We decline to address this argument because the defendant has no right to challenge prior convictions collaterally at the hearing revoking her suspended sentence except when the prior conviction was based on a denial of the right to appointed counsel, "a unique constitutional defect." Custis v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 1738 (1994) (holding that right to attack collaterally prior convictions used for sentence enhancement purposes cannot be extended beyond the right to have appointed counsel); State v. Grondin, 132 N.H. 194, 201, 563 A.2d 435, 439 (1989) (habitual offender finding may not be attacked collaterally when defendant did not appeal it and the defendant did not allege that he was denied the right to counsel at the prior proceedings); see State v. Gosselin, 117 N.H. 115, 121, 370 A.2d 264, 269-70 (1977) (holding that defendant may challenge prior convictions used to support sentence enhancement when he was unrepresented at the prior trial); see also Fairbanks v. State, 629 A.2d 63, 68 (Md. 1993). At a hearing to revoke a suspended sentence, the trial court is faced with only the narrow question of whether the defendant engaged in conduct that violated the terms of the defendant's suspended sentence.
The motion was denied. The defendant concedes that even a favorable ruling on his motion could have no effect on the prosecution for violating the habitual offender order, see State v. Grondin, 132 N.H. 194, 201, 563 A.2d 435, 439 (1989) (charge of violating habitual offender order not subject to defense by collateral attack on order itself), but he maintains he is entitled to withdraw the 1985 plea for all other purposes. The State does not generally dispute a defendant's eligibility to seek leave to withdraw a plea to a charge of a predicate offense, see Grondin, supra at 201, 563 A.2d at 439, but argues that the failure of defense counsel to advise of the plea's consequences under the habitual offender act, and the defendant's failure to understand them, do not render the plea subject to withdrawal as unintelligent or involuntary.
(concluding that the defendant could not collaterally attack the underlying factual basis of a temporary restraining order in a later criminal proceeding for violating the order); Wood v. Com., 178 S.W.3d 500, 512-13 (Ky. 2005) (concluding that appellant could not collaterally attack the validity of an emergency protective order in a later proceeding for violating that order and this preclusion did not violate appellant's due process rights because a statute allowed appellant to directly challenge the order); State v. Small, 150 N.H. 457, 843 A.2d 932, 935 (2004) ("'The general underlying premise [against collateral attacks] is that a person subject to an injunctive order ... should be bound to pursue any objection to the order through the constituted judicial process available for that purpose.'" (quoting State v. Grondin, 132 N.H. 194, 563 A.2d 435 (1989))); City of Seattle v. May, 171 Wash.2d 847, 256 P.3d 1161, 1163-64 (2011) (concluding that the collateral bar rule prohibited a defendant from challenging the validity of permanent domestic violence order in a later prosecution for
nstitutionality of an injunction by an appeal from their convictions of criminal contempt for violating that injunction); State v. Grindling, 96 Hawai‘i 402, 31 P.3d 915, 919 (2001) (concluding that the defendant could not collaterally attack the underlying factual basis of a temporary restraining order in a later criminal proceeding for violating the order); Wood v. Com., 178 S.W.3d 500, 512–13 (Ky.2005) (concluding that appellant could not collaterally attack the validity of an emergency protective order in a later proceeding for violating that order and this preclusion did not violate appellant's due process rights because a statute allowed appellant to directly challenge the order); State v. Small, 150 N.H. 457, 843 A.2d 932, 935 (2004) (“ ‘The general underlying premise [against collateralattacks] is that a person subject to an injunctive order ... should be bound to pursue any objection to the order through the constituted judicial process available for that purpose.’ ” (quoting State v. Grondin, 132 N.H. 194, 563 A.2d 435 (1989))); City of Seattle v. May, 171 Wash.2d 847, 256 P.3d 1161, 1163–64 (2011) (concluding that the collateral bar rule prohibited a defendant from challenging the validity of permanent domestic violence order in a later prosecution for violation of that order, unless the defendant could show that the order was void). Other courts, however, have concluded that such collateral attacks on a court order are permitted in certain circumstances.
ally attack the constitutionality of an injunction by an appeal from their convictions of criminal contempt for violating that injunction); State v. Grindling, 31 P.3d 915, 919 (Haw. 2001) (concluding that the defendant could not collaterally attack the underlying factual basis of a temporary restraining order in a later criminal proceeding for violating the order); Wood v. Com., 178 S.W.3d 500, 512-13 (Ky. 2005) (concluding that appellant could not collaterally attack the validity of an emergency protective order in a later proceeding for violating that order and this preclusion did not violate appellant's due process rights because a statute allowed appellant to directly challenge the order); State v. Small, 843 A.2d 932, 935 (N.H. 2004) ("'The general underlying premise [against collateral attacks] is that a person subject to an injunctive order . . . should be bound to pursue any objection to the order through the constituted judicial process available for that purpose.'" (quoting State v. Grondin, 563 A.2d 435 (N.H. 1989))); City of Seattle v. May, 256 P.3d 1161, 1163-64 (Wash. 2011) (concluding that the collateral bar rule prohibited a defendant from challenging the validity of permanent domestic violence order in a later prosecution for violation of that order, unless the defendant could show that the order was void).
As a consequence, a court trying a charge of such a violation is justified in refusing to entertain a defense in the form of a collateral attack on the order, the subject of which could have been raised and litigated through the judicial process prior to the violation charged.State v. Grondin, 132 N.H. 194, 200 (1989). Accordingly, we hold that the defendant may not collaterally attack the protective order in this criminal proceeding; therefore, we need not address the merits of the defendant's challenge of the protective order.
The petitioner's first argument is that his nonrenewal by the Laconia School District discriminated against him in violation of RSA 354-A:8 and 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (1988) (respectively, the New Hampshire and federal handicap discrimination laws), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), and the equal protection provisions of the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions, and that the State Board thus acted illegally in upholding this decision. Because the present petition can be resolved on statutory grounds, we decline the petitioner's invitation to address the constitutional issues, see State v. Grondin, 132 N.H. 194, 197, 563 A.2d 435, 436 (1989), as well as the associated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Further, as we determine that the petitioner meets the requirements of RSA chapter 354-A, an act of our legislature specifically designed to protect persons such as the petitioner against discriminatory treatment, we need not address any protection he may enjoy under federal handicap discrimination law.