State v. Gillis

10 Citing cases

  1. State v. Hanawahine

    69 Haw. 624 (Haw. 1988)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that the defendant’s late arraignment that resulted from the assigned prosecutor’s workload was "not good cause for the delay [under HRPP Rule 48(c)(8) ] given that [the prosecutor’s] problem is not that unusual" (citing State v. Gillis, 63 Haw. 285, 626 P.2d 190 (1981) (per curiam) )

    That the arraignment took place so late on February 17, 1987 because of her large workload is not good cause for the delay given that her problem is not that unusual. See State v. Gillis, 63 Haw. 285, 626 P.2d 190 (1981) (per curiam) (the normal difficulties in securing a principal witness did not justify the late complaint filing where a continuance could have been obtained). Furthermore, the office policy which required White to file the complaint after taking the case to a preliminary hearing cannot justify the violation of HRPP Rule 48(b) or any other provision promulgated by this court.

  2. State v. Abregano

    136 Haw. 489 (Haw. 2015)   Cited 7 times
    Stating that whether the nature and duration of a period of time is excludable is "dependent on the facts of each case"

    These include HRPP Rule 48(c)(2): “periods that delay the commencement of trial and are caused by congestion of the trial docket when the congestion is attributable to exceptional circumstances,” and (c)(8): “other periods of delay for good cause.” HRPP Rule 48(c) does not give any guidance on what good cause means, but this court has held that the good cause provision “is provided to take care of unanticipated circumstances,” State v. Gillis, 63 Haw. 285, 288, 626 P.2d 190, 192 (1981), and that good cause means “a substantial reason that affords legal excuse,” State v. Senteno, 69 Haw. 363, 368, 742 P.2d 369, 373 (1987) (citing State v. Estencion, 63 Haw. 264, at 267, 625 P.2d 1040, at 1043 (1981)). However, “Rule 48(c)(8) is not to be used to excuse a lack of diligence on the part of the government to comply with Rule 48,” Gillis, 63 Haw. at 288, 626 P.2d at 193.

  3. State v. Visintin

    426 P.3d 367 (Haw. 2018)   Cited 16 times
    Setting forth "principles applicable to the circuit court's determination should the [challenged] motion be further considered on remand"

    The good cause provision of HRPP Rule 48(c), we have held, "is provided to take care of unanticipated circumstances" and events that are not reasonably foreseeable. State v. Abregano, 136 Hawai‘i 489, 497, 498, 363 P.3d 838, 846, 847 (2015) (quoting State v. Gillis, 63 Haw. 285, 288, 626 P.2d 190, 192 (1981) ). It "is not to be used to excuse a lack of diligence on the part of the government to comply with Rule 48."

  4. State v. Choy Foo

    414 P.3d 117 (Haw. 2018)   Cited 25 times
    Remanding for application of a multi-factor test when the family court did not apply the factors in the first instance

    HRPP Rule 48(c)(8) provides, in relevant part, that "other periods of delay for good cause" shall be excluded from trial commencement calculation. This court has defined "good cause" to mean "a substantial reason which affords a legal excuse," Senteno, 69 Haw. at 368, 742 P.2d at 373 (citing Estencion, 63 Haw. at 267, 625 P.2d at 1042 ), and has held that the good cause provision "is provided to take care of unanticipated circumstances," State v. Gillis, 63 Haw. 285, 288, 626 P.2d 190, 192 (1981). Additionally, "a period is excludable as good cause under HRPP Rule 48(c)(8) if the events causing the delay are unanticipated and not reasonably foreseeable."

  5. State v. Jackson

    81 Haw. 39 (Haw. 1996)   Cited 62 times
    Holding that "the scope and extent of cross and recross-examination of a witness is within the sound discretion of the trial judge"

    ra; State v. Wasson, 76 Haw. 415, 879 P.2d 520 (1994); Ikezawa, supra; State v. Kahawai, 9 Haw. App. 205, 831 P.2d 936, cert. denied, 73 Haw. 627, 834 P.2d 1315 (1992); State v. Ho, 7 Haw. App. 516, 782 P.2d 29 (1989); State v. Hanawahine, 69 Haw. 624, 755 P.2d 466 (1988); cf. State v. Dwyer, 78 Haw. 367, 893 P.2d 795 (1995) (remanding for application of Rule 48); State v. Lau, 78 Haw. 54, 890 P.2d 291 (1995) (remanding for application of Rule 48); State v. Hutch, 75 Haw. 307, 861 P.2d 11 (1993) (remanding case for "entry of appropriate [findings of fact]" regarding time periods that may have been excludable); State v. Caspino, 73 Haw. 256, 831 P.2d 1334 (1992) (remanding case to trial court for findings regarding excludability of certain time period, and directing, that if time period is found not to be excludable, to dismiss the charges); State v. English, 68 Haw. 46, 705 P.2d 12 (1985) (vacating judgment of conviction and remanding for entry of order of dismissal with prejudice); State v. Gillis 63 Haw. 285, 626 P.2d 190 (1981) (reversing defendant's conviction and dismissing charge with prejudice). Although this approach to dealing with erroneous denials of HRPP Rule 48 motions to dismiss is understandable, we are troubled because vacating convictions on that basis will, in many cases, subvert the goals sought to be achieved by HRPP Rule 48.

