Summary
In State of Minnesota v. Grimes, 49 Minn. 446, the court held that "A gambling device may be defined as an invention or contrivance to determine the question as to who wins or who loses his money on a contest of chance."
Summary of this case from Lyman v. BruckerOpinion
No. C1-97-162.
Filed October 21, 1997.
Appeal from the District Court, Anoka County, File No. K8-96-8793.
Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, Robert M. Johnson, County Attorney, Robert D. Goodell, Assistant County Attorney, (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Patricia Rettler, Special Assistant State Public Defender, (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge, Huspeni, Judge, and Amundson, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
This is an appeal from convictions for felonious possession of stolen property and gross misdemeanor fleeing a police officer. Appellant argues that prior misconduct evidence should not have been introduced on cross-examination. We affirm.
FACTS
A sheriff's deputy attempted to stop appellant Steven Craine Grimes for speeding, but Grimes led the deputy on a high-speed chase which ended when Grimes stopped after jumping a curb. It was later determined that the vehicle had been reported stolen from a Wisconsin used car lot.
Grimes testified at trial that he did not know the vehicle was stolen. The prosecutor requested and was granted permission to cross-examine Grimes about a specific incident of past misconduct to impeach Grimes's credibility regarding his knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. Two days after the vehicle was reported stolen, Grimes was found at the same Wisconsin automobile lot looking in the window of a car and holding keys to other vehicles on the lot. He was charged there with attempted auto theft. The prosecutor provided the district court with the Wisconsin police arrest records as evidence to justify the cross-examination. On cross-examination, the prosecutor limited his questioning about the incident, and did not mention that charges were brought against Grimes. The court instructed the jury that this evidence could be used only to impeach Grimes, and not to infer propensity to commit the charged crime. The jury found Grimes guilty of both charges. This appeal followed.
DECISION
On appeal, a district court's decision to admit evidence of other crimes or bad acts will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Scruggs , 421 N.W.2d 707, 715 (Minn. 1988). Under Minn.R.Evid. 608(b), the prosecutor may cross-examine a defendant about prior misconduct if: (1) notice is given to the defense; (2) sufficient evidence justifies the cross-examination; and (3) the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. State v. Fallin , 540 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 1995).
Grimes argues that the district court improperly permitted the prosecutor to inquire into the incident of past misconduct on cross-examination. We disagree. Outside the hearing of the jury, the district court considered each of the Fallin requirements. The court found sufficient evidence to justify the cross-examination from the police arrest records, the criminal charges, and the extradition sought by Wisconsin. The court found the evidence of past misconduct "extremely" probative because it placed Grimes at the car lot from which the vehicle was stolen, and it helped the jury determine whether Grimes was credible when he stated that he did not know the vehicle was stolen. The district court carefully considered the potential prejudicial effect of the evidence, and addressed this concern by limiting the prosecutor's questioning and giving the jury a limiting instruction.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted evidence of past misconduct to be inquired into on cross-examination.