{26}State v. Graves provides further guidance. 119 N.M. 89, 888 P.2d 971 (Ct.App. 1994). In Graves, the Court of Appeals held that "mere presence does not justify the arrest or detention of a person, other than the resident, at a residence lawfully being searched."

Without such authority under the warrant, Defendant argued that police lacked specific and articulate facts to support a warrantless search of his person. Further, under State v. Graves, 119 N.M. 89, 888 P.2d 971 (Ct.App. 1994), Defendant argued that his mere presence during the execution of a search warrant did not justify the officer's actions. {6} The bulk of the testimony and argument at the suppression hearing centered on Defendant's location and the layout of the premises subject to the warrant.

{7} Defendant further maintains that the police did not have a reasonable basis to connect Defendant to the residence or the criminal activity and thus could not detain him. In State v. Graves, 119 N.M. 89, 888 P.2d 971 (Ct.App. 1994), relied on by Defendant, this Court addressed the rights of visitors during the execution of a search warrant. We held that visitors cannot be detained unless there is a reasonable basis to believe that the visitor is connected to the premises or to criminal activity based on the totality of the circumstances.

In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), the United States Supreme Court, in establishing a limited exception to the probable cause requirement, held that "a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." Id. at 705 (footnote omitted); see also State v. Graves, 119 N.M. 89, 92-93, 888 P.2d 971, 974-75 (Ct.App. 1994) (examining Summers in context of detention of non-resident found on premises to be searched). {15} In Summers, police officers encountered the defendant as he was walking down the front steps of his house just as they were about to execute a search warrant.

Our ease law is very clear that mere presence alone at a residence where a search warrant is being executed for drugs does not justify the arrest or detention of the mere visitor. State v. Graves, 119 N.M. 89, 94, 888 P.2d 971, 976 (Ct.App. 1994). In State v. Martinez, 1996-NMCA-109, ¶ 34, 122 N.M. 476, 927 P.2d 31, we specifically stated that police officers cannot detain a non-resident who is present during a drug raid on a home on the basis of his presence alone.

Mere presence in the area where criminal activity is taking place without more is not sufficient to justify the arrest or detention of an individual. See Ybarra v. Illinios, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); State v. Graves, 119 N.M. 89, 92, 888 P.2d 971, 974 (Ct.App. 1994). Second, the officers were required to have more than a bare suspicion that Defendant had some criminal connection with his companion on the night in question.

This Court has determined that officers cannot detain a non-resident who is present when a home is raided on the basis of his presence alone; there must be " 'presence plus' " facts that would make detaining or searching a non-resident reasonable under the circumstances. State v. Graves, 119 N.M. 89, 93, 888 P.2d 971, 975 (Ct.App. 1994). In Graves, this Court held that the defendant should have been released "[o]nce it was established that (1) [d]efendant was not a resident of the house being subjected to a warranted search, (2) the police had no specific reason to fear [d]efendant, and (3) the police had no more than a bare suspicion that he might be connected with the contraband expected to be found in the premises."

Our courts have repeatedly emphasized, "[g]uilt by association and generalized suspicions are insufficient grounds upon which to base an investigatory detention." State v. Prince , 2004-NMCA-127, ¶ 17, 136 N.M. 521, 101 P.3d 332 ; see also State v. Jones , 1992-NMCA-064, ¶ 15, 114 N.M. 147, 835 P.2d 863 (refusing to infer that "gang membership and presence in a gang activity area [were] sufficient alone to support reasonable suspicion"); In re Eli L. , 1997-NMCA-109, ¶ 13, 124 N.M. 205, 947 P.2d 162 (concluding that an officer's knowledge that juvenile was a gang member and "may have been warning other gang members that officers were present" was insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); State v. Graves , 1994-NMCA-151, ¶ 17, 119 N.M. 89, 888 P.2d 971 (holding that a defendant's "mere presence" at a location subject to a search warrant was insufficient to "justify the arrest or detention of a person, other than the resident, at a residence lawfully being searched"). In the absence of any additional facts suggestive of trafficking, it was not reasonable for the agents to believe that Defendant was engaging or about to engage in a narcotics exchange with the woman.

To determine whether such a connection exists, these cases have recognized "that police must make a minimal intrusion to ascertain the visitor's identity." Id.; see, e.g., Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1192 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. McEaddy, 780 F.Supp. 464, 471 (E.D.Mich. 1991), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014, 114 S.Ct. 608, 126 L.Ed.2d 573 (1993); People v. Glaser, 11 Cal.4th 354, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729, 734 (1995); Claffey v. State, 209 Ga.App. 455, 433 S.E.2d 441, 442 (1993), aff'd, 211 Ga.App. 335, 439 S.E.2d 516 (1993); State v. Graves, 119 N.M. 89, 888 P.2d 971, 974 (1994); State v. Schultz, 23 Ohio App.3d 130, 491 N.E.2d 735, 739 (1985); State v. Curtis, 964 S.W.2d 604, 612-14 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1997); State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash.2d 289, 654 P.2d 96, 103 (1982). Finally, a third group of jurisdictions defines "occupant" most broadly to include all visitors within a dwelling, or viewed leaving it, provided that the law enforcement interests at stake outweigh the level of the police intrusion.

.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that "'occupant' refers to any individual on the premises who, from the perspective of the executing officers at the scene, might reasonably have some relationship to the subject premises."), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014, 114 S.Ct. 608, 126 L.Ed.2d 573 (1993); People v. Glaser, 11 Cal.4th 354, 365, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729, 734 (1995) (holding that the detention of the defendant, who drove up to his own house prior to search, "was justified by the need to determine what connection defendant, who appeared to be more than a stranger or casual visitor, had to the premises, and by the related need to ensure officer safety and security at the site."); Claffey v. State, 209 Ga. App. 455, 456, 433 S.E.2d 441, 442 (upholding the detention of a motorist and passengers for the purpose of ascertaining whether they lived in the premises being searched), aff'd, 211 Ga. App. 375, 439 S.E.2d 375 (1993); State v. Graves, 119 N.M. 89, 92, 888 P.2d 971, 974 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that "the police cannot detain a non-resident unless they have a reasonable basis to believe that the non-resident has some type of connection to the premises or to criminal activity."); State v. Schultz, 23 Ohio App.3d 130, 133, 491 N.E.2d 735, 739 (1985) (extending the definition of "occupants" to persons with a "reasonable connection" to the property); State v. Curtis, 964 S.W.2d 604, 612-14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (noting that police may detain but not search a "transient visitor" when reasonable suspicion exists that he or she might be connected to the illegal activity conducted in the residence); State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289, 295, 654 P.2d 96, 103 (1982) (en banc) (requiring, to detain a visitor, facts additional to the visitor's "mere presence" at the scene that associate him or her with the illegal activities to be investigated); cf. 2 LAFAVE, § 4.9(e), at 651 ("The police still must make the judgment as to who is an occupant rather than a visitor, and surely they