In essence, the hearing justice agreed with Bouffard's contention that the magistrate in 2006 had in effect imposed a consecutive sentence, which extended the original sentence in the 1997 case, in excess of his statutory authority under § 12–19–9. Despite his findings concerning the illegality of Bouffard's sentence, the hearing justice ultimately resentenced Bouffard to seven years to serve for the 2006 violation based on the re-bundling concept adopted by this Court in State v. Goncalves, 941 A.2d 842 (R.I.2008). Pursuant to Goncalves, a hearing justice who corrects an illegal sentence may modify “the entire initial sentencing package to preserve the originally intended sentencing scheme * * *.”
Re-bundling occurs when one or more components of a defendant's sentence are held to be illegal and the hearing justice thereafter corrects the entire sentencing package in order to effectuate the original sentencing intent. See State v. Goncalves, 941 A.2d 842, 847 (R.I. 2008) (quoting United States v. Martenson, 178 F.3d 457, 462 (7th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis in original.). "When the conviction on one or more of the component counts is vacated, common sense dictates that the judge should be free . . . to reconstruct the sentencing architecture . . . within applicable constitutional and statutory limits . . . to ensure that the punishment still fits both crime and criminal."
See State v. Wade, 297 Conn. 262, 998 A.2d 1114, 1120 (2010) (holding that “the original sentencing court is viewed as having imposed individual sentences merely as component parts or building blocks of a larger total punishment for the aggregate convictions, and, thus, to invalidate any part of that package without allowing the court thereafter to review and revise the remaining valid convictions would frustrate the court's sentencing intent”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Adams v. State, 287 Ga. 513, 696 S.E.2d 676, 679 (2010); Sanjari v. State, 981 N.E.2d 578, 583 (Ind.Ct.App.2013); State v. Goncalves, 941 A.2d 842, 848 (R.I.2008). We likewise agree with those courts that, “[a]fter an appellate court unwraps the package and removes one or more charges from its confines, the sentencing judge, herself, is in the best position to assess the effect of the withdrawal and to redefine the package's size and shape (if, indeed, redefinition seems appropriate).”
“When faced with the interpretation of statutes and court rules upon review of a Rule 35 motion, however, we apply a de novo standard.” Bouffard, 35 A.3d at 916;see also State v. Goncalves, 941 A.2d 842, 847 (R.I.2008). Finally, with respect to a trial justice's decision to execute all or a portion of a defendant's previously suspended sentence after a finding of probation violation, “[t]he [trial justice] has wide discretion when determining the proper sentence to exact upon a probation violator,” and we will uphold that decision unless it constitutes an abuse of that discretion.
In that case, we explained that although a defendant has a right to counsel at a probation violation hearing, such a hearing is summary in nature and the defendant is not entitled to the panoply of rights available at a criminal trial. Id. (citing State v. Goncalves, 941 A.2d 842, 846 (R.I. 2008)). Therefore a motion to continue a probation-violation hearing so that alternative counsel might be retained is more narrowly reviewed.
"[A] violation hearing is summary in nature and the full panoply of rights afforded to a defendant at a criminal trial are not available at a violation hearing * * * includ[ing] the right to a continuance in order to secure counsel of his or her own choice." State v. Goncalves, 941 A.2d 842, 846 (R.I. 2008) (quoting State v. Davis, 726 A.2d 13, 14 (R.I. 1998) (mem.)). A hearing justice's decision to grant or deny a request for alternate counsel requires the careful balancing of "the presumption in favor of the defendant's right to trial counsel of choice and the public's interest in the prompt, effective, and efficient administration of justice."
The R.I. Supreme Court disagreed with this contention based on Rhode Island precedent that "a hearing justice who corrects an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 35(a) may correct the entire initial sentencing package to preserve the originally intended sentencing scheme, so long as the corrected sentence does not exceed the sentence originally imposed." Id. at 700 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Goncalves, 941 A.2d 842, 848 (R.I. 2008)). Mr. Roberts' third and fourth arguments involve his 2009 sentence as a probation violator: he contends that he was not a violator because the only sentence at that time was illegal; and he asserts that his due process rights were violated when he was presented and sentenced as a parole violator.
"When interpreting statutes and court rules, we apply a de novo standard of review." State v. Morais , 203 A.3d 1150, 1154 (R.I. 2019) (quoting State v. Goncalves , 941 A.2d 842, 847 (R.I. 2008) ). "In construing statutes or court rules, it is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that when the language of a rule is clear and unambiguous, this Court must give the words of the rule their plain and ordinary meanings."
Id. (quoting Chase , 9 A.3d at 1254 ). "When faced with the interpretation of statutes and court rules upon review of a Rule 35 motion, however," this Court applies "a de novo standard." State v. Bouffard , 35 A.3d 909, 916 (R.I. 2012) (quoting State v. Goncalves , 941 A.2d 842, 847 (R.I. 2008) ). Analysis
However, "[w]hen faced with the interpretation of statutes and court rules upon review of a Rule 35 motion * * * we apply a de novo standard." State v. Bouffard , 35 A.3d 909, 916 (R.I. 2012) ; see alsoState v. Goncalves , 941 A.2d 842, 847 (R.I. 2008). III