Moreover, even on defendant's reading, none of those cases suggest that a demurrer was an inappropriate mechanism for raising pretrial notice issues. In State v. Green , 245 Or. 319, 422 P.2d 272 (1966), this court held that an indictment failed to comply with ORS 135.520(2) (1965), which contained the requirement now found in ORS 132.550(7). In that case, because part of the defendant's argument depended on showing that part of what the grand jury had alleged was false, this court held that the defendant's remedy was not through a demurrer but through a "motion for a directed verdict of acquittal or a motion in arrest of judgment," though the court was willing to consider the argument even though it was raised through an evidentiary objection.

The state then appealed pursuant to ORS 138.060. "Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution provides that in 'all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right * * * to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof * * *.' * * *" State v. Green, 245 Or. 319, 322, 422 P.2d 272 (1966). The statutes implementing the constitution as to indictments set forth the particularity with which an offense must be charged in an indictment.

Although the financing statement explicitly covers "tools", the word tool in my opinion establishes a security interest only in hand tools of the bankrupt and not in power equipment or machinery. A tool is defined as a hand operated device or instrument used to facilitate mechanical operations and is not thought of as a piece of powered machinery. Dept. of Treasury, Gross Income Tax Division v. Ranger-Cook, Inc., 114 Ind. App. 107, 49 N.E.2d 548, 550; State v. Green, 245 Or. 319, 422 P.2d 272, 274. A tool can be a simple inexpensive machine but not a complicated one. Thresher v. McEvoy (Tex.Civ.App.) 193 S.W. 159, 161. While a financing statement may have the effect of restricting the perfection of a security interest created by a security agreement, the opposite is not true. The financing statement cannot expand the security provided for in the security agreement.

Where matters or things necessary to be alleged in an indictment are unknown to the grand jury, it is proper to allege that they are unknown. State v. Green, 245 Or. 319, 326-27, 422 P.2d 272 (1966); see also, State v. Schwensen, 237 Or. 506, 526, 392 P.2d 328 (1964) (cause of death unknown); 2 Wharton's Criminal Procedure (12th ed) § 279, p 94; see Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) (the means by which the defendant committed the offense unknown).

Reversed and remanded. State v. Green, 245 Or. 319, 422 P.2d 272 (1966).

Defendants are correct in pointing out, of course, that " 'Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution provides that in "all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right * * * to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof * * *." * * * [State v. Green, 245 Or. 319, 322, 422 P.2d 272 (1966)] But defendants do not go beyond a mere citation of that principle to assert wherein they were misled as to the nature of the accusation, nor are we able to discern any way in which they could have been prejudiced in preparing their defenses.

State v. Bengtson, 230 Or. 19, 367 P.2d 363, 96 ALR2d 150 (1961); State v. German, 162 Or. 166, 90 P.2d 185 (1939). Second, defendant argues the indictment does not adequately describe the property embezzled, relying on State v. Green, 245 Or. 319, 422 P.2d 272 (1966). The present indictment describes the property as "a certain pair of scales of the value of $75.00."

It should be pointed out that there is no statute in Oregon authorizing a bill of particulars in a criminal proceeding. State v. Green, 245 Or. 319, 327, 422 P.2d 272 (1966); State v. Reyes, 209 Or. 595, 620, 308 P.2d 182 (1957). In lieu the framers of our penal code provided for a demurrer on the ground that the indictment is not sufficiently definite and certain.