State v. Gandhi

490 Citing cases

  1. State v. McCray

    243 N.J. 196 (N.J. 2020)   Cited 20 times

    Judges regularly enter orders in domestic violence cases and other matters that bar defendants from contacting witnesses, victims, and others. In State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 989 A.2d 256 (2010), the Court held that violations of no-contact orders -- even if issued as part of a pretrial release order -- can serve as a basis for contempt charges. That precedent remains firmly in place.

  2. State v. McCray

    458 N.J. Super. 473 (App. Div. 2019)   Cited 3 times
    Noting that "[t]he goal of the criminal contempt statute[, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a),] is to promote compliance with judicial orders by punishing those who purposely or knowingly fail to comply with those orders"

    We first consider the language of the statute because the statutory language is "the best indicator" of legislative intent. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176, 989 A.2d 256 (2010) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005) ). We must interpret the words of a statute in accordance with "their ordinary meaning and significance."

  3. State v. Bryant

    419 N.J. Super. 15 (App. Div. 2011)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that the mens rea requirement of the child endangerment statute applies only to the engaging in sexual conduct element of the offense

    Instead, according to the State, the Legislature intended "to target and punish those who purposely or knowingly engage in sexual conduct when that conduct is directed at a child, and is of the type that a reasonable person would view as tending to impair or debauch that child's morals." Last, by analogy, the State points to State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 170, 989 A.2d 256 (2010), in which the Supreme Court construed the version of the stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, that was in effect at the time of the defendant's trial. The Court held that the State was required only to prove that a defendant engaged in a course of repeated stalking conduct that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death.

  4. State v. Hill

    474 N.J. Super. 366 (App. Div. 2023)   Cited 2 times

    [ N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5 (emphasis added).] In State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 989 A.2d 256 (2010), our Supreme Court interpreted a substantially similar "reasonable person" feature in the stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10. The defendant argued the jury instruction on the stalking charge "was insufficient because it did not explicitly require the jury to find that a defendant had the conscious object to induce, or awareness that his conduct would cause, fear of bodily injury or death in his victim.

  5. State v. Tindell

    417 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 2011)   Cited 88 times
    Holding the State's burden requires it establish the vehicle in the defendant's possession was stolen

    Verdicts in criminal cases must be unanimous. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const., art. 1, ¶ 9; R. 1:8-9; State v. Gandhi 201 N.J. 161, 192-93, 989 A.2d 256 (2010); R. 1:8-9. General charges on unanimity are insufficient where there is the risk of jury confusion or a fragmented verdict.

  6. State v. Hill

    No. A-4544-19 (App. Div. Jan. 23, 2023)

    In State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010), our Supreme Court interpreted a substantially similar "reasonable person" feature in the stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10. The defendant argued the jury instruction on the stalking 18 charge "was insufficient because it did not explicitly require the jury to find that a defendant had the conscious object to induce, or awareness that his conduct would cause, fear of bodily injury or death in his victim.

  7. State v. Gil

    DOCKET NO. A-3725-14T4 (App. Div. Dec. 12, 2016)

    State v. Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. 530, 555 (App. Div. 2011) (citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 193 (2008)). Courts are required to provide "'specific unanimity' instructions — that is, impose a requirement that the jury unanimously agree on the facts underlying the guilty verdict — when there is a specific request for those instructions and where there exists a danger of a fragmented verdict."

  8. State v. Robinson

    217 N.J. 594 (N.J. 2014)   Cited 150 times
    Holding that "[w]hen a provision of [our criminal code] is modeled after the MPC [Model Penal Code], it is appropriate to consider the MPC and any commentary to interpret the intent of the statutory language"

    Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 364, 471 A.2d 370. This inquiry is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176, 989 A.2d 256 (2010). Thus, the interpretation and application of N.J.S.A. 2C:44–5(a)(2) presents an issue of law that we review de novo. Hudson, supra, 209 N.J. at 529, 39 A.3d 150.

  9. State v. Hudson

    209 N.J. 513 (N.J. 2012)   Cited 125 times
    Noting that third degree aggravated assault under N.J. Stat. Ann.. § 2C:12–1(b) was a lesser included offense of second degree aggravated assault

    Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 364–65, 471 A.2d 370. Generally, the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies in appellate sentencing review, see State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297, 997 A.2d 194 (2010); State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 180, 966 A.2d 473 (2009), but questions of law are reviewed de novo, see State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176, 989 A.2d 256 (2010) (noting that legal conclusions of trial or intermediate appellate court in sentencing context are reviewed de novo). Thus, the sentencing court's interpretation and application of N.J.S.A. 2C:44–5, in respect of whether multiple extended terms were permissible when imposed on defendant in separate proceedings at different times, raises an issue of law that we review de novo.

  10. State v. Lyon

    No. A-4583-18 (App. Div. Jul. 13, 2021)

    Our review is further focused because, although specific unanimity instructions-mandating unanimous agreement by the jurors "on the facts underlying the guilty verdict"-should be provided "when there is a specific request for those instructions and where there exists a danger of a fragmented verdict, the failure to provide a specific unanimity instruction in the absence of such a request will not necessarily constitute reversible error." State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 192-93 (2010) (citation omitted). "The core question is, in light of the allegations made and the statute charged, whether the instructions as a whole [posed] a genuine risk that the jury [would be] confused."