State v. Greenwood

11 Citing cases

  1. State v. Schiene

    907 S.E.2d 87 (N.C. Ct. App. 2024)

    Defendant alternatively argues that even if the trial court had found that Sgt. Buie smelled an odor of illegal marijuana, the motion to suppress must be reversed following the advent of legalized hemp. In support, Defendant contends the so-called "odor alone" doctrine is no longer valid, challenging the holding in State v. Greenwood, 47 N.C. App. 731, 268 S.E.2d 835 (1980), affโ€™d in part and revโ€™d in part, 301 N.C. 705, 273 S.E.2d 438 (1981). In Greenwood, this Court mentioned two factors for concluding the odor of marijuana gives rise to probable cause for a warrantless search: (1) evidence properly established that the officer believed she smelled marijuana; and, (2) evidence properly established the officer in question was qualified to identify marijuana by its "distinct odor" alone.

  2. State v. Monroe

    193 N.C. App. 753 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)

    "The law is settled in North Carolina that a law enforcement officer may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile if the officer has a reasonable belief that the automobile contains contraband materials." State v. Greenwood, 47 N.C. App. 731, 741, 268 S.E.2d 835, 841 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 301 N.C. 705, 707, 273 S.E.2d 438, 440 (1981). "Our Supreme Court has held the odor of marijuana to be sufficient to establish probable cause to search for the contraband drug in an automobile."

  3. State v. Douglas

    51 N.C. App. 594 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 7 times

    In appropriate circumstances even absent probable cause to arrest, police officers may temporarily approach and detain an individual for purposes of investigating "possible criminal behavior." State v. Greenwood, 47 N.C. App. 731, 735, 268 S.E.2d 835, 838 (1980), reversed on other grounds, 301 N.C. 866, 273 S.E.2d 438 (1981); see, State v. Tillett, 50 N.C. App. 520, 274 S.E.2d 361 (1981). If a police officer can specify an articulable and reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 210, 195 S.E.2d 502, 507 (1973), then a brief stop of the suspicious individual in order to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information does not violate Fourth Amendment rights.

  4. State v. Tillett

    50 N.C. App. 520 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion based on activity at 9:40 p.m. in a seasonally unoccupied area where there had been recent reports of illegal hunting activity

    This protection has been extended to occupants of automobiles. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979) (at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that occupants or vehicle somehow subject to seizure for violation of law). See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 252 S.E.2d 776, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907, 62 L.Ed.2d 143, 100 S.Ct. 220 (1979); State v. Greenwood, 47 N.C. App. 731, 268 S.E.2d 835 (1980). Therefore, in examining whether the officer's conduct was proper in this situation, we must examine both the objective and articulable facts known to the officer at the time he determined to approach and investigate the activities of the occupants of the vehicle, and the rational inferences which the officer was entitled to draw therefrom.

  5. State v. Greenwood

    301 N.C. 705 (N.C. 1981)   Cited 52 times
    Holding that the Court of Appeals properly concluded that the odor of marijuana emanating from defendant's vehicle constituted probable cause to search the vehicle

    Search of a pocketbook found on the rear seat of defendant's automobile subsequent to his warrantless arrest for possession of marijuana was proper since defendant offered no evidence to show any legitimate property or possessory interest in the pocketbook; the State's evidence tended to show that it belonged to a third person and it had been stolen from her automobile which was parked near defendant's automobile; and defendant failed to show that the seizure and search of the pocketbook infringed upon his own personal rights under the Fourth Amendment. APPEAL by the State from decision of the Court of Appeals, 47 N.C. App. 731, 268 S.E.2d 835 (1980), reversing the trial court's order which denied defendant's motion to suppress a pocketbook and its contents. Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by William R. Shenton, Associate Attorney, for the State, appellant.

  6. State v. Dobson

    900 S.E.2d 231 (N.C. Ct. App. 2024)   Cited 2 times

    Defendant raises several arguments concerning prior opinions of our appellate courts regarding law enforcement officersโ€™ identification of marijuana by odor alone. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 22A N.C. App. 171, 175, 735 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2012) ("We have held that the mere odor of marijuana or [the] presence of clearly identified paraphernalia constitutes probable cause to search a vehicle."), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 366 N.C. 578, 740 S.E.2d 466 (2013); State v. Greenwood, 47 N.C. App. 731, 741โ€“42, 268 S.E.2d 835, 841 (1980) (affirming denial of motion to suppress where "the officer, trained in the identification of marijuana by its odor, detected the distinct odor of marijuana emanating from [the] defendantโ€™s automobile" because "it was reasonable for the officer to assume that the odor originated from [the] defendantโ€™s vehicle and that the vehicle contained marijuana"), revโ€™d on other grounds, 301 N.C. 705, 273 S.E.2d 438 (1981). Like a number of similarly situated appellants before him, Defendant raises questions about the effect of the recent legalization of industrial hemp on those precedents.

  7. State v. Covington

    532 S.E.2d 221 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 3 times

    Likewise, our courts have established that police officers may be warranted in making investigatory stops and detaining the occupants of motor vehicles when the facts would justify an "articulable and reasonable suspicion" that the occupants of that vehicle may be engaged in or connected with some form of criminal activity. State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 706, 252 S.E.2d 776, 779 (1979); State v. Douglas, 54 N.C. App. 85, 91, 282 S.E.2d 832, 835 (1981); State v. Greenwood, 47 N.C. App. 731, 735, 268 S.E.2d 835, 838 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 301 N.C. 237, 273 S.E.2d 438 (1981). The relevant standard for testing the conduct of law enforcement officers in effecting a warrantless "seizure" of an individual is that "the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion."

  8. Brunson v. State

    54 Ark. App. 248 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 4 times

    Lopez v. State, 29 Ark. App. 145, 778 S.W.2d 641 (1989). See also State v. Greenwood, 268 S.E.2d 835 (N.C.Ct.App. 1980).See also State v. Schoendaller, 578 P.2d 730 (Mont.

  9. State v. Cornelius

    410 S.E.2d 504 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 6 times

    In addition, we note that once Officer Means smelled marijuana near the car, he had probable cause to search the vehicle. See State v. Greenwood, 47 N.C. App. 731, 268 S.E.2d 835, 841 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 301 N.C. 705, 273 S.E.2d 438 (1981). In State v. Isleib, 319 N.C. 634, 638, 356 S.E.2d 573, 576-77 (1987), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that "no other exigent circumstances other than the motor vehicle itself are required in order to justify a warrantless search of a motor vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that it contains the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime and the vehicle is in a public place."

  10. State v. Douglas

    54 N.C. App. 85 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 6 times
    Adopting the holding of Douglas , 277 S.E.2d 467, and explaining that ยง 14-54 covers mobile homes that are characterized by "the qualities of permanence and immobility"

    Likewise, our Courts have held that police may be warranted in making investigatory stops and detaining the occupants of motor vehicles when the facts would justify the police officer's reasonable suspicion that the occupants of that vehicle might be engaged in or connected with some form of criminal activity. State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 252 S.E.2d 776 (1979); State v. Tillett and State v. Smith, 50 N.C. App. 520, 274 S.E.2d 361, appeal dismissed, 302 N.C. 633, 280 S.E.2d 448 (1981); State v. Greenwood, 47 N.C. App. 731, 268 S.E.2d 835 (1980), reversed on other grounds, 301 N.C. 237, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1981). In so holding in State v. Thompson, supra, the Court stated: