As noted, we are satisfied that the court correctly concluded Detective Maldonado's affidavit provided ample support for the existence of probable cause, rendering any misstatement with respect to the CDS immaterial to the court's decision to issue the warrants. See State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 568 (1979); State v. Goldberg, 214 N.J.Super. 401, 406 (App. Div. 1986).
In addition, "the misstatements claimed to be false must be material to the extent that when they are excised from the affidavit, that document no longer contains facts sufficient to establish probable cause." Id. at 568; see also State v. Goldberg, 214 N.J.Super. 401, 406 (App. Div. 1986) ("[B]efore a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the veracity of the contents of a police officer's affidavit or . . . testimony given in support of a search warrant, it must be demonstrated, among other things, that the allegedly false statements were essential to support a probable cause determination.").
Ibid. ("[T]he misstatements claimed to be false must be material to the extent that when they are excised from the affidavit, that document no longer contains facts sufficient to establish probable cause."); see also State v. Goldberg, 214 N.J.Super. 401, 406 (App. Div. 1986) ("[B]efore a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the veracity of the contents of a police officer's affidavit or . . . testimony given in support of a search warrant, it must be demonstrated, among other things, that the allegedly false statements were essential to support a probable cause determination."); State v. Desir, 245 N.J. 179, 196 (2021) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56). If a search warrant affidavit contains sufficient facts establishing probable cause even when the alleged false statements are excised, a Franks hearing is not required.
In addition, "the misstatements claimed to be false must be material to the extent that when they are excised from the affidavit, that document no longer contains facts sufficient to establish probable cause." Id. at 568; see also State v. Goldberg, 214 N.J. Super. 401, 406 (App. Div. 1986) ("[B]efore a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the veracity of the contents of a police officer's affidavit or . . . testimony given in support of a search warrant, it must be demonstrated, among other things, that the allegedly false statements were essential to support a probable cause determination."). A search warrant may be issued based on the "applicant's affidavit or testimony" or the testimony of any "witness the applicant produces."
Probable cause means "a suspicion of guilt that is well grounded; a reasonable basis for a belief that a crime has been or is being committed." State v. Goldberg, 214 N.J. Super. 401, 406 (App. Div. 1986) (quoting State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 116 (1968)), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 118 (1987). Once issued, a warrant is presumed valid and a defendant challenging the validity of a warrant has the burden to prove that there was no probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant.
If the CI's initial description of defendant were stricken from the affidavit, there would still be sufficient information to support a finding of probable cause based upon the CI's identification of defendant's picture. See State v. Goldberg, 214 N.J. Super. 401, 406 (App. Div. 1986) (holding if probable cause would still exist despite the inaccurate information the defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 118 (1987). Next, defendant argues the affidavit omitted that the second address in the search warrant was in fact a gambling house, frequented by many people.
Howery v. N.J., 444 U.S. 994, 100 S. Ct. 527, 62 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1979) (adopting the Franks standard for analyzing claims of misrepresentation in affidavits utilized to obtain warrants). State v. Goldberg, 214 N.J. Super. 401, 404 (App. Div. 1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 118 (1987) (holding that if a probable cause affidavit is based partly on true, and partly on untrue, statements, the warrant will not be invalidated unless the true statements are insufficient to support a finding of probable cause). --------
Without a basis for determining the reliability of informants' hearsay, there can be no probable cause finding. See, e.g., Spinelli v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410, 416-18, 89 S.Ct. 584, 589-90, 21 L.Ed.2d 637, 643-44 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); State v. Ebron, 61 N.J. 207, 212-13, 294 A.2d 1 (1972); State v. Goldberg, 214 N.J. Super. 401, 406, 519 A.2d 907 (App.Div. 1986). Whether the error was made in good faith and Sheeran reasonably believed that Source # 2's source's information provided the necessary link in the probable cause chain or, on the other hand, whether the error was intentional and made for the purpose of inducing the issuance of a warrant which otherwise would not have been forthcoming is clearly a matter of fact to be resolved by the jury.
See State v. Spruill, 16 N.J. 73 (1954). Compare State v. Goldberg, 214 N.J. Super. 401, 407 (App.Div. 1986) (a search warrant can properly issue on the report of an informant who admits his own involvement while implicating another; the report can fairly be credited because "[p]eople do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own admissions." (quoting United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2081, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971))).