Messrs. Williams, Croft Busbee, for appellant, cite: Error to exclude testimony as to appearance of deceasedand specific instances of violence on his part: 86 S.C. 323. Jury should have been allowed to consider evidenceas to character: 25 S.C. 177; 13 S.C. 30; 30 C.J., 174; 71 Ala., 351; 68 S.C. 306; 13 R.C.L., 916, 918. Mr. R.L. Gunter, Solicitor, for the State, cites: Relevancyand admissibility of testimony largely in discretionof Court: 65 S.C. 1; 85 S.C. 273. Reputation cannotbe proven by specific instances: 72 S.C. 74; 73 S.C. 257; 123 S.C. 24. Charge as to retreat proper: 73 S.C. 257; 85 S.C. 64; 116 S.C. 284; 119 S.C. 120. How far character may be considered: 24 S.C. 593; 83 S.C. 34. July 30, 1924.
Messrs. S.G. Mayfield, E.C. Mann and W.C. Wolfe, for appellant, cite: Powers of policeman in making arrest: 21 A.E. Enc., 2d Ed., 204; 13 R.C.L., 704, 826, 827, 874; 1 Hill 327; 1 S.C. 292; 80 S.C. 339. Self defense: 85 S.C. 67. Mr. R.L. Gunter, Solicitor, and B.D. Carter, for the State, cite: Charge must be considered as a whole: 85 S.C. 234; 79 S.C. 128; 76 S.C. 94; 38 S.C. 346; 119 S.C. 120; 90 S.C. 290; 85 S.C. 240; 84 S.C. 209; 87 S.C. 327; 99 S.C. 432; 118 S.C. 158. Charge on law of retreatcorrect: 73 S.C. 257; 85 S.C. 64; 109 S.C. 409; 116 S.C. 284; 119 S.C. 120. General statement of thelaw is not error in absence of a request to modify: 71 S.C. 444; 70 S.C. 148, 76 S.C. 116. Party cannot complainof charge in absence of a request for a specific instruction: 85 S.C. 64; 86 S.C. 64; 95 S.C. 441; 91 S.C. 201; 64 S.C. 311. December 13, 1923. Petition for rehearing dismissed February 14, 1924.
Id. "The law says if one can give back or step aside, or retreat without increasing his danger, and thus avoid taking human life, it is his duty to do so, and unless he has done so, it will not permit his plea of self-defense." State v. George, 119 S.C. 120, 121, 111 S.E. 880 (1921). It is clear from appellant's own testimony, when Kenneth went inside the apartment, ostensibly to obtain a weapon, appellant was no longer in imminent danger and he was free to leave the premises.
367, 147 S.E. 310; 147 S.C. 514, 145 S.E. 404; 134 S.C. 329, 133 S.E. 31; 5 Am. Jur., 768, Arrest, Sec. 82; 211 S.C. 300, 44 S.E.2d 844; 260 F. 16, cer. den. 250 U.S. 674, 63 L.Ed. 1201, 40 S.Ct. 54, 7 A.L.R. 307; 286 F. 983; 5 Am. Jur.2d 769, Arrest, Secs. 82, 83; 1 S.C. 292, 40 C.J.S. 1023; 161 Ga. 166, 129 S.E. 772; 41 Idaho 616, 243 P. 359; 232 Ky. 159, 22 S.W.2d 599; 202 S.C. 473, 25 S.E.2d 178; 116 S.C. 282, 108 S.E. 93; 113 S.C. 147, 101 S.E. 644; 94 S.C. 458, 78 S.E. 324; 85 S.C. 236, 67 S.E. 314; 82 S.C. 388, 64 S.E. 595; 66 S.C. 469, 45 S.E. 1; 43 S.C. 205, 21 S.E. 4; 33 S.C. 582, 12 S.E. 556; 13 S.C. 464; 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681; 210 S.C. 348, 42 S.E.2d 710; 200 S.C. 504, 21 S.E.2d 178; 113 S.C. 513, 101 S.E. 847; 113 S.C. 147, 101 S.E. 644; 108 S.C. 442, 95 S.E. 74; 86 S.C. 81, 67 S.E. 24; 66 S.C. 469, 45 S.E. 1; 129 S.C. 116, 123 S.E. 788; 129 S.C. 166, 123 S.E. 817; 103 S.C. 316, 88 S.E. 20; 85 S.C. 64, 67 S.E. 6; 85 S.C. 236, 67 S.E. 314; 126 S.C. 528, 120 S.E. 240; 119 S.C. 120, 111 S.E. 880; 43 S.C. 132, 20 S.E. 993; 185 S.C. 184, 193 S.E. 303; 90 S.C. 290, 73 S.E. 177; 72 S.C. 194, 51 S.E. 685. Julian S. Wolfe, Esq., Solicitor, of Orangeburg, for Respondent, cites: As to the trial Judge properly refusing themotion for arrest of judgment and denying the motion fora new trial: 209 S.C. 246, 39 S.E.2d 769; 205 S.C. 514, 32 S.E.2d 825; 205 S.C. 514, 32 S.E.2d 825; 117 S.C. 470, 108 S.E. 119; 111 S.C. 174, 97 S.E. 62, 3 A.L.R. 1500.
t the deceasedin self-defense: 149 S.C. 367, 147 S.E. 310; 147 S.C. 514, 145 S.E. 404; 134 S.C. 329, 133 S.E. 31; 82 S.C. 388, 64 S.E. 595; 72 S.C. 74, 51 S.E. 524; 66 S.C. 469, 45 S.E. 1; 43 S.C. 132, 20 S.E. 993; 33 S.C. 582, 12 S.E. 556; 24 S.C. 283; 5 Am. Jur. 768, Arrest, Sec. 82; 1 S.C. 292; 211 S.C. 300, 44 S.E.2d 844; 260 F. 16, cer. den. 250 U.S. 674, 63 L.Ed. 1201, 40 S.Ct. 54, 7 A.L.R. 307; 286 F. 963; 5 Am. Jur.2d 769, Arrest, Secs. 82, 83; 161 Ga. 166, 129 S.E. 772; 41 Idaho 616, 243 P. 359; 232 Ky. 159, 22 S.W.2d 599; 206 S.C. 426, 34 S.E.2d 779; 1 Mill Const. 34; 1 Bay 351; 202 S.C. 473, 25 S.E.2d 178; 116 S.C. 282, 108 S.E. 93; 113 S.C. 147, 101 S.E. 644; 94 S.C. 458, 78 S.E. 324; 85 S.C. 236, 67 S.E. 314; 43 S.C. 205, 21 S.E. 4; 13 S.C. 464; 210 S.C. 348, 42 S.E.2d 710; 113 S.C. 513, 101 S.E. 847; 108 S.C. 442, 95 S.E. 74; 86 S.C. 81, 67 S.E. 24; 129 S.C. 116, 123; 129 S.C. 166, 123 S.E. 817; 103 S.C. 316; 88 S.E. 20; 85 S.C. 64, 67 S.E. 6; 126 S.C. 528, 120 S.E. 240; 119 S.C. 120, 111 S.E. 880; 185 S.C. 184, 193 S.E. 303; 90 S.C. 290, 73 S.E. 177; 72 S.C. 194, 51 S.E. 685. As to the pistol being wrongfully procured and notadmissible as evidence: 367 U.S. 643, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684; (S.C.) 156 S.E.2d 326.
5. As to point No. 5 in appellants' brief charging reversible error in the refusal to charge defendants' request No. 3, and set out in Exception No. 6, we hold that the same is without merit. The cases on this subject are numerous, and among them are: State v. George, 119 S.C. 120, 111 S.E., 880; Johnson v. Ry., 142 S.C. 125, 140 S.E., 433; Key v. C. N.W.R. Co., 150 S.C. 29, 147 S.E., 625; Holladay v. A.C.L., 150 S.C. 243, 147 S.E., 927. We think that the charge in other places amply safeguarded the rights of the defendants in this case.
