ORCP 55 B(2)(c)(iii) allows mail service of a subpoena in some circumstances, and it imposes requirements for "valid" service, including that "the witness or, if applicable, the witness's parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem, signed the receipt more than 3 days before the date to appear and testify." Indeed, the legislature has long been on notice that, if it wants to impose a personal-signature requirement attendant to certified mail, it must do so expressly. In State v. Gartzke , 35 Or App 151, 153, 580 P.2d 1062 (1978), the sole issue on appeal was whether the defendant had "received notice" of the suspension of his driver's license as required by a particular statute. The statute allowed the Motor Vehicle Division to send a suspension notice by "certified mail, return receipt requested."

Defendant does not argue it did not. In State v. Gartzke, 35 Or. App. 151, 580 P.2d 1062 (1978), another driving while suspended case where defendant claimed lack of notice under former ORS 482.570, we said, "When the required procedure is followed, proof of it alone is sufficient evidence upon which to base a finding that defendant received notice of suspension of his driver's license." 35 Or App at 154.

See also Floyd v. Motor Vehicles Div., 27 Or. App. 41, 554 P.2d 1024 (1976); Boykin v. Ott, 10 Or. App. 210, 498 P.2d 815 (1972). But see State v. Buen, 13 Or. App. 426, 509 P.2d 865 (1973), and State v. Gartzke, 35 Or. App. 151, 580 P.2d 1062 (1978). Defendant further contends that "where constructive notice is required as a matter of due process, shifting the burden of proof on that issue to the defendant is unconstitutional," citing this court's decisions in State v. Stockett, 278 Or. 637, 565 P.2d 739 (1977), and State v. Stilling, 285 Or. 293, 590 P.2d 1223 (1979).

The state contends, nonetheless, that since the notice complies with the 1975 amendments to ORS 482.570 which were part of the Motor Vehicle Code revision in effect when defendant was charged, Chapter 451, Oregon Laws 1975, it was sufficient. We held in State v. Gartzke, 35 Or. App. 151, 580 P.2d 1062 (1978), that the validity of the notice for purposes of ORS 487.560(2)(b) is governed by the provisions of ORS 482.570 that were in effect on the date that the notice was given. Any other rule in that case would have led to the incongruous result of retroactively invalidating a notice of suspension that was valid at the time it was given. The state contends here, however, that the 1974 and 1975 notices to defendant ripened into effective notice by virtue of ORS 487.065(1), which provides: "Sections 2 to 169 of chapter 451, Oregon Laws 1975, shall govern the construction of punishment for any vehicle code offense defined in Oregon Laws, 1975, chapter 451, and committed after June 27, 1975, the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense and any administrative proceedings authorized or affected by chapter 451, Oregon Laws 1975."