We nevertheless held that a stepparent separated from the family continued to owe support because the statutorily required event — termination of the marriage — had not yet occurred.State v. Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. 560, 507 P.2d 1223 (1973). LAWS 1969, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 207, §§ 1-2, at 1549.

In three cases, the Court of Appeals interpreted RCW 26.16.205 as requiring a stepparent to contribute to the support of stepchildren after separation but before dissolution of the marriage between the custodial parent and the stepparent. Stahl v. Department of Soc. Health Servs., 43 Wn. App. 401, 717 P.2d 320 (1986) (obligation to support stepchildren continues until marriage is legally dissolved); Groves v. Department of Soc. Health Servs., 42 Wn. App. 84, 709 P.2d 1213 (1985) (same); State v. Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. 560, 507 P.2d 1223 (1973) (stepfather who had separated from stepchild's mother was charged under criminal nonsupport statute, former RCW 26.20.030(1)(b)). The Legislature again amended RCW 26.16.205 in 1990.

Again, the rights of stepchildren in those cases had been legislatively established by the explicit inclusion of the word "stepchild" in the statutory language. In re Estate of Bordeaux, 37 Wn.2d 561, 225 P.2d 433, 26 A.L.R.2d 249 (1950); State v. Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. 560, 507 P.2d 1223 (1973). In Bordeaux, petitioners claimed to be stepchildren of decedents for inheritance tax purposes, and the court's task was to determine whether they were in fact stepchildren within the meaning of the tax statute.

The stepparent may be held criminally liable for failure to support the stepchild, Wash.Rev. Code § 26.20.030 (1969), and this sanction has been applied to the stepfather of an illegitimate child. State v. Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. 560, 507 P.2d 1223 (1973). We conclude that Sarah is Elwood's stepchild for purposes of the Social Security Act as well. The government argues that a "stepchild" must be the child of a prior marriage. If we applied this definition, Sarah's failure to qualify for benefits would be based solely on her putative illegitimacy.

Thus, a stepparent is not subject to the family support statute unless he or she has established a loco parentis relationship with a child, which requires more than merely taking a child into one's home or exercising temporary custody and control. See Gilroy, 37 Wn.2d at 934; Montell, 54 Wn. App. at 712; State v. Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. 560, 562, 507 P.2d 1223 (1973). ¶41 The courts below recognized a stepparent's loco parentis status generally presents a question of fact but considered a fact-intensive inquiry inappropriate in the context of deciding the applicability of parental immunity.

aw); In re Grant, 109 Wn.2d 545, 580, 747 P.2d 445 (1987) (Goodloe, J., dissenting) (sanctity of human life is natural law principle which leads back through John Marshall, to Edmond Burke, Henry de Bracton, and even beyond the Magna Charta to Judean law), amended by 757 P.2d 534 (1988); Vergeyle v. Employment Security Dep't, 28 Wn. App. 399, 404, 623 P.2d 736 (equality of treatment may be natural law principle), review denied, 95 Wn.2d 1021 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Department of Employment Security, 108 Wn.2d 272, 737 P.2d 1262 (1987); Stack v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul Pacific R.R. Co., 94 Wn.2d 155, 161, 615 P.2d 457 (1980) (tactic used by railroads to discourage injured employees from engaging in litigation interferes with natural law rights of each employee as a human being); Mead Sch. Dist. v. Mead Educ. Ass'n, 85 Wn.2d 278, 290, 534 P.2d 561 (1975) (Finley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (contempt power subject to natural law limitations); State v. Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. 560, 562, 507 P.2d 1223 (1973) (natural law relation between step-parent and step-child); State v. Russell, 68 Wn.2d 748, 755, 415 P.2d 503 (1966) (providing minor children with necessities of life is a principle of natural law); Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wn.2d 616, 627, 277 P.2d 352 (1954) (Hill, J., dissenting) (freedom of action and private property are closely related to doctrines of natural law and inalienable rights); In re Hudson, 13 Wn.2d 673, 692, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (principle of natural law that father knows far better as a rule what is good for his children than a court of justice and (at page 693) the obligation of parents to provide their minor children with the necessaries of life is a principle of natural law); In re Fujimoto's Guardianship, 130 Wn. 188, 193, 226 P. 505, 39 A.L.R. 937 (1924) (by natural law minors are entitled to the guidance and care of their parents); Jordan v. Jordan, Wentworth Co., 129 Wn. 126, 130, 224 P. 389 (1924) (principle of contribution is not based on contract but na

At common law, a stepparent-stepchild relationship imposes no obligations and confers no benefits on either the stepparent or the child. Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal.3d 342, 131 Cal.Rptr. 3, 551 P.2d 323, 331 (1976); Harper v. New Mexico Department of Human Services, 95 N.M. 471, 623 P.2d 985, 987 (1980); State v. Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. 560, 507 P.2d 1223, 1224 (1973); see also 4 H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 6.2, at 188 (1968). Since a stepparent need not support a stepchild, any such support provided must be presumed to be a gift.

Estate of Smith v. Nicholson, 49 Wn.2d 229, 299 P.2d 550 (1956).Estate of Griffen v. Haugland, 86 Wn.2d 223, 543 P.2d 245 (1975); State v. Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. 560, 507 P.2d 1223 (1973). 542 P.2d 840 (Colo.

This statute has been construed by Division One, Panel 1, and Division Two of the Court of Appeals. See State v. Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. 560, 507 P.2d 1223 (1973), and State v. Finister, 5 Wn. App. 44, 486 P.2d 114 (1971). It appears that all of the stepchildren involved in this action are living in the home of their stepparents.

Indeed, Mr. Higgins had a legal obligation to support Boyd. See State v. Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. 560, 562, 507 P.2d 1223 (1973). Under the wrongful death statute, Boyd would have had a claim.