  6. State v. Sujohn

    64 Haw. 516 (Haw. 1982)   Cited 6 times

    We do not reach the question of the applicability of Rule 48(c)(8), HRPP, argued by the State since a specific exception, that contained in Rule 48(c)(1), was applicable. State v. Gillis, 63 Haw. 285, 626 P.2d 190 (1981). Given the exception, the six-month period for commencement of the trial, from the date of arrest, had not run and the order below was erroneous.

  7. State v. Castillo

    No. 32358-7-III (Wash. Ct. App. Sep. 17, 2015)

    In a series of persuasive cases, other courts have charged the State with delays caused by absent witnesses for purposes of speedy trial rights. In State v. Gillis, 63 Haw. 285, 626 P.2d 190 (1981), the Hawaii Supreme Court dismissed charges against Richard Gillis because of delay in bringing the prosecution to trial. The State abandoned earlier charges because of a missing chief prosecution witness.

  8. State v. Caminos

    24910 (Haw. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003)

    (1) the record supports the circuit court's findings that the period of time from May 21, 2001 through July 16, 2001 was properly excluded pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 48(c)(4)(i) and (ii) because of the unavailability of the State's material witnesses, State v. Ahlo, 79 Haw. 385, 393, 903 P.2d 690, 698 (App. 1995); (2) the record supports the circuit court's exclusion of the period of time from September 4, 2001 through October 18, 2001, (a) pursuant to HRPP Rule 48(c)(4)(i) because a material witness was unavailable and (b) pursuant to HRPP Rule 48(c)(8) because defense counsel was unavailable, State v. Gillis, 63 Haw. 285, 288, 626 P.2d 190, 192 (1981); and (3) the calculation errors in the circuit court's Findings of Fact ¶¶ 6 and 8 were harmless because the errors do not change the outcome of Caminos's HRPP Rule 48 challenge.

  9. State v. Camara

    24675 (Haw. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2003)

    13. The period from May 10, 2001, to May 29, 2001 [(15 days), is an excluded period pursuant to HRPP [Rule] 48(c)(4). It is also excluded under HRPP [Rule] 48(c)(3), (c)(7) and (c)(8) because the co-defendant, [Scarlett], consented to this continuance and there was good cause to continue the case for this period of time. State v. Faalafua, 67 Haw. 335, 686 P.2d 826 (1984); State v. Gillis, 63 Haw. 245, 626 P.2d 190 (1981). Since the period from May 10 to May 14, 2001 was already included in the period from April 30, 2001 to May 14, 2001 that was excluded in COL No. 12, the overlapping period has been deducted in this calculation.

  10. STATE v. AHLO

    79 Haw. 385 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that the defendant's failure to comply with Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 4(b), which provides for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal for a period not to exceed thirty days, did not preclude the defendant's right to appeal

    ]" Based on this rule, the Haw. appellate courts have held that periods of delay occasioned by the unavailability of the State's material witnesses are excludable in determining whether a defendant's Rule 48 right to a speedy trial has been violated. In State v. Gillis, 63 Haw. 285, 288, 626 P.2d 190, 193 (1981), for example, the supreme court held excludable a period of delay caused by a continuance requested by the prosecutor, who had been experiencing difficulty locating a principal prosecution witness. See also State v. Hirano, 8 Haw. App. 330, 802 P.2d 482, cert. denied, 71 Haw. 668, 833 P.2d 901 (1990) (it was within sound discretion of the court to grant a continuance because the State's material witnesses were scheduled to be in Japan for a two-week trip the day after trial was scheduled to start); State v. Ferraro, 8 Haw. App. 284, 800 P.2d 623 (1990) (delay due to unavailability of a material witness, which does not appear to be deliberate or designed to give the State an advantage at trial, is excludable delay).