"Diminished capacity is distinguishable from insanity because as a legal defense the latter has to do only indirectly, if at all, with a specific mental state." State v. Gough, 768 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Wash. App. Ct. 1989); see also Lewis v. Uttecht, No. CV-11-324-JPH, 2012 WL 2466577, at *14 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 18, 2012) (noting that the insanity and diminished capacity defenses are distinct defenses under Washington law). "[D]iminished capacity does not ipso facto follow from insanity."
Mr. Atsbeha's ability, or lack thereof, to form the requisite criminal intent is obviously a matter of consequence to the determination of the action. See State v. Gough, 53 Wn. App. 619, 622, 768 P.2d 1028 (1989) (`Diminished capacity arises out of a mental disorder . . . that is demonstrated to have a specific effect on one's capacity to achieve the level of culpability required for a given crime.'). Dr. Rose had been the defendant's physician since 1986.
RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(ii), (b), (2)(b)(ii).State v. Gough., 53 Wn.App. 619, 622, 768 P.2d 1028 (1989).Gough.
The mere "[e]xistence of a mental disorder is not enough, standing alone, to raise an inference that diminished capacity exists, nor is conclusory testimony that the disorder caused a diminution of capacity." State v. Gough, 53.Wn. App. 619, 622, 768 P.2d 1028, review denied, 112 Wn.2d 1026 (1989).
The mere "[e]xistence of a mental disorder is not enough, standing alone, to raise an inference that diminished capacity exists, nor is conclusory testimony that the disorder caused a diminution of capacity." State v. Gough, 53.Wn. App. 619, 622, 768 P.2d 1028, review denied, 112 Wn.2d 1026 (1989). Accordingly, based on this record, Holtz has not established that his counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a diminished capacity defense.
"Diminished capacity arises out of a mental disorder, usually not amounting to insanity that is demonstrated to have a specific effect on one's capacity to achieve the level of culpability required for a given crime." State v. Gough, 53 Wn.App. 619, 622, 768 P.2d 1028 (1989). A trial court may admit evidence of the defendant's diminished capacity "only if it tends logically and by reasonable inference to prove that a defendant was incapable of having the required level of culpability."
"Diminished capacity arises out of a mental disorder, usually not amounting to insanity, that is demonstrated to have a specific effect on one's capacity to achieve the level of culpability required for a given crime." State v. Gough, 53 Wn.App. 619, 622, 768 P.2d 1028 (1989). A trial court may admit evidence of the defendant's diminished capacity "only if it tends logically and by reasonable inference to prove that a defendant was incapable of having the required level of culpability."
"`Diminished capacity arises out of a mental disorder, usually not amounting to insanity, that is demonstrated to have a specific effect on one's capacity to achieve the level of culpability required for a given crime.'" Stumpf, 64 Wn. App. at 524 (quoting State v. Gough, 53 Wn. App. 619, 622, 768 P.2d 1028 (1989)). Washington's Diminished Capacity Defense Under Attack states:
Instead, the Washington Supreme Court considered Moore's additional evidence of two expert reports and found that neither supported a defense of diminished capacity. See State v. Gough, 768 P.3d 1028, 1030 (Wash. App. Ct. 1989). As
ΒΆ20 Diminished capacity "allows a defendant to undermine a specific element of the offense, a culpable mental state, by showing that a given mental disorder had a specific effect by which his ability to entertain that mental state was diminished." State v. Gough , 53 Wash.App. 619, 622, 768 P.2d 1028 (1989). The intent to assert diminished capacity must "be declared pretrial."