Zeigler v. Northeastern RailroadCompany, 5 S.C. 221; Edwards v. Southern Railroad Company, 63 S.C. 271, 277, 41 S.E., 458; Bamberg v. AtlanticCoast Line Railroad Company, 72 S.C. 389, 392, 51 S.E., 988; Chisholm v. S.A.L. Railway Company, 121 S.C. 394, 402, 114 S.E., 500. It may also be proper to observe at this time and in this connection that the Courts of this State, except, of course, when federal questions are involved, are not controlled by decisions of the Federal Courts, notwithstanding the very high regard which is entertained at all times for such opinions and for the great ability and learning of the eminent jurists who pronounce them ( State v.George, 119 S.C. 120, 111 S.E., 880; Johnson v. A.C.L.Railroad Company, 142 S.C. 125, 140 S.E., 443; Key v.C. N.W. Railroad Company, 150 S.C. 29, 35, 147 S.E., 625), and that the utterance of Mr. Justice Holmes, who delivered the opinion of the Court in the frequently cited case of Baltimore Ohio Railroad Company v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 48 S.Ct., 24, 25, 72 L.Ed., 167, 56 A.L.R., 645, to the effect that it is the duty of the driver of an automobile before crossing a railroad track at a grade crossing, if not otherwise sure whether a train is dangerously near, to "stop and get out of his vehicle," has not been sanctioned and adopted in this State, but on the contrary, for reasons, amongst others, so clearly and forcefully stated by Mr. Justice Bell, in the case of Georgia Railroad Banking Companyv. Stanley, 38 Ga. App., 773, 145 S.E., 530, has been expressly declared to be in conflict with our decisions. Keyv. C. N.W. Railroad Company, supra; Holladay v. A.C.L. Railroad Company, 150 S.C. 243, 147 S.E.
The Courts of South Carolina, except when federal questions are involved, are not bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, however highly we may regard the opinions of that great Court. State v. George, 119 S.C. 120, 111 S.E., 880; Johnson v. A.C.L. Railway Co., 142 S.C. 125, 140 S.E., 443. The Goodman case is in conflict with the decisions of this State. We are impressed, and agree, with the decision of the Court of Appeals of Georgia in the case of Georgia Railroad Banking Co. v. Stanley, 145 S.E., 530, where that Court repudiated the doctrine of the Goodman case, and where Judge Bell, who spoke for that Court, completely answered some of the things stated in the Goodman case in the following language: "It might add but little, if anything, to a traveler's safety for him to leave his automobile for the purpose of looking for a train and then, after returning to his car, attempt to cross the track, without opportunity for a later view.
"The law says if one can give back or step aside, or retreat without increasing his danger, and thus avoid taking human life, it is his duty to do so, and unless he has done so, it will not permit his plea of self-defense." State v. Burriss , 334 S.C. 256, 268, 513 S.E.2d 104, 111 (1999) (Burnett, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. George , 119 S.C. 120, 121, 111 S.E. 880, 880 (1921) ). "Unless the incident occur[s] in the accused's home or business or on the curtilage thereof, the accused generally has a duty to retreat." State v. Jackson (C. Jackson) , 384 S.C. 29, 37, 681 S.E.2d 17, 21 (Ct. App. 2009).
"The law says if one can give back or step aside, or retreat without increasing his danger, and thus avoid taking human life, it is his duty to do so, and unless he has done so, it will not permit his plea of self-defense." State v. Burriss, 334 S.C. 256, 268, 513 S.E.2d 104, 111 (1999) (Burnett, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. George, 119 S.C. 120, 121, 111 S.E. 880 (1921)).The trial court did not err in ruling Muns could not meet the fourth element of self-defense—that the defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the danger—as Muns presented no evidence that he had no other probable means of avoiding the danger of losing his own life or sustaining serious bodily injury than to act as he did. Muns argues on appeal that he was trapped between Victim's car and his open truck door; however, Muns never testified that he was "trapped" or that his only exit was blocked by his open truck door, with no ability to retreat from the area of the vehicles.