A written judgment and sentence, by contrast, is a final order subject to appeal. See State v. Gallegos, 69 Wash.2d 586, 587–88, 419 P.2d 326 (1966) (judgment and sentence “was self-executing and was the final order in this case”). Our court rules reflect this distinction: the superior court's authority to modify a judgment is limited by CrR 7.8 and, if a party appeals, RAP 7.2(e) ; a trial court's oral rulings are not subject to the same limitations.
Generally, a trial court loses authority to change a previously imposed sentence following a finding of guilt. In re Shriner, 95 Wn.2d 541, 627 P.2d 99 (1981); State v. Sampson, 82 Wn.2d 663, 513 P.2d 60 (1973); State v. Gallegos, 69 Wn.2d 586, 419 P.2d 326 (1966); State ex rel. Schock v. Barnett, 42 Wn.2d 929, 259 P.2d 404 (1953); State v. Cirkovich, 42 Wn. App. 403, 406, 711 P.2d 374 (1985), review denied, 106 Wn.2d 1005 (1986). Also, it has been held a trial court is without authority to modify its sentence under CR 60(b)(11) based on changes in a defendant's situation which have occurred since entry of judgment.
The imposition of sentence after a finding of guilty makes a case final, State v. Siglea, 196 Wn. 283, 82 P.2d 583 (1938); Tembruell v. Seattle, 64 Wn.2d 503, 392 P.2d 453 (1964), and the court thereafter has no power to change its sentence. State v. Gallegos, 69 Wn.2d 586, 419 P.2d 326 (1966); State ex rel. Schock v. Barnett, 42 Wn.2d 929, 259 P.2d 404 (1953). We hold that the juvenile court also lacks authority to modify its sentence under the circumstances presented here.