Opinion
I.D. 0107010230
Submitted: August 23, 2002
Decided: September 12, 2002
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS DENIED.
Colleen K. Norris, Caroline L. Cross, Deputy Attorneys General, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for the State.
J. Brendan O'Neill, James D. Nutter, Assistant Public Defenders, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for the Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant, Robert Garvey, was arrested on July 15, 2001 and subsequently charged with First Degree Felony Murder, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Robbery First Degree, Attempted Robbery First Degree, Conspiracy Second Degree, and two counts of Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon.
Defendant has filed a Motion to Suppress, asking that the Court suppress as evidence statements made by Defendant to police after his arrest. Defendant argues that the statements are inadmissible because he did not waive unequivocally his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights to remain silent and to representation by counsel. The Court held a hearing on June 22, 2002 to consider Defendant's motion This is the Court's decision on Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Both the State and the Defendant agree on the basic facts surrounding Defendant's police interview. Briefly, on July 15, 2001, City of Wilmington Police Officers arrested Defendant on suspicion of murder. After arresting Defendant, police officers transported him to headquarters and placed him in an interrogation room. An officer then advised Defendant of his Miranda rights. When police asked Defendant whether he agreed to waive his rights, Defendant responded by stating, "that depends on what you're asking me." After hearing Defendant's response, police proceeded to question Defendant. Defendant responded to those questions. Defendant's interview was videotaped and the Court has reviewed that videotape.
In support of his Motio n to Suppress, Defendant argues that, by responding, "that depends on what you're asking me," when police questioned Defendant whether he agreed to waive his rights, Defendant communicated to police that he was unsure whether he wanted to go forward with the interrogation. Therefore, Defendant argues, his words constituted an ambiguous assertion of his rights to counsel and against self-incrimination.
In response, the State argues that Defendant's statement does not constitute an ambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent. Rather, the State contends that, by responding, "that depends on what you're asking me," Defendant announced his intention to discriminate among the questions that were to be asked of him. The State argues that a reasonable police officer receiving that response would interpret it as meaning that the defendant expects to answer some questions and not others, contingent on what is being asked. In short, Defendant's statement falls short of indicating a general unwillingness to speak to police. The State also argues that Defendant did not ambiguously waive his right to counsel and that, in fact, Defendant did not indicate in any way that he wished to have representation by counsel.
It is well-settled that police may not conduct a custodial interrogation of a suspect without first obtaining the suspect's waiver of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. If the suspect, after knowingly and voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights, unambiguously states that he no longer wishes to continue to talk to police, all questioning must cease. However, in situations where a suspect's attempted invocation of his Miranda rights is not clear and unequivocal, the United States and Delaware constitutions provide differing levels of protection to the suspect.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-471 (1966).
Id. at 473-474.
Under federal law, if a suspect's invocation of his Miranda rights is not clear and unequivocal, police may continue to interrogate the suspect "until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney." Police are not required to ask questions to attempt to clarify the suspect's intent. However, the Delaware constitution provides additional protection to a suspect in such cases. As a matter of Delaware law, police must stop to clarify the suspect's intention to invoke his Miranda rights before continuing the interrogation.
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-462 (1994).
Id.
Draper v. State, Del. Supr., No. 147, 2000, Berger, J. (Jan. 28, 2002), Mem. Op. at 7; Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998); Crawford v. State, 580 A.2d 571, 576 (Del. 1990).
Specifically,
Where a suspect does not unequivocally invoke [the] right [to counsel], the police should be entitled to attempt to determine the suspect's intention. We thus endorse the clarification approach which may include . . . the repeating of Miranda warnings as a means of emphasizing the defendant's constitutional right to counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Del. Const. art. I, § 7. If, however, the police make additional inquiries concerning a suspect's intentions, the clarifying questions may not coerce or intimidate the suspect or otherwise discourage his effort to secure counsel, if that is his intention. Nor may the police tender any legal advice or attempt to dissuade the suspect from pursuing an intended course.
Draper, No. 147, 2000, at 7-8 (quoting Crawford, 580 A.2d at 577).
Draper acknowledged that the right to remain silent is subject to the same level of constitutional protection as the right to counsel.
Id. at 8 (citing Dodson v. State, 513 A.2d 761 (1986)).
Draper found that a suspect had ambiguously invoked his right to remain silent by stating that he wanted to talk to his mother before he spoke to police. Because the police were unable to obtain clarification, the suspect's videotaped statements made after the ambiguous innovation should have been suppressed. The Court finds that Defendant's statement in the instant case is distinguishable from Draper's insistence upon speaking to his mother before talking to police.
Id.
Id.
The Court cannot find that Defendant's response to the police inquiry whether he wished to waive his right to remain silent constituted equivocation on his part. Rather, the Court finds that by responding in a clear voice, "that depends on what you're asking me," Defendant merely indicated to police that he intended to choose which questions he intended to answer and what information he intended to share with police. Defendant answered the questions posed to him and did not state that he no longer wanted to talk to police. As a result, the Court cannot find that the police erred by failing to obtain clarification as to whether Defendant was attempting to invoke his right to counsel or to remain silent.
In conclusion, the Court finds that Defendant's post-arrest statements to police at issue in the Motion to Suppress are admissible as evidence against him. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is therefore DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.