, and "confronted him with the fact that [they] had the DNA match from the cigarette butt to . . . CODIS." Groves initially denied being with the victim, but, after about an hour to an hour and a half, he admitted he had "struck him in the head" with a rock during a fight after the victim attempted to steal a money bag from him.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). --------
¶5 After the hearing, the trial court determined Groves's statement had been voluntary, but it concluded the officers had not complied with A.R.S. § 13-3905. Specifically, the court found "no factual grounds for the issuance of the order" to obtain DNA because a DNA sample had been taken by the Department of Public Safety after Groves's earlier felony conviction. The court ruled, however, that the DNA would not be excluded because "there was probable cause at the time to take [Groves] into custody for the interrogation" and "[t]he intrusion was minimal."
¶6 On appeal, relying on Dunaway v. New York, Groves argues his statements should have been suppressed because his arrest was "unconstitutional" and "illegal." 442 U.S. 200 (1979). But in Dunaway, like the other cases on which Groves relies, there was no probable cause for the detention at issue. 442 U.S. at 216; see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 812, 817 (1985); State v. Wineger, 147 Ariz. 440, 442-43 (1985). In this case, the trial court found the officers had probable cause to detain Groves, apparently based on the CODIS DNA match. See State v. Love, 123 Ariz. 157, 159 (1979) (officer with probable cause "may arrest the suspect in a public place without a warrant"); see also A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(1) ("A peace officer, without a warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe . . . [a] felony has been committed and probable cause to believe the person to be arrested has committed the felony."). Groves has not explained how the DNA match from CODIS was not sufficient to establish probable cause. See State v. Keener, 206 Ariz. 29, ¶ 15 (App. 2003) ("Probable cause derives from 'reasonably trustworthy information and circumstances [that] would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that a suspect has committed an offense.'" ((alteration in Keener) (quoting State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, ¶ 30 (2000))).
¶7 Furthermore, as our supreme court noted in Winegar, a confession is admissible when it is the "product of a valid arrest, or if, absent arrest, the statement is voluntarily given." 147 Ariz. at 444 (citations omitted). The trial court found Groves's statement voluntary, and he has not explained how that ruling was in error. Indeed, as detailed above, although evasive at times, Groves agreed to speak with officers and nothing in the record suggests his statement was coerced. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Groves's motion to suppress. See Brown, 233 Ariz. 153, ¶ 4.
¶8 We affirm Groves's conviction and sentence.