Opinion
No. 56244-4-I.
May 1, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Whatcom County, No. 04-1-011403-8, Ira Uhrig, J., entered April 26, 2005.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Gregory Charles Link, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave Ste 701, Seattle, WA 98101-3635.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Royce Scott Buckingham, Attorney at Law, Whatcom Co Prosc Atty Ofc, 311 Grand Ave, Bellingham, WA 98225-4048.
Hilary A. Thomas, Whatcom County Prosecutors Office, 311 Grand Ave Ste 201, Bellingham, WA 98225-4038.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Juan Manuel Garcia appeals the trial court's order of restitution for medical and time loss payments by the Department of Labor and Industries arising from Garcia's assault of a health care assistant at her work. He argues the trial court abused its discretion and denied him due process when it ordered restitution without sufficient evidence or proof that he caused the disputed damages. We affirm.
FACTS
Juan Manuel Garcia pleaded guilty to one count of assault in the third degree. Garcia stipulated to the affidavit of probable cause, which states that on August 25, 2004, he intentionally assaulted a health care assistant in the performance of her duties. Garcia blocked the victim's path, grabbed her breast, ran his hand over her chest, and grabbed her hand and rubbed his fingers against her palm. At sentencing, the court imposed nine months incarceration, and reserved the issue of restitution.
At the initial restitution hearing, the prosecutor informed the court that as a result of this crime the victim, who had previously been sexually assaulted, experienced severe depression, had to take medical leave from work, was hospitalized twice, and needed counseling and medications for her depression. The prosecutor submitted Department of Labor and Industries documentation itemizing payments the Department made to the victim and her health care providers. It stated that the payments were related to the victim's injury, which occurred on August 25, 2004.
Garcia argued that he should not be responsible for expenses related to past trauma and that the Department's documentation was neither sworn nor clear. The prosecutor responded that he was prepared to present testimony through his office's Victim Witness Coordinator to explain the documentation. The trial court then granted Garcia's request for a continuance to review the documentation and to discuss it with the State's witness.
At the subsequent hearing, the prosecutor presented testimony from Victim Witness Coordinator Wilva Foster. Foster testified that she spoke with the Department's third party adjudicator about the Department's claim for reimbursement of payments to the victim of Garcia's crime. The Department established that the victim was injured at work on August 25, 2004, and it paid worker's compensation to the victim during her medical leave after that date. The Department also paid for related medical treatments, including psychological counseling, medications, and two hospitalizations for severe depression and suicidal ideation. Foster also testified that the Department paid for vocational return-to-work assessments that the victim needed as a result of the assault. These costs totaled $14,961.09, which the State requested Garcia be ordered to pay.
Defense counsel cross-examined Foster, who conceded that she did not have first-hand knowledge of the victim's injuries, time loss from work, or medical treatments. The defense did not otherwise rebut the State's evidence, nor did it call other witnesses. The defense then argued that Foster's testimony regarding the Department's documentation, and the documentation itself, were hearsay, and not substantial credible evidence. The defense also argued that the State failed to show a sufficient causal connection between the crime charged and the restitution.
The court entered an order of restitution for $10,592.32 in time loss and $4,368.77 in medical costs, for a total of $14,961.09. Garcia appeals.
ANALYSIS
Garcia argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay restitution, contending that the State did not prove that an injury had resulted from his offense, and thus no amount of restitution could be imposed. He also contends that the trial court infringed on his due process rights by relying on the State's hearsay evidence.
We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion. State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d 675, 679, 974 P.2d 828 (1999). A trial court abuses its discretion when the court exercises its discretion in a manifestly unreasonable manner or based upon untenable grounds. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d at 679-80.
The court may order restitution when a defendant has been convicted of an offense that caused damage to, or loss of, property. RCW 9.94A.753(5). Restitution is appropriate where a causal connection exists between the crime and the injuries for which compensation is sought. State v. Vinyard, 50 Wn. App. 888, 893, 751 P.2d 339 (1988). The trial court's restitution award must be "based on easily ascertainable damages." RCW 9.94A.753(3). But the damages "need not be established with specific accuracy." State v. Fleming, 75 Wn. App. 270, 274, 877 P.2d 243 (1994). "Evidence supporting restitution `"`is sufficient if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not subject the trier of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.'"'" State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 154, 110 P.3d 192 (2005) (quoting Fleming, 75 Wn. App. at 274). The court may consider the factual basis for the plea in determining whether restitution should be ordered. State v. Landrum, 66 Wn. App. 791, 799-800, 832 P.2d 1359 (1992). Initially, we reject Garcia's claim that his due process rights were violated by the trial court's admission of hearsay evidence. Evidence rules do not apply to restitution hearings. State v. Kisor, 68 Wn. App. 610, 620, 844 P.2d 1038 (1993); ER 1101(c)(3). In order to satisfy due process, the defendant must have an opportunity to refute the evidence presented and the evidence presented must be reliable. Kisor, 68 Wn. App. at 620. Accordingly, although Foster's testimony and the Department documentation were hearsay, they were reliable, and therefore properly admitted for the purpose of determining restitution. Kisor, 68 Wn. App. at 620; Zipp v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, 36 Wn. App. 598, 601, 676 P.2d 538 (1984) (to establish a compensable claim under worker's compensation, it must be more probable than not that the industrial injury caused the disability); Dep't of Labor Indus. v. Kantor, 94 Wn. App. 764, 783, 973 P.2d 30 (1999) ("L I has broad statutory authority to decide claims for workers' compensation and to ensure that workers receive only `proper and necessary medical and surgical services.'").
Moreover, we find that the record in this case was sufficient to establish the necessary causal connection between Garcia's assault of the victim and her subsequent medical leave from work and medical treatment. The affidavit of probable cause constitutes uncontested evidence that Garcia assaulted the victim on August 25, 2004. The State presented documentation detailing the payments made by the Department for time loss and medical treatment related to the injury sustained on August 25, 2004. The victim witness coordinator testified in detail about the Department's payments. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by making reasonable inferences regarding the causal connection between the crime and expenses. State v. Pierson, 105 Wn. App. 160, 168, 18 P.3d 1154 (2001); see also State v. Dennis, 101 Wn. App. 223, 6 P.3d 1173 (2000) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution for victim's claim based upon letters from Victim Assistance Unit and a workers compensation claims specialist). The documents the court considered provided sufficient details to elevate the proof beyond the realm of conjecture and speculation.
Garcia was given an opportunity to rebut the State's evidence at the restitution hearing, in addition to being given a continuance to investigate the Department's documentation. Garcia's attorney did cross-examine the State's witness, but all he attempted to establish was that the coordinator's testimony was based on hearsay from the Department's adjustor and the timing of the hospitalizations. Garcia has not satisfied his burden of showing that the court's restitution order was manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. We affirm the restitution order.
DWYER, BECKER and COX, JJ., concur.