Opinion
Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by: Kelly Terry, Asst. Att'y Gen., for appellant.
No response.
ARNOLD, Chief Justice.
The State files its petition suggesting that we erred in refusing to accept its appeal. While we agree that we misstated our guidelines regarding the acceptance of State's appeals, we do not agree that we should have accepted the State's appeal in Gray's case.
Citing State v. Hart, 329 Ark. 582, 952 S.W.2d 138 (1997), State v. Rice, 329 Ark. 219, 947 S.W.2d 3 (1997), and State v. Townsend, 314 Ark. 427, 863 S.W.2d 288 (1993), we said that "we only accept appeals by the State when our holding would establish important precedent." (Emphasis added.) Our review of State's appeals is not limited to cases that would establish precedent. We correctly stated our guidelines for accepting State's appeals under Ark. R.App. P.--Crim. 3(c) in our recent decision in State v. Stephenson, 330 Ark. 594, 955 S.W.2d 518 (1997):
We accept appeals by the State when our holding would be important to the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law. Rule 3(c). As a matter of practice, this court has only taken appeals "which are narrow in scope and involve the interpretation of law." State v. Banks, 322 Ark. 344, 345, 909 S.W.2d 634, 635 (1995). Where an appeal does not present an issue of interpretation of the criminal rules with widespread ramifications, this court has held that such an appeal does not involve the correct and uniform administration of the law. State v. Harris, 315 Ark. 595, 868 S.W.2d 488 (1994). Appeals are not allowed merely to demonstrate the fact that the trial court erred. State v. Spears and Boyce, 123 Ark. 449, 185 S.W. 788 (1916). 330 Ark. at 595, 955 S.W.2d 518. Resolution of the issue of abandonment in the present appeal turned on the facts unique to Gray's case, and thus did not require interpretation of our criminal rules with widespread ramifications. Thus, because the issues presented by the State in this appeal did not involve the correct and uniform administration of justice, we correctly dismissed the appeal. Accordingly, we deny the State's petition for rehearing.
GLAZE, J., dissents.
GLAZE, Justice, dissenting.
While the majority has corrected its opinion to reflect the proper standard or rule this court utilizes when determining if it will grant the State's appeal under Ark. R.App. P.--Crim. 3(c), the majority then incorrectly applies the rule to the circumstances of this case. In other words, the majority opinion rejects the State's appeal, stating "resolution of the issue of abandonment in the present appeal turned on the facts unique to Gray's case, and thus did not require interpretation of our criminal rules with widespread ramification." Not true.
As I pointed out earlier, the State asks this court to interpret Criminal Rule 16.2(a)(4) and the meaning of "other evidence" as employed by that rule. See State v. Gray, 330 Ark. 364, 367-369, 955 S.W.2d 502 (1997), Glaze, J., dissenting, 330 Ark. at 367-369, 955 S.W.2d 502. Gray used Rule 16.2(a)(4) to support his argument that the one-pound bag of marijuana, which was the subject of the suppression hearing, had been illegally seized when Officer Poe was unlawfully positioned on Bruton's private property. See Id. at 368, 955 S.W.2d 502. This issue has never been addressed by any Arkansas appellate court, and is reason alone to grant the State's appeal. Obviously, this legal issue regarding the interpretation of Rule 16.2(a)(4) has widespread ramifications, since our appellate courts, until now, have never had an opportunity to address the question. Accordingly, I would grant the State's petition for rehearing.