Judges regularly enter orders in domestic violence cases and other matters that bar defendants from contacting witnesses, victims, and others. In State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 989 A.2d 256 (2010), the Court held that violations of no-contact orders -- even if issued as part of a pretrial release order -- can serve as a basis for contempt charges. That precedent remains firmly in place.
We first consider the language of the statute because the statutory language is "the best indicator" of legislative intent. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176, 989 A.2d 256 (2010) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005) ). We must interpret the words of a statute in accordance with "their ordinary meaning and significance."
Instead, according to the State, the Legislature intended "to target and punish those who purposely or knowingly engage in sexual conduct when that conduct is directed at a child, and is of the type that a reasonable person would view as tending to impair or debauch that child's morals." Last, by analogy, the State points to State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 170, 989 A.2d 256 (2010), in which the Supreme Court construed the version of the stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, that was in effect at the time of the defendant's trial. The Court held that the State was required only to prove that a defendant engaged in a course of repeated stalking conduct that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death.
[ N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5 (emphasis added).] In State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 989 A.2d 256 (2010), our Supreme Court interpreted a substantially similar "reasonable person" feature in the stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10. The defendant argued the jury instruction on the stalking charge "was insufficient because it did not explicitly require the jury to find that a defendant had the conscious object to induce, or awareness that his conduct would cause, fear of bodily injury or death in his victim.
Verdicts in criminal cases must be unanimous. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const., art. 1, ¶ 9; R. 1:8-9; State v. Gandhi 201 N.J. 161, 192-93, 989 A.2d 256 (2010); R. 1:8-9. General charges on unanimity are insufficient where there is the risk of jury confusion or a fragmented verdict.
In State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010), our Supreme Court interpreted a substantially similar "reasonable person" feature in the stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10. The defendant argued the jury instruction on the stalking 18 charge "was insufficient because it did not explicitly require the jury to find that a defendant had the conscious object to induce, or awareness that his conduct would cause, fear of bodily injury or death in his victim.
State v. Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. 530, 555 (App. Div. 2011) (citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 193 (2008)). Courts are required to provide "'specific unanimity' instructions — that is, impose a requirement that the jury unanimously agree on the facts underlying the guilty verdict — when there is a specific request for those instructions and where there exists a danger of a fragmented verdict."
Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 364, 471 A.2d 370. This inquiry is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176, 989 A.2d 256 (2010). Thus, the interpretation and application of N.J.S.A. 2C:44–5(a)(2) presents an issue of law that we review de novo. Hudson, supra, 209 N.J. at 529, 39 A.3d 150.
Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 364–65, 471 A.2d 370. Generally, the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies in appellate sentencing review, see State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297, 997 A.2d 194 (2010); State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 180, 966 A.2d 473 (2009), but questions of law are reviewed de novo, see State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176, 989 A.2d 256 (2010) (noting that legal conclusions of trial or intermediate appellate court in sentencing context are reviewed de novo). Thus, the sentencing court's interpretation and application of N.J.S.A. 2C:44–5, in respect of whether multiple extended terms were permissible when imposed on defendant in separate proceedings at different times, raises an issue of law that we review de novo.
Our review is further focused because, although specific unanimity instructions-mandating unanimous agreement by the jurors "on the facts underlying the guilty verdict"-should be provided "when there is a specific request for those instructions and where there exists a danger of a fragmented verdict, the failure to provide a specific unanimity instruction in the absence of such a request will not necessarily constitute reversible error." State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 192-93 (2010) (citation omitted). "The core question is, in light of the allegations made and the statute charged, whether the instructions as a whole [posed] a genuine risk that the jury [would be] confused."