The court's procedures for circulating and mandating opinions have been written about before. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, ¶ ¶ 25–40, 359 Wis.2d 1, 856 N.W.2d 580 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (setting forth the procedure in full). Others have noted the light case load this term.
The four justices must be relying on the procedure for opinion preparation and mandate adopted by a majority of the court in September 2014.See State v. Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, ¶¶ 30–31, 359 Wis.2d 1, 856 N.W.2d 580(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (setting forth in full the procedure adopted by the court and disagreeing with its adoption).¶ 38 The September 9, 2014 procedure for opinion preparation and mandate is set forth in the Supreme Court's Internal Operating Procedures (IOP) at II G. A reading of the plain language of IOP II G. demonstrates, however, that IOP II G. does not govern the instant OLR per curiam.
Since the change was adopted in September 2014, the court no longer discusses draft opinions in conference unless a majority of justices votes to do so. From September 2014 to June 2015, no in person court conference was held on any draft opinion, including the drafts in the John Doe trilogy. The procedure adopted in September 2014 for processing opinions is set forth in full in State v. Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, ¶30-31, 359 Wis. 2d 1, 856 N.W.2d 580 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). ¶99 Thoughtful discussion and careful collegial review of the draft opinions in the John Doe trilogy would have revealed the internally contradictory nature of the several opinions joined in different parts by four justices.
The core function of courts is, of course, consistent and reliable application of the law. I set forth the new procedure for opinion preparation and mandate in full in my concurring opinion in State v. Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, ¶¶ 25–40, 359 Wis.2d 1, 856 N.W.2d 580 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). ¶ 137 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
Because of the new procedure, the three opinions were on different orbits, with each draft opinion a moving target of revisions and with no opportunity for considering and conferencing the three opinions together. ¶ 86 For the text of our new procedure and some comments, see my concurrence in State v. Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, ¶¶ 25–40, ––– Wis.2d ––––, 856 N.W.2d 580. I
Because of the court's new procedure for opinion preparation and mandate, I cannot comment on the other decision at this time given that I want this dissent to be mandated at the same time as the majority opinion. SeeState v. Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, ¶ 30, 359 Wis.2d 1, 856 N.W.2d 580 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (setting forth the new procedure). ¶ 67 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent.
However, the record is well established on this point through hearing testimony from Morales–Munoz and C.D., such that the police reports would have been merely cumulative. Evidence can be excluded on the grounds that it is cumulative of already presented evidence, and that decision is one the circuit court has discretion to make and is subject to highly deferential review on appeal. State v. Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, ¶ 22, 359 Wis.2d 1, 856 N.W.2d 580. Morales–Munoz fails to explain what else in the reports might have made any difference to his defense and, thus, we are not persuaded that exclusion of the reports was an erroneous exercise of the circuit court's discretion.¶ 10 Morales–Munoz also argues that he should have been permitted to develop testimony that C.D. was involved in an affair with another man. He asserts that this evidence would be relevant to establishing a motive for C.D. to lie about the domestic abuse incident.
” See Wis.Stat. § 904.03; State v. Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, ¶ 22. Friar contends that Brophy admitted that he lacked a strategic reason for not objecting to this further questioning as cumulative, Dkt. 28 at 3, but that's not quite true.
The core function of courts is, of course, consistent and reliable application of the law. I set forth the new procedure for opinion preparation and mandate in full in my concurring opinion in State v. Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, ¶¶25-40, ___ Wis. 2d ___. ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). ¶137 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
We therefore hold the trial court did not violate Murray's Fifth Amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination when it required him to show his teeth to the jury. See , e.g. , Sholler v. Commonwealth , 969 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Ky. 1998) (holding defendant's right against compulsory self-incrimination was not violated when trial court ordered him to show his teeth to the jury); State v. Gonzalez , 359 Wis.2d 1, 856 N.W.2d 580, 588 (2014) (same). [17] Moreover, even if requiring Murray to show his teeth to the jury amounted to a violation of the Fifth Amendment, any such error was harmless.