Similarly, in Rakas, the court observed that “[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his [f]ourth [a]mendment rights infringed.” Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. at 134, 99 S.Ct. 421; accord State v. Gonzalez, 278 Conn. 341, 348, 898 A.2d 149 (2006). Thus, the application of the exclusionary rule, a remedial measure intended to protect against fourth amendment violations, would be inappropriate in the absence of a showing of some such infringement of the defendant's own fourth amendment rights.

¶ 37 A number of courts deciding similar cases under the Fourth Amendment have concluded that whether law enforcement officers were lawfully on the premises when they answered a phone is irrelevant if the defendant cannot show that he or she had a protected privacy interest in the phone or the conversation itself. Thus, in United States v. Congote, 656 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.1981), and State v. Gonzalez, 278 Conn. 341, 898 A.2d 149 (2006), the courts concluded that, regardless of whether police were unlawfully on the premises, no constitutional violation occurred when the defendants voluntarily spoke with police officers who answered a telephone and a cell phone, respectively, knowing the person answering to be a stranger but nonetheless making incriminating statements about drug transactions that led to their arrests. In Congote, 656 F.2d at 976, the court observed that the defendant “instituted the calls and spoke voluntarily and without hesitation to the agents.

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 550–51, 909 A.2d 969 ; see also State v. Gonzalez, 278 Conn. 341, 348–49, 898 A.2d 149 (2006) (“the [United States] Supreme Court has long held that a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subject of a search is a prerequisite for fourth amendment protection” [footnote omitted] ). By contrast, the defendant at the suppression hearing submitted that he possessed standing to contest the validity of the search of the vehicle pursuant to Brendlin v. California, supra, 551 U.S. at 249, 127 S.Ct. 2400.

However, because the petitioner has neither briefed the state constitutional question nor presented any argument as to why article first, §§ 8 and 9, affords broader protection than its federal counterpart, we limit our analysis to the petitioner's rights under the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., State v. Delgado , 323 Conn. 801, 805 n.4, 151 A.3d 345 (2016) ; State v. Gonzalez , 278 Conn. 341, 347 n.9, 898 A.2d 149 (2006).A

The fourth amendment has been made applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment." State v. Gonzalez, 278 Conn. 341, 344 n. 4, 898 A.2d 149 (2006).

"The fourth amendment to the United States constitution provides: `The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' The fourth amendment has been made applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment." State v. Gonzalez, 278 Conn. 341, 344 n. 4, 898 A.2d 149 (2006). The constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 7, provides: "The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation."

Accordingly, we need not determine whether the state constitution affords greater protection in that one regard and limit our review with respect to the remaining issues to the federal constitution. See State v. Gonzalez, 278 Conn. 341, 347 n. 9, 898 A.2d 149 (2006). Setzer offered the following testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress the evidence seized at the time of the defendant's arrest.

[W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gonzalez, 278 Conn. 341, 347–48, 898 A.2d 149 (2006). When an appeal raises questions of law, as this case does, our review is plenary.

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gonzalez, 278 Conn. 341, 347-48, 898 A.2d 149 (2006). After carefully reviewing the court's entire decision, we are unable to ascertain the factual or legal basis for the court's reliance on the abandonment doctrine.

See State v. Batts, 281 Conn. 682, 690 n. 6, 916 A.2d 788, cert. denied. 128 S.Ct. 667, 169 L.Ed.2d 524 (2007); accord State v. Gonzalez, 278 Conn. 341, 347 n. 9, 898 A.2d 149 (2006); see also State v. Geisler, 222 Conn 672, 684-86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992) (defendant must provide independent analysis under particular provision of state constitution). In this case, the plaintiff maintains that he brought his allegations of public concern relating to certain of the defendant's acts and omissions to state and federal agencies, and that it was only after he had raised these concerns that he was suffered from intolerable working conditions.