State v. Griffin

Full title: State of Connecticut v. Chazantine M. Griffin

Court: Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Jan 21, 2020

HHBCR1900910000 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2020)

Opinion

HHBCR1900910000

01-21-2020

State of Connecticut v. Chazantine M. Griffin

Hon. Vernon D. Oliver Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Oliver, Vernon D., J.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS

Hon. Vernon D. Oliver Judge.

Claim

The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the substitute information filed by the prosecuting authority, charging him with robbery in the first degree, larceny in the second degree and assault in the second degree. The defendant seeks to dismiss the first two of these charges, pursuant to practice book section 41-8(5), asserting lack of probable cause/insufficiency of the evidence in the information. The court heard argument from counsel and reviewed the warrantless arrest report, from within the court file, upon which the presentment court (Cronan, J.) made an initial finding of probable cause.

Law/Discussion

Connecticut Practice Book Section 41-8 states, in relevant part:

"The following defenses or objections, if capable of determination without a trial of the general issue, shall, if made prior to trial, be raised by a motion to dismiss the information:"

(5) Insufficiency of evidence or cause to justify the bringing or continuing of such information or the placing of the defendant on trial.

Conn. Practice Book Sec. 41-8.

Connecticut General Statutes Section 54-56 states, in relevant part:

All courts having jurisdiction of criminal cases shall at all times have jurisdiction and control over informations and criminal cases pending therein and may, at any time, upon motion by the defendant, dismiss any information and order such defendant discharged if, in the opinion of the court, there is not sufficient evidence or cause to justify the bringing or continuing of such information or the placing of the person accused therein on trial.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-56.

Court’s Authority to Dismiss Charges

We begin our analysis of the defendant’s claim by noting that a trial court is empowered to dismiss a case for insufficient cause under § 54-56 only in the most compelling of circumstances. State v. Corchado, supra, 200 Conn. at 460, 512 A.2d 183. Because discretionary prosecutorial decisions, including the decision whether to proceed to trial, ordinarily are unreviewable by the court absent a showing of prosecutorial impropriety, the power to render a dismissal under § 54-56 for insufficient cause is to "be sparingly exercised and then only with great caution and awareness of the probable consequences." Id., at 464, 512 A.2d 183. In order to ensure that this discretion is exercised in accordance with these principles, it is essential for "the court explicitly to weigh all the competing factors and considerations of fundamental fairness to both sides- the defendant, the state and society, and presumably the victim ... This difficult and delicate process necessarily involves a careful consideration by the court of such factors as the strength of the state’s case, the likelihood of conviction, the severity of the crime, its effect on the victim, the strength of the defendant’s defense, the defendant’s personal situation, and all the other myriad factors that underlie a judgment regarding fundamental fairness." State v. Dills, supra, 19 Conn.App. at 503-04, 563 A.2d 733; see State v. Daniels, 209 Conn. 225, 238, 550 A.2d 885 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1069, 109 S.Ct. 1349, 103 L.Ed.2d 817 (1989); State v. Corchado, supra, at 458-59, 512 A.2d 183. Thus, a trial court’s invocation of its authority to dismiss a case under the insufficient cause prong of § 54-56 can be justified only when: (1) the court expressly and carefully has considered all of the relevant competing factors; and (2) dismissal is supported by overriding equitable considerations.

State v. Kinchen, 707 A.2d 1255, 1262 (Conn. 1998).

"...[U]nless constitutional or other compelling reasons require otherwise, we abstain from setting policy for the performance of the prosecutorial function." State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 478, 497 A.2d 974 (1985); see State v. Haskins, 188 Conn. 432, 474, 450 A.2d 828 (1982) ("[s]o long as [the prosecutor] acts within the jurisdiction of his office it is not appropriate for a court to set policy for the performance of his prosecutorial function"). Consistently with this principle, the court, "[i]n the absence of statutory authority ... has no power of its own motion to dismiss a criminal prosecution unless there is a fundamental legal defect in the information or indictment (such as want of jurisdiction or form of the information), or a constitutional defect such as denial of the right to a speedy trial ..." State v. Carr, 172 Conn. 608, 610-11, 376 A.2d 74 (1977); State v. Dills, 19 Conn.App. 495, 500, 563 A.2d 733 (1989).

State v. Kinchen, 243 Conn. 690 (1998).

In determining whether the evidence proffered by the state is adequate to avoid dismissal, such proof must be viewed in the light most favorable to the state. See State v. Patterson, 213 Conn. 708, 717, 570 A.2d 174 (1990); State v. Morrill, 193 Conn. 602, 611, 478 A.2d 994 (1984).

State v. Kinchen, supra, 243 Conn. 691.

Fact-Finding, Inferences, and Circumstantial Evidence

It is axiomatic that the burden in criminal cases is on the prosecution to prove each essential element of the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt and that there is no burden on the defendant to prove his innocence. State v. Gabriel, 192 Conn. 405, 413, 473 A.2d 300 (1984). State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 516, 519, 427 A.2d 403 (1980); State v. Jackson, 176 Conn. 257, 258, 407 A.2d 948 (1978); see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 699-701, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1889-91, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). In finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury may not resort to speculation and conjecture but it is clearly within the province of the jury to draw reasonable, logical inferences from the facts proven. State v. Haddad, 189 Conn. 383, 388, 456 A.2d 316 (1983); State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 503, 438 A.2d 749 (1980); State v. Festo, 181 Conn. 254, 259, 435 A.2d 38 (1980); State v. Jackson, supra .

State v. Morrill, 478 A.2d 994, 997-98 (Conn. 1984).

Generally, intent can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. State v. Harrison, 178 Conn. 689, 695, 425 A.2d 111 (1979); State v. Bzdyra, 165 Conn. 400, 403, 334 A.2d 917 (1973)." ‘Intent may be, and usually is, inferred from conduct. State v. Cofone, 164 Conn. 162, 164, 319 A.2d 381 [1972]; State v. Smith, 157 Conn. 351, 354, 254 A.2d 447 [1969]. Intention is a mental process, and of necessity it must be proved by the statements or actions of the person whose act is being scrutinized. State v. Cofone, supra, 164, 319 A.2d 381; State v. Mazzadra, 141 Conn. 731, 735, 109 A.2d 873 [1954]. A person’s intention is to be inferred from his conduct. Kiernan v. Borst, 144 Conn. 1, 6, 126 A.2d 569 [1956].’ State v. Bzdyra, [supra ]." State v. Sober, 166 Conn. 81, 92-93, 347 A.2d 61 (1974). Where there is sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that the defendant intended to commit the crime charged, whether such an inference should be drawn is properly a question for the jury to decide. State v. Sober, supra, 93, 347 A.2d 61

State v. Morrill, 478 A.2d 994, 998 (Conn. 1984).

Conclusion

As there is, in viewing the allegations and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the two challenged offenses, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the current charging document is denied.