State v. Brown, 1998-NMSC-037, ¶ 32, 126 N.M. 338, 969 P.2d 313. "Failure to disclose a witness' identity prior to trial in itself is not grounds for reversal. . . . The objecting party must show that he [or she] was prejudiced by such non-disclosure." State v. Griffin, 108 N.M. 55, 58, 766 P.2d 315, 318 (Ct.App. 1988) (internal citation omitted). The prejudice must be more than speculative.

"Failure to disclose a witness' identity prior to trial in itself is not grounds for reversal." State v. Griffin, 108 N.M. 55, 58, 766 P.2d 315, 318 (Ct.App. 1988). Defendant has the burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the untimely disclosure.

The objecting party must show that he was prejudiced by such non-disclosure. " Statev.Griffin, 108 N.M. 55, 58, 766 P.2d 315, 318 (Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted).          {26} Legitimate rebuttal evidence consists of evidence on new matters, and not simply reiteration of evidence in chief.

When viewed in combination with the other evidence linking Defendant to the crime, the expert testimony regarding the palm print analysis was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for first degree felony murder. See State v. Duran, 107 N.M. 603, 605, 762 P.2d 890, 892 (1988); cf. State v. Mireles, 119 N.M. 595, 597, 893 P.2d 491, 494 (Ct.App. 1995) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to support involuntary manslaughter conviction where presence of defendant's fingerprints at the crime scene was consistent with other testimony); State v. Griffin, 108 N.M. 55, 59, 766 P.2d 315, 319 (Ct.App. 1988) (considering testimony of fingerprint expert in determining sufficiency of evidence of identity). Thus, this issue does not provide a basis for reversing Defendant's first degree felony murder conviction.

The determinative question then is whether Setser was prejudiced by the State's failure. See State v. Griffin, 108 N.M. 55, 58, 766 P.2d 315, 318 (Ct.App. 1988) (holding that the "[f]ailure to disclose a witness' identity prior to trial in itself is not grounds for reversal" and that "[t]he objecting party must show that he was prejudiced by such non-disclosure"). 19.

On review, however, the defendant bears the burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the nondisclosure. See State v. Griffin, 108 N.M. 55, 58, 766 P.2d 315, 318 (Ct.App.) (interpreting Rule 5-501(A)(5)), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 97, 766 P.2d 1331 (1988). In the instant case, Defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice. The evidence in question, the slides taken from the victim, showed that she was not raped prior to her death. Nothing contained in the slides implicated Defendant in her murder.

See State v. Freed, 1996-NMCA-044, ¶ 9, 121 N.M. 569, 915 P.2d 325 (stating that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply in the habitual offender context because a sentence is no longer valid once it is proved that the defendant has prior convictions that must be used to enhance the sentence, and the invalid sentence may then be superseded by a valid enhanced sentence); Baker, 1977-NMCA-033, ¶ 17 (acknowledging that "enhanced sentences are new sentences"). {32} Finally, Defendant argues that under State v. Griffin, 1988-NMCA-101, ¶ 17, 108 N.M. 55, 766 P.2d 315, the State failed to provide sufficient evidence of identity with regard to a prior conviction in El Paso, Texas, to enhance his sentence using that conviction. A sentence enhancement under NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-17(D) (2003), requires that the State prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: "(1) the defendant is the same person, (2) the defendant has been convicted of the prior felony, and (3) less than ten years has passed since the defendant completed serving the sentence, probation, or parole."

{50} We reject this claim, because Defendant Chee does not explain how allowing Mr. Martindale to testify prejudiced her. See State v. Griffin , 1988-NMCA-101, ¶ 11, 108 N.M. 55, 766 P.2d 315 ("Failure to disclose a witness'[s] identity prior to trial in itself is not grounds for reversal. The objecting party must show that he was prejudiced by such non-disclosure.").

[MIO 6-8] {6} As we stated in our notice, and as Defendant acknowledges, we review the district court's action in this matter only for abuse of discretion. See State v. Griffin, 1988-NMCA-101, ¶¶ 10-14, 108 N.M. 55, 766 P.2d 315 (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed two witnesses, including one expert, to testify even though they had not been disclosed until the day of trial). Under the circumstances, we cannot find an abuse of discretion here. Although Defendant argues that the State was on notice of the need to procure an expert once he filed his motion in limine, that motion was not granted. The district court instead informed Defendant that he should have filed a Daubert motion to challenge admission of the CDR evidence.

The objecting party must show that he was prejudiced by such non-disclosure." State v. Griffin, 1988-NMCA-101, ¶ 11, 108 N.M. 55, 766 P.2d 315 (internal citation omitted). The prejudice must be more than speculative.