. . . The general rule is that restrictions on the scope of cross-examination are within the sound discretion of the trial judge . . . but this discretion comes into play only after the defendant has been permitted cross-examination sufficient to satisfy the sixth amendment." State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 508, 438 A.2d 749 (1980). Therefore, the threshold question is whether the cross-examination of Luntz accorded to defense counsel at trial satisfied the principle enunciated in Davis v. Alaska, supra.

The circumstantial evidence in this case is largely uncontested, but the parties differ as to the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it. "This court will construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's verdict and will affirm the conclusion of the trier of fact if it is reasonably supported by the evidence and the logical inferences drawn therefrom. State v. Perez, 182 Conn. 603, 606, 438 A.2d 1149 (1981); see, e.g., State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 503, 438 A.2d 749 (1980); State v. Festo, 181 Conn. 254, 259, 435 A.2d 38 (1980); State v. Avcollie, 178 Conn. 450, 466, 423 A.2d 118 (1979). Our review is the same whether the trier of fact is a judge, a panel of judges, or a jury.

Only relevant evidence may be elicited through cross-examination. State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 509, 438 A.2d 749 (1980). The court determines whether the evidence sought on cross-examination is relevant by determining whether that evidence renders the existence of [other facts] either certain or more probable. . . . State v. Kelly, 208 Conn. 365, 376, 545 A.2d 1048 (1988).

Because Braziel "was the state's key witness"; State v. Wilkes, supra, 37 Conn. App. 462; any limitation on his cross-examination is subject to the most rigorous appellate review. State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 250, 630 A.2d 577 (1993), on appeal after remand, 234 Conn. 683, 663 A.2d 339 (1995); State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 509 n. 7, 438 A.2d 749 (1980). We need address only briefly the first question in response to which the privilege was invoked, namely, whether Braziel had sold narcotics on Huron Street prior to his arrest on February 6, 1992.

Such an interest is the trial court's right, indeed, duty, to exclude irrelevant evidence. State v. Mastropetre, supra, 521; State v. Talton, supra, 283-85; State v. Randolph, 190 Conn. 576, 594, 462 A.2d 1011 (1983); State v. Johnson, [ 190 Conn. 541, 551, 461 A.2d 981 (1983)]; State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 509 n. 8, 438 A.2d 749 (1980)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

So far as probative force is concerned, there is no legal distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence. State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 506 n. 3, 438 A.2d 749 (1980). "Intent may be, and usually is, inferred from conduct."

"So far as probative force is concerned, there is no legal distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence." State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 506 n. 3, 438 A.2d 749 (1980). The facts underlying this claim of error are not in dispute; it is rather the resultant inferences drawn by the trier of fact that the defendant now challenges as improperly based on speculation and conjecture.

Such an interest is the trial court's "right, indeed, duty, to exclude irrelevant evidence." State v. Mastropetre, supra, 521; State v. Talton, supra, 283-85; State v. Randolph, 190 Conn. 576, 594, 462 A.2d 1011 (1983); State v. Johnson, supra, 551; State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 509 n. 8, 438 A.2d 749 (1980). Since the defendant failed to establish that the testimony he sought to elicit was relevant to a material issue in the case, he cannot complain that his constitutional rights were violated when that testimony was excluded.

This argument is not persuasive. "The law recognizes no distinction between circumstantial evidence and direct evidence so far as probative force is concerned. If evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, should convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused is guilty, that is all that is required for a conviction." State v. Smith, 138 Conn. 196, 200, 82 A.2d 816 (1951); see also State v. Davis, 283 Conn. 280, 330, 929 A.2d 278 (2007); State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 80, 905 A.2d 1101 (2006), cert. denied, U.S., 127 S. Ct. 1491, 167 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2007); State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 147, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 506 n. 3, 438 A.2d 749 (1980). The defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient "because the police failed to investigate the possibility of any other perpetrator for [these crimes]. . . .

"So far as probative force is concerned, there is no legal distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence." State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 506 n. 3, 438 A.2d 749 (1980). The facts underlying this claim are not in dispute.