State v. Grier

8 Citing cases

  1. Caldwell v. State

    313 Ga. 640 (Ga. 2022)   Cited 8 times
    Explaining that this Court is not bound by cases that have been implicitly overruled, and we generally follow the decision in the most recent case

    That is because "although Georgia law requires independent corroboration of an accomplice's testimony to secure a conviction, federal law does not require such corroboration and, thus, a failure to corroborate accomplice testimony [does] not offend constitutional due process." State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 456 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 (2020) (citing Llewellyn v. Stynchcombe , 609 F.2d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1980) ). See also Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B), 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; Grier , 309 Ga. at 455-56 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 ("As a matter of federal constitutional due process the evidence ... was sufficient to sustain the convictions, regardless of whether it showed [the witness] to be an accomplice." (citation omitted)).

  2. Johnson v. State

    311 Ga. 221 (Ga. 2021)   Cited 5 times
    Finding jury was authorized to conclude that witness "had no knowledge that [defendant] intended to shoot [victim], did not share [defendant]’s criminal intent to do so, fled the scene out of fear and surprise, and thus was not an accomplice," despite some evidence to the contrary

    And if the evidence at the original trial would have authorized a properly instructed jury to find that a witness was not an accomplice, that finding would eliminate the need for corroboration under OCGA § 24-14-8, and the witness’ testimony alone could be sufficient to convict. See State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 456 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 (2020) ; see also Fisher v. State , 309 Ga. 814, 819 (2) (a), 848 S.E.2d 434 (2020) ; Kelly v. State , 270 Ga. 523, 525 (2), 511 S.E.2d 169 (1999). At Johnson's trial, evidence was presented that, on New Year's Eve in 2005, Johnson, Reaux, and Williams went to a club and encountered Scott there.

  3. Goodman v. State

    313 Ga. 762 (Ga. 2022)   Cited 10 times
    Noting that "we often … exercise our discretion sua sponte to vacate a sentence for the benefit of defendants if we notice that it is void"

    But "although Georgia law requires independent corroboration of an accomplice's testimony to secure a conviction, federal law does not require such corroboration and, thus, a failure to corroborate accomplice testimony [does] not offend constitutional due process." State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 456 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 (2020).

  4. Montanez v. State

    311 Ga. 843 (Ga. 2021)   Cited 9 times
    Limiting sufficiency review to counts actually argued on appeal

    However, the evidence may also authorize a properly instructed jury to find that a witness was not an accomplice, and in that case, the testimony of that witness is sufficient to convict the defendant. See State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 456 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 (2020). Although OCGA § 24-14-8 provides that corroboration is required to support a guilty verdict in felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, only slight evidence of corroboration is required.

  5. Martin v. Byrd

    310 Ga. 658 (Ga. 2020)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that it was not unforeseeable that "someone might get shot during "the commission of such an obviously dangerous and illegal enterprise"

    Although Georgia mandates this corroboration by statute, we note that federal constitutional due process does not have such a requirement. See, e.g., State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 455-456 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 (2020) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions as a matter of federal constitutional due process under Jackson v. Virginia , supra, "regardless" of whether evidence showed that State's witness was an accomplice, before considering whether evidence was sufficient under state law, specifically OCGA § 24-14-8 ). Byrd's argument that the presence and shooting of Gant's son was an unforeseeable collateral consequence is equally meritless.

  6. Golden v. State

    310 Ga. 538 (Ga. 2020)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that the trial court's curative instruction was sufficient to protect the defendant from the prejudicial effect of a witness’ statement that the defendant, who killed the victim as part of a robbery, had previously robbed someone else and that the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for new trial

    Although the jury certainly could have found that Walters was an accomplice of Golden, federal constitutional due process does not require compliance with the corroboration requirement of OCGA § 24-14-8. See, e.g., State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 455-456 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 (2020) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions as a matter of federal constitutional due process under Jackson v. Virginia , "regardless" of whether evidence showed that State's witness was an accomplice, before considering whether evidence was sufficient under state law, specifically OCGA § 24-14-8 ). Golden argues only that the evidence was insufficient under Jackson and does not allege a violation of OCGA § 24-14-8.

  7. State v. Dowell

    359 Ga. App. 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)

    Because we are reviewing the trial court's conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Dowell's convictions, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdicts, even though this is not a direct appeal from Dowell's convictions. See State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 456 (2), 847 S.E.2d 313 (2020) (reviewing evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict to conclude that "there was some evidence that would have authorized the jury to find sufficient corroboration of his testimony, notwithstanding that the trial judge as the thirteenth juror found corroboration wanting"). Less than a half-hour later, officers discovered a silver sedan parked at a local apartment complex, approximately four-to-five miles away from the convenience store. Three men were observed in the vehicle and were later identified as Dowell, Montavious Hunt, and Eugene Watkins; officers observed Dowell exit the vehicle from the rear passenger seat to speak with individuals in the area.

  8. Fisher v. State

    309 Ga. 814 (Ga. 2020)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that defendant's flight from police, with other evidence, corroborated accomplice testimony

    The properly charged jury was authorized to credit Lewis's testimony that he had no prior knowledge that Appellant would shoot or kill Cullins and that Lewis drove Appellant away from the shooting out of fear that Appellant might shoot him too. The jury could thus determine that Lewis was not an accomplice and that his testimony did not need to be corroborated. See, e.g., State v. Grier , 309 Ga. 452, 456, 847 S.E.2d 313, 317 (2020) ; Kelly v. State , 270 Ga. 523, 525, 511 S.E.2d 169 (1999) ("[B]ased on [the witness's] testimony that he had no knowledge that [the defendant] was planning to murder [the victim] and that he acted in compliance with [the defendant's] orders only because he feared for his own life, the question of whether [the witness] acted as [the defendant's] accomplice was properly submitted to the jury.... Because the jury was authorized to conclude that [the witness] was not an accomplice, corroboration was not required."). See also Vega v. State , 285 Ga. 32, 33, 673 S.E.2d 223 (2009) (" ‘It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.’ "