Opinion
21-K-659
02-18-2022
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. BLAISE GRAVOIS IN RE BLAISE GRAVOIS
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. JAMES, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE ALVIN TURNER, JR., DIVISION "E", AND KATHERINE TESS STROMBERG, DIVISION "C", NUMBER 84, 79
Panel composed of Judges Marc E. Johnson, Stephen J. Windhorst, and John J. Molaison, Jr.
WRIT DENIED
Relator, Blaise Gravois, seeks review of the trial court's October 5, 2021 sua sponte order of recusal. Relator further seeks mandamus relief from this court requesting the appointment of a judge ad hoc. Relator argues that the trial judge's sua sponte recusal order is legally insufficient. The writ application does not ask this court to reverse or vacate the order of recusal by the trial judge, but instead seeks mandamus relief, requesting that this court appoint a judge ad hoc to preside over the case, and that this court order the immediate setting of the pending pretrial motions.
Relator subsequently filed a motion for leave to file appendix exhibits referencing grand jury testimony under seal, labeled appendix 999-1009, which we hereby grant.
Contention that the Voluntary Recusal was Legally Insufficient
La. C.Cr.P. art. 671 provides in pertinent part:
A. In a criminal case a judge of any court, trial or appellate, shall be recused when he:
(1) Is biased, prejudiced, or personally interested in the cause to such an extent that he would be unable to conduct a fair and impartial trial;
or
(6) Would be unable, for any other reason, to conduct a fair and impartial trial.
A judge may recuse himself, whether a motion for his recusal has been filed by a party or not, in any case in which a ground for recusal exists. La. C.Cr.P. art. 672. Further, a judge may recuse himself sua sponte. State v. Kitts, 17-777 (La.App. 1 Cir. 05/10/18), 250 So.3d 939, 957, writ denied, 18-872 (La. 01/28/20), 291 So.3d 1057; State v. Franks, 45, 818 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/03/10), 55 So.3d 34, writ denied, 11-107 (La. 11/18/11), 75 So.3d 451. A trial judge must step down in any case in which he is "biased, prejudiced or personally interested in the cause to such an extent that he would be unable to conduct a fair and impartial trial." State v. Connolly, 06-540 (La. 06/02/06), 930 So.2d 951, 953. Recusal may be voluntary, as when a judge takes himself off of a case for legally compelling reasons, or simply because he believes that he cannot fairly and impartially judge a matter before him. In re Lemoine, 96-2116 (La. 01/14/97), 686 So.2d 837, on reh'g, 96-2116 (La. 04/04/97), 692 So.2d 358, 840.
On the other hand, a judge has an obligation, part of his sworn duty as a judge, to hear and decide cases properly brought before him. Id. He is not at liberty, nor does he have the right, to take himself out of a case and burden another judge with his responsibility without good and legal cause. Id.
Although relator contends in the original writ application, and again in his recent reply brief, that Judge Turner's stated ground is legally insufficient to justify his recusal, relator does not ask that we reverse or vacate the order of voluntary recusal. After arguing that the recusal was not legitimate, relator nonetheless prays that we appoint an judge ad hoc to preside over the case. The latter is not requested in the alternative; it is requested along with the contention that we should invalidate the recusal. We find these requests incompatible and self-defeating.
Without reaching the merits of the recusal, we conclude that because relator has not requested that we reverse or vacate the order of recusal, and further contends that the trial judge be replaced, we find that this assignment of error lacks merit.
Request for Recusal of Remaining Judges and Appointment of Judge ad hoc
Although listed as an assignment of error, this claim does not allege any error by the trial court, as required by La. U.R.C.A., Rule 4-5 C (5). We nevertheless address these requests.
First, relator did not file a written motion with the trial court requesting the recusal of the remaining judges of the 23rd Judicial District Court. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 674. Nor does relator claim to have made any motion to recuse any judge, or that there was any related adverse ruling. Again, this court is not a court of first impression. We cannot consider issues or evidence not first raised and considered by the trial court. We have no trial court ruling to review on the matter. La. U.R.C.A., Rules 1-3 and 4-5 C(7).
La. C.Cr.P. art. 674 provides:
A party desiring to recuse a trial judge shall file a written motion therefor assigning the ground for recusation. The motion shall be filed prior to commencement of the trial unless the party discovers the facts constituting the ground for recusation thereafter, in which event it shall be filed immediately after the facts are discovered, but prior to verdict or judgment. If a valid ground for recusation is set forth in the motion, the judge shall either recuse himself, or refer the motion for hearing to another judge or to a judge ad hoc, as provided in Article 675.
Second, to the extent relator seeks mandamus for recusal of the remaining trial judges of the 23rd Judicial District Court, we find that relator is not entitled to the relief requested. Generally, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to be applied where ordinary means fail to afford adequate relief. Hoag v. State, 05-857 (La.12/01/04), 889 So.2d 1019, 1023. A writ of mandamus may be directed to a public officer to compel the performance of a ministerial duty required by law. La. C.C.P. art. 3863. A ministerial duty is one in which nothing is left to the discretion of the officer compelled to perform the duty. Hoag, 889 So.2d at 1023. This relief requested herein is by no means ministerial, and in no case could it be the subject of mandamus. Further, there is no right to en globo recusal of all of the several judges of a court. Recusal of judges, voluntarily or involuntarily, is individual.
Further, to the extent relator seeks to have this court appoint a judge ad hoc to his case, La. Const. art. 5, §5(A) states in pertinent part, "The supreme court shall have sole authority to provide by rule for appointments of attorneys as temporary or ad hoc judges of city, municipal, traffic, parish, juvenile, or family courts." Under Article V, Section 5(A) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, only the Louisiana Supreme Court has the authority to assign a sitting or retired judge to any court. Cosse v. Orihuela, 12-456 (La.App. 5 Cir. 01/20/13), 109 So.3d 950, 955, writ denied, 13-680 (La. 04/26/13), 112 So.3d 850. The constitutional grant of supervisory authority to the Louisiana Supreme Court over all other courts is plenary, unfettered by jurisdictional requirements, and exercisable at the complete discretion of the court. Id. Thus, this court cannot provide relator with the requested relief because the Louisiana Supreme Court has the sole authority to appoint a judge ad hoc.
The relief requested-recusal of all of the remaining judges of the 23rd Judicial District Court and appointment of a judge ad hoc-was not first brought before the trial court, nor is there legal authority for this court to do either.
Accordingly, this application for supervisory writs is denied.
SJW
MEJ
JJM