Finally, we note that evidence presented in Branham establishing foreseeability, namely, the testimony that the children had previously left the apartment when left alone, further distinguishes it from the present case wherein, as we have noted, the testimony indicated that the two year old had never left the home before under these circumstances. The dissent also cites State v. Fields, 302 Conn. 236, 24 A.3d 1243 (2011), and State v. George, 37 Conn.App. 388, 390, 656 A.2d 232 (1995), for the proposition “that leaving young children at home alone for any appreciable period of time will support a conviction under § 53–21(a)(1).” (Emphasis in original.)

State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 802, 640 A.2d 986 (1994). Since the "minimum guidelines" prong is applicable only where a statute is challenged as being unconstitutional on its face; State v. George, 37 Conn. App. 388, 390 n. 2, 656 A.2d 232 (1995); and the respondent did not make a facial challenge, we focus our attention on the first requirement. Because the respondent's vagueness claim was not raised in the trial court, he now seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).

The latter principle is relevant only when a statute is challenged as being unconstitutional on its face. State v. George, 37 Conn. App. 388, 390 n. 2, 656 A.2d 232 (1995); see State v. Pickering, supra, 180 Conn. 57-58. Because the defendant's claim here is that § 53-21 is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case, we address the principle of fair warning only within the context of this vagueness challenge. "A determination of fair warning is ascertained in several ways.

In Fields, the Connecticut Supreme Court determined the defendant had fair notice that § 52-21 proscribes leaving a one-year-old child alone in a crib for twenty-five minutes. Id. at 261; see also State v. Branham, 56 Conn. App. 395, 397 (2000) (defendant had fair notice that § 53-21 proscribes leaving three children, all under the age of four, home alone); State v. George, 37 Conn. App. 388, 390-91 (1995) (defendant had fair notice that § 53-21 proscribes leaving seventeen-month-old child home alone). Given that the Connecticut Supreme Court has applied § 53-21(a)(1) to a situation where an individual left a toddler at home alone for less than half an hour, it was not objectively unreasonable for Officer Dunford to conclude that the statute extended to a situation where an eight-year-old was left alone for more than an hour.

State v. Dumlao, 3 Conn. App. 607, 614 (1985). Illustrative cases upholding convictions under the first part of § 53-21(1) include State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93, 116-18 (upholding the defendant's conviction under § 53-21 where he was aware of the child's abuse by her mother and he permitted the child to be subjected to additional abuse), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 224 (2002); State v. Branham, 56 Conn. App. 395 (upholding the defendant's conviction for risk of injury when he left his three young children unattended in an apartment for approximately one hour), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937 (2000); and State v. George, 37 Conn. App. 388 (1995) (upholding a conviction where the defendant left a 17-month old child unattended at home). In those cases, often referred to as "deliberate indifference" cases, a defendant need not physically touch the child, nor is there any substantial risk that the defendant would use physical force against the child.

Moreover, on at least two occasions, the Appellate Court has considered and rejected claims that § 53–21(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct of a defendant who had been convicted under that statute for leaving a very young child or children unattended, without adult care or supervision. See State v. Branham, 56 Conn.App. 395, 397, 402, 743 A.2d 635 (defendant had fair notice that § 53–21 proscribes leaving three children, all under four years of age, home alone), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937, 747 A.2d 3 (2000); State v. George, 37 Conn.App. 388, 390–91, 656 A.2d 232 (1995) (defendant had fair notice that § 53–21 proscribes leaving seventeen month old home alone). Although Branham and George involve factual scenarios that differ slightly from that of the present case, the conduct at issue in both Branham and George is sufficiently similar to the conduct of the defendant in this case that it placed him on notice that causing E to be left alone for an extended period of time was detrimental to E's safety and well-being, in violation of § 53–21(a)(1).

While this court has not had occasion to determine the meaning of health in the first part of § 53-21, the Appellate Court previously has found violations of the first part of the statute based on a meaning of the term broader than strictly physical health. See, e.g., State v. George, 37 Conn. App. 388, 391-92, 656 A.2d 232 (1995) (leaving seventeen month old child unattended in apartment created situation risking injury to child's health and life or limb); State v. Jones, 29 Conn. App. 683, 688-89, 617 A.2d 918 (1992) (engaging in high-speed automobile chase and intentional crash with four year old child in car created situation risking child's health); State v. Velez, supra, 17 Conn. App. 199 (sexual activity with children created situation likely to be harmful to their physical and emotional well-being); State v. Mancinone, 15 Conn. App. 251, 277, 545 A.2d 1331, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 818, 551 A.2d 757 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 1132, 103 L.Ed.2d 194 (1989) (providing children with alcohol and marijuana created situation risking injury to health or morals). In addition, courts in other jurisdictions have also interpreted health to include mental health.

In so doing, the defendant risked the health of the minor children, as they had no access to parental care during these three nights. See State v. Branham , 56 Conn. App. 395, 398–99, 743 A.2d 635 (evidence that defendant left three young children unattended in apartment for approximately one hour deemed sufficient for jury to find that physical well-being of children was put at risk), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937, 747 A.2d 3 (2000) ; State v. George , 37 Conn. App. 388, 389–90, 656 A.2d 232 (1995) (affirming defendant's conviction of risk of injury to child for leaving seventeen month old infant unattended in car between 8 and 9 p.m.). During oral argument before this court, the defendant's appellate counsel argued that the thirteen year old child could care for the six younger children.

In so doing, the defendant risked the health of the minor children, as they had no access to parental care during these three nights. See State v. Branham , 56 Conn. App. 395, 398–99, 743 A.2d 635 (evidence that defendant left three young children unattended in apartment for approximately one hour deemed sufficient for jury to find that physical well-being of children was put at risk), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937, 747 A.2d 3 (2000) ; State v. George , 37 Conn. App. 388, 389–90, 656 A.2d 232 (1995) (affirming defendant's conviction of risk of injury to child for leaving seventeen month old infant unattended in car between 8 and 9 p.m.). During oral argument before this court, the defendant's appellate counsel argued that the thirteen year old child could care for the six younger children.

Id., 562. If the language of a statute fails to provide definite notice of prohibited conduct, "fair warning can be provided by prior judicial opinions involving the statute"; State v. George, 37 Conn. App. 388, 390, 656 A.2d 232 (1995); or "by an examination of whether a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably know what acts are permitted or prohibited by the use of his common sense and ordinary understanding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)