Opinion
No. CR4-04-331927
November 22, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Following his conviction after a jury trial on four drug charges, the defendant seeks an order from the court returning $17,730 in cash that was seized from the defendant and the defendant's vehicle when he was arrested. The cash was admitted into evidence during the trial as probative of his intent to sell narcotics. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for return of seized property is denied.
I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The relevant facts, as the court finds them to be, and procedural history are as follows. The defendant was arrested on June 22, 2004, by the Waterbury Police Department after undercover Waterbury police officers observed the defendant engage in a hand-to-hand drug transaction at a convenience store in Waterbury. During the arrest of the defendant and the buyer of the drugs, the police seized a significant amount of cocaine and marijuana.
The police officers also seized approximately $3,220 in cash from the person of the defendant, along with an additional $14,510 in cash that was located in two shoe boxes in the Lexus automobile that the defendant had driven to the scene. At the time of the arrest the defendant was on parole for a 1997 drug conviction and in fact had only been released from prison just a few months before the date of his arrest. The defendant was not employed at the time and no plausible explanation was offered as to how the defendant could have lawfully possessed the large amount of cash and the Lexus.
The defendant was subsequently charged with: (1) possession with intent to sell narcotics, General Statutes § 21a-278(a); (2) possession with intent to sell narcotics within a school zone, General Statutes § 21a-278a(b); (3) possession with intent to sell a controlled substance, General Statutes § 21a-277(b); and (4) possession with intent to sell a controlled substance within a school zone, General Statutes § 21a-278a(b).
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent the state from admitting into evidence the cash seized from the defendant and his vehicle. The defendant argued that the probative value of that evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The court denied the motion in limine, concluding that the cash was probative of the defendant's participation in narcotics sales and therefore was relevant to his intent to sell drugs, an element of the crimes charged here. The court also concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence did not outweigh its probative value. The cash was subsequently admitted into evidence at trial.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all four counts against the defendant. Based in part on the defendant's lengthy criminal record, which included multiple prior convictions for the sale of narcotics, the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of incarceration of thirty-one years.
At his sentencing, the defendant filed this motion for return of seized property. In light of the court's factual finding that the $17,730 constitutes proceeds of an illegal drug transaction, and for the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied. The court hereby orders that the $17,730 should be forfeited to the state upon final disposition of this case, including any direct appeal of the underlying convictions.
II ANALYSIS
The defendant claims that he is entitled to the return of the seized cash because the cash belongs to him and the state failed to file a timely asset forfeiture action pursuant to General Statutes § 54-36h. The state asserts that this court has discretionary authority, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-36a(c), to dispose of property following the completion of a criminal case and that this authority is not circumscribed by the state's failure to file a timely civil forfeiture action.
It is long established in Connecticut that the court has inherent and common-law authority to dispose of property, including cash, seized and detained as evidence in a criminal case. See Bruchal v. Smith, 109 Conn. 316, 320-21, 146 A. 491 (1929) (Courts have inherent power to direct that property taken or detained as evidence in a criminal case, including money, "be returned to the owner, delivered up on his order or otherwise disposed of, when it is no longer required for the purposes of justice."). More recently, this long-standing, inherent power has been codified in General Statutes § 54-36a(c), which provides in relevant part: "Unless such seized property is stolen property and is ordered returned pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, or unless such property is adjudicated a nuisance in accordance with section 54-33g, or unless the court finds that such property shall be forfeited or is contraband . . . it shall, at the final disposition of the criminal action . . . order the return of the property to its owner." (Emphasis added.) The court's power to make a determination that the property be forfeited is not limited by any language in § 54-36a requiring that the underlying forfeiture be determined in a civil in rem proceeding.
Similarly, there is nothing in the language of § 54-36h, the civil in rem statute, that would suggest that a civil in rem proceeding is the sole and exclusive method by which drug proceeds, seized as evidence in a criminal case, may be forfeited to the state or that the legislature in any way intended to limit the common-law authority of a criminal court to dispose of property properly at the end of the case.
