We have for review Nemeth v. Department of Revenue, 686 So.2d 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), in which the district court certified the following question as one of great public importance: WHETHER DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE V. KUHNLEIN, 646 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1994), OVERRULED OR RECEDED FROM STATE EX REL. VICTOR CHEMICAL WORKS V. GAY, 74 SO. 2d 560 (Fla. 1954), TO THE EXTENT THAT VICTOR CHEMICAL HOLDS THAT THE RIGHT TO A REFUND OF TAXES IS BARRED IF THE TAXPAYER FAILS TO MAKE A TIMELY CLAIM FOR REFUND AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 215.26, FLORIDA STATUTES? Id. at 780.

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint with prejudice because they failed to allege that they had filed a claim for refund as required by section 215.26(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994). Appellants argue that Department of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1994) controls this case, and that State ex rel. Victor Chemical Works v. Gay, 74 So.2d 560 (Fla. 1954) does not apply to their claims. We agree and reverse and remand this cause for further proceedings.

" The Supreme Court of Florida in State ex rel. Victor Chemical Works v. Gay (Fla. 1954), 74 So.2d 560 likewise dealt with an issue similar to that before us, i.e., a taxpayer alleging that he could not file for a refund because he did not know his right to do so had accrued until the outcome of another party's litigation determined the legality of the tax. The Florida Supreme Court stated:

Turning specifically to Verizon’s NOL argument, Florida’s tax code includes a statute of non-claim that fixes a definitive three-year time period in which refunds can be requested for taxes or payments made in error: "Application for refunds as provided by this section must be filed with the Chief Financial Officer, except as otherwise provided in this subsection, within 3 years after the right to the refund has accrued or else the right is barred." § 215.26(2), Fla. Stat; Victor Chem. Works v. Gay, 74 So. 2d 560, 563 (Fla. 1954) (noting § 215.26 to be a statute of nonclaim that "while partaking of the nature of a statute of limitations is not wholly such. It constitutes part of the procedure of the court, … and, where no exemption from the provisions of a statute exist, the court is powerless to create one."

Under Florida law, the VPR generally prohibits actions for refunds of taxes voluntarily paid, absent a specific statutory remedy. See, e.g., State ex rel. Victor Chem. Works v. Gay, 74 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1954); Johnson v. Atkins, 32 So. 879 (Fla. 1902); City of Miami v. Florida Retail Fed'n, Inc., 423 So. 2d 991 (Fla. App. 1982). The United States argues that (1) the Court should find that the Transfers were made voluntarily, and (2) as such, under the VPR, there can be no action for recovery of the Transfers absent a provision in the law authorizing a refund (Mot. 6-7).

We have for review Miami Tiresoles, Inc. v. State Department of Revenue, 695 So.2d 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), in which the Third District certified the following question as one of great public importance: WHETHER DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE V. KUHNLEIN, 646 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1994), CERT. DENIED, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2608, 132 L.Ed.2d 853 (1995), OVERRULED OR RECEDED FROM STATE EX REL. VICTOR CHEMICAL WORKS V. GAY, 74 So.2d 560 (Fla. 1954)? Id. at 851.

Several cases are cited as authority for the above statement from the Third District opinion in this case. The only one relating to refund of taxes was State ex rel. Victor Chemical Works v. Gay, 1954 Fla., 74 So.2d 560, 46 A.L.R.2d 1340. There, this Court was concerned with a limitation or non-claim of one year in F.S. § 215.26, F.S.A., for filing claims for refunds of monies paid for taxes levied and collected under a statute subsequently held unconstitutional.

III. The law does not restrict the Commissioner merely to the face of the return in making additional assessments of income tax. McWilliams v. McKeigney, 227 Miss. 730, 86 So.2d 672. IV. Appellants, failing to request a hearing before the Commissioner within the time prescribed, have forfeited all rights to relief of any kind. Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co., 342 U.S. 197, 96 L.Ed. 225; State Ex Rel. Victor Chemical Works v. Gay (Fla.), 74 So.2d 560; United Advertising Corp. v. Lynch, 63 F.2d 243; Secs. 9220-25(1) — 9220-35, Code 1942; Griffith's Mississippi Chancery Practice (2d ed.), Sec. 24 p. 26. RODGERS, J.

The establishment of an exclusive remedy against the state for the recovery of taxes illegally collected is not an invasion of constitutional rights, if the remedy afforded is fair and adequate and does not deprive the taxpayer of procedural due process. Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 81 L.Ed. 1143, 57 S.Ct. 816 (1937); see, also, W. J. Sloane v. Commonwealth, 253 Mass. 529, 149 N.E. 407 (1925); Kleban v. Morris, 363 Mo. 7, 247 S.W.2d 832 (1952); State ex rel. Victor Chemical Works v. Gay (Fla.), 74 So.2d 560, 46 A.L.R. 2d 1340 (1954). The statute before us meets this test.

Where that is the case mandamus is permitted. State ex rel. Victor Chemical Works v. Gay, Fla., 74 So.2d 560, 562; State ex rel. Tampa Electric Co. v. Gay, Fla., 40 So.2d 225. See also State ex rel. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Gay, 160 Fla. 445, 35 So.2d 403. There are numerous other Florida cases to the same effect. There is another aspect of this case which we feel impelled to mention.