Opinion
(June Term, 1843.)
On the trial of an indictment for assault and battery, in order to show some motive of resentment, on the part of the defendant, it was competent for the State to prove that the prosecutor had said in the defendant's hearing, a short time before, "that no honest man would avail himself of the bankrupt law," and then to prove further that the defendant's father had previously been talking about taking the benefit of that act.
APPEAL from Manly, J., Spring Term, 1842, of JOHNSTON.
This was an indictment for an assault and battery on one George W. Daughtry. On the trial, it appeared there had been a political wrangle between Daughtry and a company assembled at a vendue in Johnston County, which was continued into the twilight of the evening, until nearly dark. At the time while Daughtry and one of his friends were engaged in conversation apart from the assembly, some one from behind struck Daughtry three blows with a knife, two of which wounded him. As he received the third blow, he caught around and seized the hand of a man, who, upon being led to the light, was identified as the defendant John A. Griffis. Immediately after the commission of the offense, the defendant was charged with it, and did not deny it. It was also in proof, that there was no one near enough to Daughtry, at the time of the blows, to strike him, except the defendant. No one saw the blows given; and there was no proof of any quarrel between Daughtry and the defendant. But in behalf of the State it was proved that Daughtry declared in the crowd, in the course of the (505) dispute, that no honest man would avail himself of the late bankrupt law of Congress, and, in connection with that declaration, a witness was called and proved that he had heard the defendant's father previously talking about the benefit of that act. This evidence was objected to on the part of the defendant, but admitted by the Court, as tending to establish some motive in the defendant for the act, with which he was charged, and thus to throw light upon the question of his guilt. The jury found the defendant guilty, and a new trial having been refused and judgment rendered pursuant to the verdict, the defendant appealed.
Attorney-General for the State.
J. H. Bryan for the defendant.
The testimony to which the defendant has excepted is not liable to the objection that it is "hearsay evidence." It was not offered to establish the truth of what the defendant's father had said, but simply to prove the fact, that he made such a declaration. If that fact became material or relevant in the inquiry before the jury, certainly testimony of the fact was proper. Now we cannot say that the fact was altogether immaterial or irrelevant. The assault upon the prosecutor followed soon after his declaration, that no honest man would avail himself of the bankrupt law, and such a declaration was likely to provoke to resentment the son of one thus publicly branded as dishonest. We think the State had a right to show this circumstance as tending to point out the individual who took fire at this remark, and wreaked his vengeance on the person who made it. The circumstance, per se, would be exceedingly weak, but in connection with the other evidence in the case, it was entitled to some regard.
PER CURIAM. No error.
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