Indeed, an explication of the underlying purpose of a civil in rem proceeding makes clear that such a proceeding is meant to supplement, rather than displace, the traditional authority of a criminal court to dispose of property at the conclusion of the criminal matter. A proceeding brought pursuant to General Statutes § 54-36h is, by its own terms, "a civil suit in equity." Unlike the criminal action itself, the standard of proof is "clear and convincing evidence." Id. This statute is intended to permit the seizure and forfeiture of more than just the cash that may exchange hands in drug transaction. The statute sweeps broadly and permits the seizure and forfeiture of " [a]ll property constituting the proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, from any sale or exchange of any controlled substance . . .". . ." General Statutes § 54-36h(a)(2) (Emphasis added.). Consequently, an expensive yacht owned by the defendant that was purchased with profits from the sale of narcotics can be seized and forfeited in an in rem proceeding even though the yacht itself might not be seized and used as evidence in the underlying criminal case.
The defendant has not pointed to any language in either of the two statutes that would suggest that, in enacting the in rem forfeiture statute, the legislature intended to limit the court's inherent authority to dispose of seized property at the end of the criminal case. To the extent that there is any latent ambiguity in these provisions, the legislative history makes clear that these two statutes are to operate in tandem, even in cases involving seized cash from drug transactions. As Senator Avallone remarked in supporting passage of the in rem statute: "This bill creates th[e] vehicle that . . . local and state police will be able to, under specific circumstances, take the assets related to drug sales so that condo, and that [Jaguar] or that expensive car or cash for that matter, that can directly be related to the sale of drugs, in the possession of that individual may be forfeited . . .
"This system parallels with the criminal process." 32 S. Proc., Pt. 10, 1989 Sess., 3504-05, Remarks of Senator Anthony V. Avallone.
It is well established that when construing statutes, "we will avoid constructions that lead to absurd, unworkable or bizarre results." In re Flanagan, 240 Conn. 157, 183, 690 A.2d 865, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 865 (1997); see also General Statutes § 1-2z. The defendant's suggestion that, even after a defendant is convicted on drug charges following a plea or a trial in which the defendant's guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the cash proceeds from the underlying drug sales must be returned to the drug dealer unless the state has filed a civil in rem proceeding would lead to absurd and unworkable results. Under this scenario, in order to prevent criminal defendants from retaining their drug profits, the state would be obligated to file a civil action following virtually every drug arrest in the state, at least after every arrest in which cash was seized as evidence of drug activity. Such a requirement would obviously burden our court system, create unnecessary inefficiencies and serve no useful public purpose. The court therefore declines the defendant's request to interpret § 54-36h to require such a result.
Finally, the defendant fails to cite any case law authority supporting his claim. Although the precise claim raised by the defendant has not been squarely addressed by any Connecticut courts, the Connecticut Supreme Court, see Bruchal v. Smith, supra, 109 Conn. 316 at 320-21, and other states have recognized the broad authority of a court presiding over a criminal prosecution to forfeit and dispose of evidence seized in the case. See, e.g., Garmire v. Red Lake, 265 So.2d 2, 4 (Fla. 1972) (Criminal court "has inherent authority and jurisdiction to determine the disposition of the subject money confiscated temporarily for evidentiary purposes."); State v. Guazelman, 200 Kan. 12, 13-14, 434 P.2d 543 (1967) (holding that money paid as a bribe must be forfeited in criminal case even in the absence of a forfeiture statute). Indeed, some courts have directly held that there is concurrent jurisdiction to consider forfeiture as part of the criminal matter or as a separate civil matter. See, e.g., State ex rel Haas v. One 1965 Ford Automobile, Licence No. HBH 029, 19 Ore.App. 879, 883, 529 A.2d 410 (Or.Ct.App. 1974); but see State v. Alaway, 64 Wn.App. 796, 828 P2d. 591 Wash.Ct.App.), cert. denied 119 Wn.2d 1016 (1992).
Accordingly, the motion for return of seized property is denied and the seized cash is ordered forfeited to the state after final disposition of this matter, including any direct appeal, of the underlying convictions.