Opinion
ID No. 0602015743.
Date Submitted: September 5, 2008, Bench Ruling Issued: September 5, 2008.
Written Decision: September 8, 2008, Date Amended: September 9, 2008.
Upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress — GRANTED.
Allison L. Texter, Esq., Wilmington, DE.
Brian J. Chapman, Esq., Wilmington, DE.
Dear Counsel:
The Court has previously ruled that the defendant's statement was obtained in violation of Miranda. In follow up to the Court's comments and bench ruling on Friday, September 5, 2008, the Court holds that the State may not use Mr. Gibson's statement for impeachment purposes should Mr. Gibson testify at trial. Given all the circumstances, the Court is not satisfied that Mr. Gibson's statement was voluntary, and the Court is also not satisfied that the statement is trustworthy. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Foraker v. State, 394 A.2d 208 (Del. 1978). Mr. Gibson's documented mental retardation and cognitive limitations (noted in great detail by experts for the State and the defense), his lack of a high school degree, and his lack of prior dealings with the police, coupled with the custodial setting and the interrogator's comment telling Gibson he had to tell her what happened, render his statement involuntary — not the product of his "free and rational choice." See also Mental Health Status and Vulnerability to Police Interrogation Tactics, CRIM. JUST. Fall 2007, at 5-7. Use of Mr. Gibson's statement for any purpose under these circumstances would be a denial of due process of law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.