His convenience in connection with that of all other people, and not merely and exclusively that of the inhabitants of a part of the town of Enfield, seemed to the legislature to require or justify the establishment of the works and its maintenance by the defendant. State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1, 29-31. Whether the legislature may authorize the taxation for state purposes of some municipal water-works, and exempt others or omit to include them in the designated classes of taxable property, is a question that is not germane to the present inquiry.

The mere statement of the proposition is sufficient to demonstrate that the act cannot be sustained here upon the theory that the legislature has power to select the classes of property upon which taxes shall be laid. The doctrine of State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1, that there may be a general law applicable to a particular place, which was applied in sustaining the special exemption to the Enfield water works (Canaan v. District, 74 N.H. 517, 547), is not involved here. In that special exemption there was a public benefit, open to everyone in Enfield.

While it is true that the view that the individual should be protected from encroachment upon his rights by the mere will of the majority has always been maintained here (Williams v. State, 81 N.H. 341, 352), it is equally true that the police power has uniformly been treated as of broad application; and the rule that, where any fair reason could be assigned for bringing legislation within its purview, the question of justice was for the legislature alone, has been consistently followed. State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1, 22 et seq., and cases cited; Barber v. School Board, 82 N.H. 426, 428, and cases cited. "Unless a court can clearly see that a law purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health and public morals has no relation to those objects, it cannot set it aside as unconstitutional and void." State v. Roberts, 74 N.H. 476, 478.

The legislature may withdraw, at will, authority thus delegated or imposed, and exercise it directly or through other agencies. State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1, 30, and authorities cited. While a town possesses the authority, its right to the authority is the right of an agent, not that of an owner.

This rule finds support in cases apparently ignored in the cases purporting to follow the rule of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), the Court upheld the shutting down without compensation of a brewery by the Kansas prohibition law and in State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1, 39 A. 260 (1896), a statute was sustained that required the defendant to cease dumping sawdust in a public water supply. In State v. Griffin, supra at 23-24, 39 A. at 260-61, the court quoted from an opinion by Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85-86 (1851):

These regulations, however, must relate to the aims of the Legislature and must not be contrary thereto. State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1, 30; Two Guys from Harrison, Inc. v. Furman, 32 N.J. 199; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 523. If the authority granted to towns and cities by RSA 578:5 amounts to a power to suspend the state Sunday laws in their locality (which it is unnecessary to decide) it is done by authority derived from the Legislature itself and is not in violation of Const., Pt. I, Art. 29th.

First, there is no specific constitutional prohibition in the New Hampshire Constitution against special or local legislation to fulfill a particular local need. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, s. 2101. As was said in State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1, 32, the "legislature may constitutionally pass a general law in relation to a particular place." Again in Canaan v. District, 74 N.H. 517, 547, it was stated that "no clause in the constitution prohibiting legislation applicable to a particular place or subject is pointed out."

Champollion, Blue Mountain Forest and its Animals, pp. 15, 59 (1899). By special act of the Legislature the defendant was given special game privileges within the park upon the erection of a fence enclosing the entire area. Laws 1895, c. 258; State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1, 30. Section 1 of that statute provided that "all fish, birds, and game of, in, or upon" the park "shall be the property" of the defendant, its successors or assigns.

"The equality of the Constitution is the equality of right, and not of enjoyment. A law that confers equal rights on all citizens of the state, or subjects them to equal burdens, is an equal law. (State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1, [76 Am. St. Rep. 139, 41 L. R. A. 177, 39 A. 260, 264].) So long as the statute does not permit one to exercise the privilege while refusing it to another of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, it is unobjectionable upon this ground.

"This cannot be held to be class legislation, for the reason that all citizens of this State have equal rights to fish in accordance with the rule prescribed, and all are bound by its restrictions." In State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1 ( 39 A. 260, 41 L.R.A. 177, 76 Am. St. Rep. 139), an act of the State of New Hampshire, forbidding deposit of sawdust in Lake Massabesic, but containing no such prohibition as to other lakes, was attacked on the ground that it was not equal and uniform and did not apply to all people similarly situated, operating only against a class in a particular occupation (sawmill) in a part only of the State. The court said: