Opinion
IN98-08-1792 1793 IN98-08-0990 0991
Submitted: February 14, 2001
Decided: May 11, 2001
Upon Remand from the Supreme Court Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law.
ORDER
The instant action comes before me on remand from an appeal by defendant-appellant, Bruce Gronenthal ("Gronenthal"), to the Supreme Court. Gronenthal was convicted of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, Kidnapping in the First Degree and Attempted Murder. This matter was remanded by Order of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, dated February 14, 2001, for findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the propriety of submitting the independent charge of Kidnapping in the First Degree to the jury.
Gronenthal v. State, Del. Supr., No. 210, 2000, Holland, J. (Feb. 14, 2001)(ORDER).
At trial, it appeared that there was testimony in the record which suggested that Gronenthal had bound the victim after he had subdued her by smothering her. At that time, I determined that the jury could conclude from the evidence that Gronenthal thought the victim was dead, or knew she was alive but thought she was brain dead, or knew she was pretending to be dead and bound her hands and feet. However, at this time, with the benefit of the transcript of the proceedings, it appears that the testimony regarding the sequence of events is unclear. The victim may have been bound between the second and third attempts to suffocate her with the pillow, in which case the binding of her hands and feet would have been in furtherance of the intended sexual assault.
Trial Tr. at 68.
Trial Tr. at 49-70.
Trial Tr. at 58-70.
In Weber v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court held that there must be a threshold determination by the trial judge that there are facts in the record which would support independent convictions on the kidnapping charge and on the underlying charge." Thus, "the trial judge must determine, as a matter of law, if the evidence of restraint proves that there was `much more' (substantial) interference with the victim's liberty than is ordinarily incident to the underlying crime."
Del. Supr., 547 A.2d 948 (1988).
Id. at 959.
Id.
With the benefit of the written record, I conclude that the testimony of the victim is not sufficient to establish a temporal sequence of restraint that demonstrates a substantial inference with the victim's liberty more than ordinarily incident to the underlying crimes.
IT IS SO ORDERED.