Opinion
No. 5-275 / 04-1513
Filed April 13, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Donald C. Nickerson, Judge.
Tina Gaston appeals, asserting her plea colloquy was defective. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Ralph Marasco, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Miller, JJ.
During Tina Gaston's plea and sentencing proceedings, the district court engaged in the colloquy required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)( b). Ms. Gaston asks that we vacate her conviction and sentence for the following alleged defect in the plea colloquy: the trial court's alleged failure to advise her she was waiving her right to confront witnesses against her. After reviewing for the correction of errors at law, see Iowa R. App. P. 6.4, we cannot agree.
The court did not use "confront" or "confrontation" during the plea colloquy; however, the State correctly notes trial courts are not required to use any magic words during plea proceedings. State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Iowa 2002). A court satisfies rule 2.8(2)( b) if the defendant is informed of the rights foregone by pleading guilty "in such a way that he is made aware of them." Id.
We conclude the trial court's exchange with Ms. Gaston complies with the applicable rule. The trial court informed her she was giving up her right, through her attorney, "to cross-examine witnesses" and "to object to potential exhibits." She indicated she understood. We conclude this exchange sufficiently informed her of her right to confront witnesses, as the right to cross-examine witnesses is "a primary interest" secured by the Confrontation Clause. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934, 937 (1965).
While including the magic word of "confrontation," in retrospect, might have been a better practice, the plea colloquy lacks a defect that would entitle Ms. Gaston to the relief she seeks. We affirm the judgment of the district court.