From this evidence, the jury was free to infer that the defendant constructively possessed the drugs. See State v. Gonzalo Moran Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 242358, at *35 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Feb. 20, 2002) ("[A] defendant's ownership or control over a vehicle in which the contraband is secreted will support a finding of constructive possession and, hence, knowing possession."
In Tennessee, "requests for driver's licenses and vehicle registration documents, inquiries concerning travel plans and vehicle ownership, computer checks, and the issuance of citations are investigative methods or activities consistent with the lawful scope of any traffic stop." State v. Gonzalo Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 242358, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Feb. 20, 2002) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2003). After hearing the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the trial court concluded that "the period of detention was reasonable."
" State v. Harris, 280 S.W.3d 832, 840 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Gonzalo Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 242358, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2002), overruled on other grounds by State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2003)).
However, this Court has previously held that "requests for driver's licenses and vehicle registration documents, inquiries concerning travel plans and vehicle ownership, computer checks, and the issuance of citations are investigative methods or activities consistent with the lawful scope of any traffic stop." State v. Gonzalo Moran Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 242358, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2002) (citing United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 268 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Lyton, 161 F.3d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1998)), rev'd on other grounds by State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2003). On appeal, Mansfield contends that he was visibly calm in the recording of the traffic stop and that nothing otherwise supported his continued detention.
State v. Harris, 280 S.W.3d 832, 840 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Gonzalo Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 242358, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2002), overruled on other grounds by State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2003)).
"'[R]equests for driver's licenses and vehicle registration documents, inquiries concerning travel plans and vehicle ownership, computer checks, and the issuance of citations are investigative methods or activities consistent with the lawful scope of any traffic stop.'" State v. Harris, 280 S.W.3d 832, 840 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Gonzalo Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 242358, at *22 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2002), reversed on other grounds by State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2003)). A driver who is stopped for a traffic violation "should expect 'to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way.'"
In Tennessee, "requests for driver's licenses and vehicle registration documents, inquiries concerning travel plans and vehicle ownership, computer checks, and the issuance of citations are investigative methods or activities consistent with the lawful scope of any traffic stop." State v. Gonzalo Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 242358, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Feb. 20, 2002) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2003). Defendant contends that the "officers exceeded the scope of the stop by the continued detention.
In the context of determining whether investigative methods run afoul of the Fourth Amendment and article 1, section 7, this Court has stated that "requests for driver's licenses and vehicle registration documents, inquiries concerning travel plans and vehicle ownership, computer checks, and the issuance of citations are investigative methods or activities consistent with the lawful scope of any traffic stop." State v. Gonzalo Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 242358 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 20, 2002) (citing United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000)), rev'd on other grounds, 123 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2003). A law enforcement officer making a constitutionally permissible traffic stop must not prolong the stop for longer than necessary to process the traffic violation without having a reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity sufficient to warrant prolonging the stop.
A defendant can constructively possess contraband found in a vehicle the defendant is driving, even if the vehicle belongs to another person. State v. Gonzalo Moran Garcia, No. M2000–01760–CCA–R3–CD, 2002 WL 242358, at *35 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Nashville, Feb. 20, 2002), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335, 342 (Tenn.2003) (“defendant's ownership or control over a vehicle in which the contraband is secretedwill support a finding of constructive possession”); State v. Brown, 915 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995) (“Knowledge may be inferred from control over the vehicle in which the contraband is secreted.”).
In Tennessee, "requests for driver's licenses and vehicle registration documents, inquiries concerning travel plans and vehicle ownership, computer checks, and the issuance of citations are investigative methods or activities consistent with the lawful scope of any traffic stop." State v. Gonzalo Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 242358, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Feb. 20, 2002) (citations omitted),overruled on other grounds by Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335. With this in mind, however, when an officer observes certain misdemeanors, such as a operating a vehicle in excess of the speed limit, the officer shall issue a citation for the violation in lieu of arresting the misdemeanant. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-8-152,-10-207(a)(1).