That is because "although Georgia law requires independent corroboration of an accomplice's testimony to secure a conviction, federal law does not require such corroboration and, thus, a failure to corroborate accomplice testimony [does] not offend constitutional due process." State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 456 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 (2020) (citing Llewellyn v. Stynchcombe , 609 F.2d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1980) ). See also Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B), 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; Grier , 309 Ga. at 455-56 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 ("As a matter of federal constitutional due process the evidence ... was sufficient to sustain the convictions, regardless of whether it showed [the witness] to be an accomplice." (citation omitted)).
And if the evidence at the original trial would have authorized a properly instructed jury to find that a witness was not an accomplice, that finding would eliminate the need for corroboration under OCGA § 24-14-8, and the witness’ testimony alone could be sufficient to convict. See State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 456 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 (2020) ; see also Fisher v. State , 309 Ga. 814, 819 (2) (a), 848 S.E.2d 434 (2020) ; Kelly v. State , 270 Ga. 523, 525 (2), 511 S.E.2d 169 (1999). At Johnson's trial, evidence was presented that, on New Year's Eve in 2005, Johnson, Reaux, and Williams went to a club and encountered Scott there.
But "although Georgia law requires independent corroboration of an accomplice's testimony to secure a conviction, federal law does not require such corroboration and, thus, a failure to corroborate accomplice testimony [does] not offend constitutional due process." State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 456 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 (2020).
However, the evidence may also authorize a properly instructed jury to find that a witness was not an accomplice, and in that case, the testimony of that witness is sufficient to convict the defendant. See State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 456 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 (2020). Although OCGA § 24-14-8 provides that corroboration is required to support a guilty verdict in felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, only slight evidence of corroboration is required.
Although Georgia mandates this corroboration by statute, we note that federal constitutional due process does not have such a requirement. See, e.g., State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 455-456 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 (2020) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions as a matter of federal constitutional due process under Jackson v. Virginia , supra, "regardless" of whether evidence showed that State's witness was an accomplice, before considering whether evidence was sufficient under state law, specifically OCGA § 24-14-8 ). Byrd's argument that the presence and shooting of Gant's son was an unforeseeable collateral consequence is equally meritless.
Although the jury certainly could have found that Walters was an accomplice of Golden, federal constitutional due process does not require compliance with the corroboration requirement of OCGA § 24-14-8. See, e.g., State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 455-456 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 (2020) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions as a matter of federal constitutional due process under Jackson v. Virginia , "regardless" of whether evidence showed that State's witness was an accomplice, before considering whether evidence was sufficient under state law, specifically OCGA § 24-14-8 ). Golden argues only that the evidence was insufficient under Jackson and does not allege a violation of OCGA § 24-14-8.
Because we are reviewing the trial court's conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Dowell's convictions, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdicts, even though this is not a direct appeal from Dowell's convictions. See State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 456 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 (2020) (reviewing evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict to conclude that "there was some evidence that would have authorized the jury to find sufficient corroboration of his testimony, notwithstanding that the trial judge as the thirteenth juror found corroboration wanting"). Less than a half-hour later, officers discovered a silver sedan parked at a local apartment complex, approximately four-to-five miles away from the convenience store. Three men were observed in the vehicle and were later identified as Dowell, Montavious Hunt, and Eugene Watkins; officers observed Dowell exit the vehicle from the rear passenger seat to speak with individuals in the area.
The properly charged jury was authorized to credit Lewis's testimony that he had no prior knowledge that Appellant would shoot or kill Cullins and that Lewis drove Appellant away from the shooting out of fear that Appellant might shoot him too. The jury could thus determine that Lewis was not an accomplice and that his testimony did not need to be corroborated. See, e.g., State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 456, 847 S.E.2d 313, 317 (2020) ; Kelly v. State , 270 Ga. 523, 525, 511 S.E.2d 169 (1999) ("[B]ased on [the witness's] testimony that he had no knowledge that [the defendant] was planning to murder [the victim] and that he acted in compliance with [the defendant's] orders only because he feared for his own life, the question of whether [the witness] acted as [the defendant's] accomplice was properly submitted to the jury.... Because the jury was authorized to conclude that [the witness] was not an accomplice, corroboration was not required."). See also Vega v. State , 285 Ga. 32, 33, 673 S.E.2d 223 (2009) (" ‘It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.’ "