Opinion
No. 1-538 / 00-1481.
Filed January 9, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, DARRELL GOODHUE, Judge.
The defendant appeals from his convictions for three counts of third-degree sexual abuse. AFFIRMED.
William L. Kutmus of Kutmus Pennington, P.C., Des Moines, and Catherine K. Levine, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant Attorney General, Wayne Reisetter, County Attorney, and Kelli Olson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER, and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Rusty Gronewald appeals from his conviction for three counts of third-degree sexual abuse. He contends the court erred in denying his motion in arrest of judgment and/or motion for new trial because (1) the State failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the jury improperly shifted the burden to the defendant to prove his innocence and violated his due process rights, and (3) the victim's testimony lacked credibility and should have been deemed a nullity. We affirm.
Jane Doe was a student in Rusty Gronewald's eight-grade physical science class during the 1998-1999 school year. After an investigation concluded Gronewald had engaged in sexual acts with the student, the State charged him with five counts of third-degree sexual abuse, five or more years older than the victim alternative and five counts of third-degree sexual abuse, position of authority alternative. A jury found Gronewald guilty of three counts of the five or more years older alternative, in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.4(2)(c)(4) (1999). The court sentenced Gronewald to a term of not more than ten years on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law. State v. Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 2000). We will uphold a finding of guilt if substantial evidence supports the verdict. Id. "Substantial evidence is evidence upon which a rational finder of fact could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. "Inherent in our standard of review of jury verdicts in criminal cases is the recognition that the jury was free to reject certain evidence, and credit other evidence." State v. Anderson, 517 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Iowa 1994).
We find sufficient evidence supports defendant's conviction. Jane Doe testified with great detail regarding the events that occurred between her and the defendant. Her testimony was corroborated by the testimony of several teachers who witnessed Jane and Gronewald together during the time period Jane alleged these incidents took place. Medical evidence also supports Jane's account.
Defendant suggests the jury improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense. He presumes that the acquittal on two of the counts under 709.4(2)(c)(4) was because the jury accepted his alibi. He cites no authority for this proposition. It is pure speculation. The jury is at liberty to believe or disbelieve the testimony of witnesses as it chooses, and give such weight to the evidence as in its judgment the evidence was entitled to receive. State v. Blair, 347 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Iowa 1984). "The very function of the jury is to sort out the evidence presented and place credibility where it belongs." Id.
Defendant also challenges the credibility of the trial testimony of Jane Doe. The testimony of a witness may be so impossible and absurd and self-contradictory that it should be deemed a nullity by the court. Graham v. Chicago Northwestern Ry. Co., 143 Iowa 604, 615, 119 N.W. 708, 711 (1909). Because we do not find the testimony of Jane Doe to be impossible, absurd, and self-contradictory, we will not disturb the jury's assessment of her credibility.
AFFIRMED.