Opinion
No. 51578-1-I.
Filed: June 1, 2004.
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 02-8-02817-1. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 12/17/2002. Judge signing: Hon. Dale Ramerman.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Maureen Marie Cyr, Washington Appellate Project, 1305 4th Ave Ste 802, Seattle, WA 98101-2402.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Andrea Ruth Vitalich, King Co Pros Ofc/Appellate Unit, 1850 Key Tower, 700 5th Ave, Seattle, WA 98104.
The warrantless strip search of a person in custody at a detention facility is lawful if there is a reasonable suspicion that the strip search is necessary to discover contraband Here, an experienced narcotics detective knew that G.D., a minor, had been involved in prior drug-related contacts, and that he had been arrested with $754 dollars in cash in his possession. We hold that there was a reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful warrantless strip search of G.D., and that the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence the cocaine that the search yielded. Moreover, we hold that there was sufficient evidence, independent of the disputed evidence gathered through G.D.'s cell phone, to support his conviction for possession with intent to deliver. We affirm.
FACTS
Seattle Police Officers Tietjen and Hansen received a complaint from a parking lot attendant that an apparently intoxicated driver was blocking access to the attendant's lot and was refusing to move his car. The officers investigated the complaint and found G.D., a minor, in the driver's seat of the car. His speech was slurred, he appeared incoherent, and he failed to respond to Officer Tietjen's commands. The officers arrested G.D. for criminal trespass and obstruction.
After they arrested him, the officers searched G.D. at the scene and discovered $754 in cash in his pockets. Officer Tietjen searched the car, which was not G.D.'s, and found a cell phone near the driver's seat. Without a warrant, and without G.D.'s consent, Officer Tietjen took the phone from the car. The officers parked the car and took G.D. and the cell phone to the police station.
As the officers were booking G.D. at the station, the cell phone rang several times. Seattle Police Detective Dornay was near the ringing phone, and he learned that it belonged to G.D. Detective Dornay, a narcotics detective, recalled having drug-related contact with G.D. in the past, and he learned that G.D. had been arrested with a large amount of cash. Detective Dornay answered the cell phone and spoke with a caller who wanted to buy `$50 worth.' Based on all of this information, Detective Dornay and the other officers conducted a warrantless strip search of G.D. This search yielded a plastic bag containing five grams of cocaine.
The trial court denied G.D.'s motion to suppress the cocaine. It concluded that the strip search was lawful because the officers had sufficient information to form a reasonable suspicion that the search was necessary to discover contraband The trial court eventually found G.D. guilty of cocaine possession with intent to deliver, a violation of RCW 69.50.401(a).
DISCUSSION
G.D. assigns error to the trial court's conclusion that the warrantless strip search was lawful. He argues that the search was the fruit of the warrantless search and seizure of his cell phone, which the State did not show was lawful under any exception to the warrant requirement. We treat unchallenged findings of fact as verities on appeal. We review the trial court's conclusions of law for legal error, but we may affirm the trial court on `any ground within the pleadings and proof.'
State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994). The only finding of fact to which G.D.'s assigns error is not relevant to our decision.
State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 214, 970 P.2d 722 (1999).
State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 242, 937 P.2d 587 (1997); State v. Hudson, 79 Wn. App. 193, 194, 900 P.2d 1130 (1995), affirmed, 130 Wn.2d 48, 921 P.2d 538 (1996).
RCW 10.79.130(1) provides:
No person [in custody at a detention facility] may be strip searched without a warrant unless:
(a) There is a reasonable suspicion to believe that a strip search is necessary to discover . . . contraband . . . that constitutes a threat to the security of a . . . detention . . . facility. . . . The reasonable suspicion standard required by RCW 10.79.130 is the same as the reasonable articulable suspicion standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio. Thus, in State v. Harris, we held that reasonable suspicion supported a strip search for concealed drugs where a police officer noticed that the defendant was holding his buttocks tightly together during a search for weapons, where the officer had prior dealings with the defendant and believed he was involved with narcotics, and where the defendant asked to use the bathroom immediately upon arrival at precinct.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
State v. Harris, 66 Wn. App. 636, 639, 643-44, 833 P.2d 402 (1992).
Here, Detective Dornay had had prior drug-related contacts with G.D., and knew that G.D. was intoxicated and had been arrested with a large amount of cash. In light of Detective Dornay's training and years of experience in narcotics investigations as a patrol officer and detective, and his experience in conducting `hundreds and hundreds' of jailhouse strip searches, we hold that it was reasonable for Detective Dornay to suspect that G.D. was concealing drugs on his person, and that the strip search was necessary to discover them.
The evidence that Detective Dornay gathered through the cell phone was not necessary to support the reasonable suspicion required for the strip search. Thus, we decline to address G.D.'s arguments with respect to the search and seizure of his cell phone. We affirm the trial court's ruling on the alternative ground argued by the parties below that the officers had sufficient information apart from the cell phone to form the required reasonable suspicion.
See Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Nov. 6, 2002) at 70-72, 75-76; Clerk's Papers at 18.
G.D. also contends that without the evidence gathered through his cell phone, there was insufficient evidence to sustain his adjudication of guilt for possession with intent to deliver. We disagree.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The reviewing court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State and interpret those inferences most strongly against the defendant.
State v. Hagler, 74 Wn. App. 232, 234-35, 872 P.2d 85 (1994) (citations omitted).
The elements of possession with intent to deliver are: (1) unlawful possession (2) with intent to deliver (3) a controlled substance; in this case, cocaine. Having established the admissibility of the evidence that G.D. possessed cocaine, the only issue is whether the State presented sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the element of intent to deliver.
In State v. Hagler, we held that a defendant's possession of 2.8 grams of cocaine and $342 in cash was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed cocaine with intent to deliver. The juvenile defendant's possession of such a large amount of cash constituted the additional factor suggestive of sale that is necessary to prove intent to deliver.
Hagler, 74 Wn. App. at 236.
Hagler, 74 Wn. App. at 236.
Here, G.D. possessed over twice the amount of cash at issue in Hagler. The inference from that much cash provided sufficient circumstantial evidence for the trial court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that G.D. intended to deliver the cocaine.
We affirm.
ELLINGTON, BECKER, JJ., concur.